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AN ANALYSIS OF CARE AND ITS ROLE IN MORAL EDUCATION

BY

DEBRA SHOGAN

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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For my parents

ABSTRACT

Moral education literature has focused primarily on the formal features of morality while neglecting content, moral motivation and the emotional dimensions of the moral life. Those writers who have attempted to include these in their accounts have usually done so by equating benevolence with moral care and excluding any reference to justice. Moreover, there has been a tendency by some of these writers to reject analysis as a means to a philosophical understanding of morality. Consequently, the features of the affective dimension of morality have not been rigorously marked out by those who have proposed alternatives to traditional moral education.

In this work I analyze the concept of moral care in order to make the concept more clear and in order to determine its role in moral education. I argue that benevolence and justice are character trait components of moral care. I distinguish benevolence as moral care from justice as moral care with respect to situations for which each is appropriate, with respect to moral motivation, and with respect to moral response. I discuss a number of factors which can affect both the motivation for moral care and consequently the caring response. Finally, I examine how moral education might attempt to include the development of moral care.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The moral education literature has been influenced by those whose view of the nature of the mind emphasizes rationality, consistency, impartiality, and universality. This view of the mind neglects the emotions, wants, desires and other affective elements which are thought to be controlled by the mind while not being central to it. According to this orthodox position, someone is morally educated if he or she understands the formal features of morality which include moral reasons, moral language, and procedural principles. The formal features rather than the content of morality are emphasized to ensure that moral education will remain neutral with respect to substantive moral disputes. Formal features of morality are those which constitute the "how" of a moral response. Content of morality constitutes the "what" of a moral response.

> . . . the distinction between a content-criterion and a form-criterion is that the former is formulated in terms of the verb, thus spelling out a concrete, specific act (the content) while the latter is formulated in terms of the adverb thus leaving the concrete specific act, ie., the verb, open to be determined by whether it can exemplify (the form) or not. To be ethically approved in the case of the form-criterion the act must exemplify the form expressed in the criterion and any content, ie., specific, concrete act, will do as long as its form corresponds to the form specified in the criterion. What is required of the procedure of application here, therefore, is the search for a concrete act that would fulfill the form specified in the criterion. Once this is found, the concrete ethical act becomes an exemplification of the criterion.[1]

Moreover, according to the proponents of formal features, the motivation to respond morally is built into the understanding of formal features.

It is my purpose in this chapter to outline the formal view of moral education by presenting the views of R. S. Peters, R. M. Hare, John Wilson, the authors of the Association of Values Education and Research (A. V. E. R.) program, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Orthodox moral education has also been influenced by an approach which stresses reflecting upon one's life goals or clarifying one's values. I examine the Reflective Ultimate

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[1]Manfred Vogel, "Buber's Ethics and Contemporary Ethical Options," Philosophy Today 13 (1969): 4-5.

Life Goals Approach of Clive Beck and the Values Clarification Program as representative of this approach. I then contrast these orthodox approaches in moral education with an alternative view which contends that, if moral living is to be understood, we must account for emotions, desires, character, beliefs, and abilities. According to this position, understanding the formal features of morality is not sufficient for moral education; the individual must care that others are treated well and want to do something about the ways in which others are treated. It will be my purpose to become more clear about what 'care' is. In the latter part of this chapter I describe how the study is organized for an analysis of 'care' and for subsequent exploration of the ways in which moral education might account for 'care'.

Orthodox Moral Education

Understanding Reasons, Procedures, Language

Peters argues that moral discourse presupposes certain principles which are "necessary for {the discourse} to have meaning, to be applied or to have point."[2] According to Peters, if one is to be morally educated, one must understand the principles which constitute morality. The principles of morality are those which are presupposed when someone seriously asks, "what ought I to do?" The principles which are presupposed by the serious asking of this question are impartiality, consideration of interests, freedom, respect for persons, and truth-telling.[3] For example, the principle of impartiality is justified, according to Peters, because anyone seriously asking, "what ought I to do?" asks for a reason. Fundamental to asking for a reason is the recognition that what ought to be done in any situation or by any person ought to be done in any other situation or by any other person, unless there is some relevant difference in the situation or person in question.[4] To ask, "what ought I to do?" also

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[2]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 115.
[3]R. S. Peters, "Moral Principles and Moral Education," The Domain of Moral Education, eds. D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazipedes (Toronto: O. I. S. E. Press, 1979), p. 197.
[4]Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 13-20.

presupposes that there is freedom to answer the question and that whoever is asked the question is a person who is respected as a separate valuable entity capable of choice.[5]

Peters claims that, if someone voluntarily participates in an activity, that individual will act in light of an understanding of the rules which constitute the activity.[6] When someone voluntarily participates in an activity, it is assumed that, if the person wants something and knows how to get it, means will be taken to achieve it.[7] This is a logical point: because activities are constituted by their rules, if someone is involved in a particular activity, the individual must be following the rules of that activity.

Moral rules have legislative, judicial, and executive functions, says Peters. He contends that the 'character' of the child "emerges as the particular style of rule-following which he develops."[8] Moral education has a role to play in the development of all three functions. The legislative function of moral education is to introduce to the child reasons for the rules so that the child can eventually assume the legislative function. This involves developing habits which allow second-order habits of assessment to develop so that children come to see that rules are backed by reasons which justify them. Children must "acquire a firm foundation of basic rules in a manner which does not incapacitate them for rational rule-following at a later stage."[9] The judicial function of rules is the ability to apply the rules one understands to a particular case so that one is able to indicate that this is an instance in which the rule is to be applied. The executive function is the ability to act on one's legislative and judicial understanding of a particular rule.

Because young children are not likely to recognize that a rule is backed by reasons which justify it, Peters says that there is a paradox of moral education in which "the palace of

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[5]Donald Arnstine, "Review Article - The Cartography of Education: R. S. Peters' Ethics and Education", Educational Theory 18 (1968): 190.
[6]R. S. Peters, "Motivation, Emotion, and the Conceptual Schemes of Common Sense," Psychology and Ethical Development (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 97.
[7]Peters, p. 97.
[8]R. S. Peters, "Moral Education and the Psychology of Character," in Moral Development and Moral Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 33.
[9]Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 134.

reason has to be entered by the courtyard of habit."[10] If the process is to be education, the habits must be acquired in such a way that the child is not indoctrinated. Morality, says Peters, can be both habitual and rational because habits do not have to be reflexive. Indeed, as Peters indicates, "life would be very exhausting if, in moral situations, we always had to reflect, debate, and make decisions."[11] This is an important point which I shall discuss again later.

> {Rules}can be taught in such a way that children gradually come to see the similarity between actions like that of lying and cheating. Parents can relate rules to their point even if children do not yet grasp the idea that their validity depends on their point. And, surely, drawing attention to the consequences of their actions will help them to understand that actions have consequences. This at least will prepare the way for the stage when they grasp that the reasons for some rules of action depend upon consequences.[12]

Since young children cannot understand the form of morality, they must be given specific rules of conduct. These rules must be presented in such a way, says Peters, as to encourage the rational understanding of the rules when the child is capable.

Peters indicates that someone "may know what he ought to do in general and have the judgment to see that a rule applies to his particular case; yet he may ruthlessly and doggedly do what he knows to be wrong."[13] This is inconsistent with his claim that one will act in light of one's understanding of rules if one voluntarily participates in the activity defined by the rules, unless the individual Peters describes does not voluntarily participate in the moral life. If the individual does not voluntarily participate in the moral life, the demand on moral education will not be to have the individual become more astute at the legislative, judicial and executive function of rules--the demand will be to have the individual voluntarily participate in the moral life. Peters does not account for the person who is not interested in asking, "what ought I to do?" Nor does he account for the person who does not recognize that there is a question of

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[10]Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 314.
[11]R. S. Peters, "Virtues and Habits in Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, p. 273.
[12]Peters, p. 280.
[13]Peters, "Moral Education and the Psychology of Character," p. 39.

this kind to be asked.

The principles which are presupposed by asking, "what ought I do?" have formal validity only. Essential to the principle of impartiality, for example, is that, others are treated differently only if there are relevant differences among them. The principle of impartiality does not, however, show what is to count as a relevant difference. Similiarly, the principle of freedom does not tell us which constraints, if any, are defensible. Even the principle of respect for persons is less helpful than Peters thinks. So often, the issue in a dispute is not whether we should respect persons but who is to count as a person. Women in Canada, for example, were not legally considered to be persons until 1929. Peters limits the concept of a person to someone who determines one's own destiny and who represents an assertive point of view.[14] Consequently, the very young, the insane and animals are excluded. It is often those who do not represent an assertive point of view who are the victims of immoral behavior. The principle of respect for persons is not helpful to these individuals.

Peters's conception of moral education is consistent with his view of liberal education. The moral life is based on fundamental principles which are "personalized" by the rational passions which "permeate a whole range of activities . . . {and} make them worthwhile for their own sake."[15] Peters's understanding of liberal education is based, however, on a particular view of the mind in which feelings and emotions have no central part.[16] Peters has written quite extensively about the affective dimension of morality but his primary concern has been to show that there is a "passionate side of the life of reason"[17] and that the education of the emotions

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[14]Peters, Ethics and Education, p 214.

[15]R. S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," in Moral Development and Moral Education, p. 81.

[16]See, for example, Jane Roland Martin's "Needed: A New Paradigm for Liberal Education," in The Eightieth N. S. S. E. Yearbook, University of Chicago Press, 1981 for a critique of Peters' view of liberal education and see Paul Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. R.D. Archambault (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). Hirst, who has often collaborated with Peters, writes that liberal education is concerned with developing moral understanding for its own sake. The development of moral character is not part of liberal education, according to Hirst, because it involves components which are not considered to be part of the mind which is restricted to the intellect.

[17]Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," p. 68.

entails control and direction of emotions into creative activities. In other words, the affective dimension is to be understood in relation to either the intensity of one's commitment to rationality or in relation to the cognitive control of emotion. I have more to say about Peters's view of the emotions in Chapter Four.

John Wilson

John Wilson contends that educating people to 'do' morality can be accomplished in much the same way as we educate people to do science. Morality, argues Wilson, has its own methodology and principles which must be taught separately just as the methodology and principles of science are taught separately.

> Our chief aim is not to offer pupils, much less indoctrinate them with, a specific moral content. Our aim is essentially similar to what we try to do in other subjects or 'forms of thought': that is, to initiate pupils into a particular methodology, to get them to appreciate and master the principles, procedures, concepts, and so on which proper moral thought and action require, so that they can then make up their own minds about what moral beliefs and behavior to adopt - just as, in science or any other subject, our chief aim is to make the pupils good at, or competent in, or well-equipped for, doing the subject itself, rather than insist that they should accept certain specific scientific (historical, mathematical, etc.) beliefs.[18]

According to Wilson, if we call someone rational or irrational we do not "refer primarily to the truth or falsehood of his beliefs"; rather, we refer to, "the ways in which or the reasons for which he comes to believe, and continues to believe . . ."[19] Consequently, programs in moral education, according to Wilson, should be non-partisan and develop an understanding of moral methodology--"we are to show pupils how to get the right answers."[20]

The non-partisan approach to moral education is derived from pure reason,[21] because, says Wilson, the components of morality are derived from the principle of rationality. Facing

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[18]John Wilson, "Motivation and Methodology in Moral Education", Journal of Moral Education 10 (1981): 85.
[19]John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Inc., 1967), p. 74.
[20]John Wilson, "Moral Education: Retrospect and Prospect," Journal of Moral Education 9 (1980): 3.
[21]Wilson, "Motivation and Methodology in Moral Education," p. 3.

facts, getting to know oneself and other people, self-control, being able to act on one's own decisions are essential components, says Wilson, to any rational person who takes morality seriously and, by definition, all rational persons do take morality seriously.[22] These rational moral principles are "conceptually connected to the notions of being human and being educated."[23]

Some of Wilson's components are affective, but his focus is on their conceptual understanding. For example, one of his categories emphasizes possessing concepts of various emotions and moods and the ability to identify emotions and moods in oneself and others. These are important skills to possess but they allow only the possibility of a better understanding of the emotions one already has, not the development of emotions one does not have. The component which Wilson calls PHIL (a concern for other people as equals) is, he claims, a logical requirement for a rational person in a moral context. However, no particular moral response follows from the acknowledgement that others interests are of equal importance to one's own. As Wilson, himself, states, accepting that others should be treated equally is not the same as loving them or feeling for them.[24] Moreover, PHIL only has force for those who want to function in a moral context. It is of little use to indicate to someone that he or she should understand that PHIL is a logical requirement of morality, if the individual does not see the point of morality.

Wilson insists that learning procedural principles is to do morality but, as Mary Warnock writes, "there is no such thing as 'doing morality'"[25] Moral reasoning is only one capacity an individual must have in order to be moral.

> Wilson suggests that children should be taught how to argue with regard to the interests of others, and this is very good. But teaching methodology will not ensure that they actually want other people's

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[22]John L. Harrison, "Review Article: John Wilson as Moral Educator," Journal of Moral Education 7 (1978): 59.
[23]John Wilson, "The Study of Moral Development," in Values and Moral Development in Higher Education, eds. G. Collier, J. Wilson, and P. Tomlinson (London: Crom Helm, 1974), p. 8.
[24]Wilson et al., Introduction to Moral Education, p. 192.
[25]Mary Warnock, Schools of Thought (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 132.

interests to be looked after as well as their own.[26]

Wilson claims, however, that an individual's wants and desires do not explain his or her actions. He indicates that it is important to try "to get the child . . . to like people"[27] but he insists that this can be accomplished by cultivating "a general regard for reason, good sense, self-control and thoughtfulness."[28] Concern for motivation in moral education must be directed at "certain principles of rationality and justice, natural sympathy or personal benevolence . . . {are} desirable but too fragile."[29]

R. M. Hare

According to Wilson, behaving well towards others entails having the concept of a person and understanding the meaning of moral language. This postion is similar to that of R. M. Hare who, in "Language and Moral Education,"[30] indicates that the task of moral education is to teach moral language "because knowing and using it is an essential condition for taking one's part in a civilized and peaceful or even viable society."[31]

> I am convinced that if parents first, and then children, understand better the formal character of morality and of the moral concepts, there would be little need to bother, ultimately, about the content of our children's moral principles: for if the form is really and clearly understood, the content will look after itself.[32]

The formal character of morality is located in moral language with its two main features, prescriptivity and universalizability. The principle that one is supposed to act on one's moral judgments is the principle of prescriptivity, while universalizability is the recognition that the prescriptive principle applies to everyone. According to Hare, any judgment which can meet these two requirements are moral judgments and these requirements

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[26]Warnock, p. 134.
[27]Wilson, "Motivation and Methodology in Moral Education," p. 92.
[28]Wilson, p. 92.
[29]Wilson, p. 85.
[30]R. M. Hare, "Language and Moral Education, in The Domain of Moral Education.
[31]Hare, p. 92.
[32]Hare, p. 104.

override any others which might arise when making a decision.

Moral education consists of teaching students how to think prescriptively and universalizably, although Hare concedes that "it would be difficult to learn this moral language without learning it in the context of some given set of moral principles."[33] However, he adds that, even if the content of the principles is completely changed, one "will still mean the same thing by 'ought'; he will still be using the same moral language that he learnt earlier."[34] The vacuity of this statement is acknowledged by Hare on two accounts. First he admits that it is possible that there could be those who understand prescriptivity and universalizability and utilize them to justify fanatic acts such as exterminating a race of people.[35] Second, Hare acknowledges what he calls the 'so what?' moralists--those who say, "Yes, I know I ought-- so what?"[36] Hare does, then, recognize that understanding moral language does not translate into moral action. Ironically, Hare's solution is for people to be well-informed about actions and their consequences, to be sensitive to the feelings of others and to love and be concerned for others.[37] As G. J. Warnock says, the universalized prescriptions of people with these attributes will be "absolutely splendid" but those things which are of importance--being well-informed, sensitive, and imbued with love--have nothing to do with prescriptivity and universalizability.

> Study of "the moral language" is of scarcely any importance at all: everything that matters comes in when we stop talking about language, and set about trying to become well-informed as we can, as fully aware as we can of how other people feel and are affected by what we do, and - obviously most importantly of all - what we try to cultivate in ourselves, and to inculcate in others, that kind of concern for other people that one can call 'love'. None of that - nothing of what really matters - has anything significantly to do with "the moral language" . . .[38]

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[33]Hare, "Language and Moral Education," p. 98.
[34]Hare, p. 98.
[35]Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprinted 1978), pp. 159-85.
[36]Hare, "Language and Moral Education," p. 95.
[37]Hare, pp. 101-102
[38]G. J. Warnock, "A Reply to R. M. Hare," in The Domain of Moral Education, p. 114.

Being intellectually astute and being consistent are of value to morality but they are limited to particular types of situations. Certainly morality cannot be reduced to either.

A. V. E. R.

The Association of Values Education and Research (A. V. E. R.) produces teaching materials for moral education in order to introduce students to: the basic features of moral discourse, the basic content of the moral point of view, the procedures that can be used to test proposed answers to moral questions, the complexity of some moral questions and, "above all, to the idea that it is, in fact, possible to approach moral questions on a rational basis."[39] Despite indicating that morality is complex, A. V. E. R. claims that one can determine whether one's value judgments are justified by testing them by use of the logical syllogism. According to A. V. E. R., once someone has determined relevant facts and his or her value standard, the logical syllogism allows the individual to determine if his or her value judgment follows logically from these facts and standards.[40] The major premise contains the value premise and the minor premise contains the relevant facts. For example,

> Major premise - It is wrong to cut down trees in the forest without replacing them.
> Minor premise - The British Columbia government cuts down trees without replacing them.
> Conclusion - The British Columbia government ought not to cut down trees without replacing them.

A. V. E. R. argues that the rationality of the value standard is based on four tests (the willingness to exchange places, the desire that everyone acts according to the same principle, the establishment of legitimate exceptions to the principle, and the determination of whether the principle follows logically from a higher order principle which one finds acceptable.[41]). The A. V. E. R. program is typical of a procedural principles approach for

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[39]C. B. Daniels, "Moral Education in the Context of Lifelong Education," Journal of Educational Thought 15 (1981): 37.
[40]L. Daniels, L. Douglas, C. Oliver, I Wright, eds., The Elderly (Toronto: O.I.S.E. Value Reasoning Series, 1978), p. 5.
[41]Daniels, Douglas, Oliver, Wright, eds., The Elderly, pp. 7-8.

two reasons: the nature of morality is reduced to understanding the rationality of procedural principles and there is the assumption that individuals are motivated by understanding the procedural principles. Both of these claims are inaccurate. There are difficulties, as I show later, with reducing morality to moral reasoning and it is absurd to reduce moral reasoning to the ethical syllogism. The tests to establish a value premise can readily accommodate the Nazi. Moreover, the determination of which facts are 'relevant' is problematic. Syllogistic reasoning cannot generate the 'relevant' facts. Furthermore, regardless of how skilled one is at inserting the value premise and the 'relevant' facts, there is no assurance that one will act or that one should act upon understanding the logic of the syllogism.

Lawrence Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg also thinks that if one is to be morally educated one must understand 'moral' reasons. His emphasis, however, is on development rather than on moral motivation. As with other human development theorists, Kohlberg argues that one must wait until the learner is "ready" before introducing the individual to the next stage. Understanding reasons is essential to moral education, according to Kohlberg, but the individual must be at the appropriate stage of cognitive development if the reasons are to be understood. Kohlberg has identified six stages, divided into three levels, each with its own type of 'moral' reasoning. Each of us, says Kohlberg, proceeds through the same invariant stages which are identified by the type of reasons given to support the judgments and not by the judgments themselves. At the pre-conventional level, the individual's orientation is to obedience and avoidance of punishment (stage one) and personal interest (stage two); at the conventional level, the individual's orientation is to receiving other's approval (stage three) and to obeying authority, fixed rules and maintaining the social order (stage four); and at the post-conventional or autonomous level, the individual is oriented to social contracts (stage five) and to a universal principle of justice(stage six). Although these are all stages of 'moral' reasoning, according to Kohlberg, morality and moral education is ultimately concerned with justice. I will show that

there are three types of moral reasons--moral justifying reasons which provide the context in which one's response makes sense; moral motivating reasons which indicate why the individual responds; and moral adjudicating reasons which are provided in the resolution of conflicts. I will argue that there are moral situations in which neither justifying nor adjudicating reasons are appropriate as part of the moral response and, I show that, although one may explain a moral response by reference to justifying and motivating reasons, these reasons need not be considered at the time of the response. Moreover, I contend that it is inappropriate to reduce morality to reasons. Although justice is an important part of morality, morality cannot be reduced to the reasons associated with justice.

According to Kohlberg, growth in moral reasoning from one stage to the next results from cognitive conflict or stimulation. Optimal conflict is considered to occur when the individual is exposed to arguments which are one stage above his or her present stage. This cognitive conflict motivates the individual to change his or her beliefs in order to reduce the conflict. Kohlberg claims that cognitive moral development avoids both indoctrination and subjectivism. Indoctrination is avoided because the next stage of moral reasoning is latent in the individual and needs only to be drawn out.[42] Subjectivism is avoided because the sequence of stages is the same for everyone.

Since my concern is to account for 'care' in morality and moral education, my critique of Kohlberg is confined to his equation of morality with reasons and his reduction of 'ultimate moral reasons' to justice.[43] Kohlberg claims that motivation for action is linked to one's

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[42]Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Fransisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 46.

[43]For criticisms of Kohlberg's methodological problems see, for example, Anne R. Conroy and John K. Burton, "The Trouble with Kohlberg: A Critique" Educational Forum 4 (1980-81): 43-55; for other general criticisms see Betty A. Sichel, "A Critical Study of Kohlberg's Theory of the Development of Moral Judgments," Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook (1976): 209-220, Deborah Lange, "Kohlberg's Social Value Theory: An Ethical Analysis," Philosophy of Education Yearbook (1977): 89-99, Barry L. Bull, "Kohlberg's Place in a Theory of the Legitimate Role of Value in Public Education," Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook (1978): 70-84, R. S. Peters, "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education," in Moral Development and Moral Education, Owen J. Flanagan, "Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections of the Moral Psychology Debate," Ethics 92 (1982): 499-512.

developmental stage and the cognitive conflict one experiences at that stage. Once, however, one achieves the autonomous moral stage, judgment and action are closely related. ". . . true knowldege of justice," says Kohlberg, "does entail virtuous action."[44] Kohlberg faces the same criticisms levelled at those who argue that being morally educated entails understanding moral reasons, language, or procedural principles. Understanding stage six reasons is motivation for moral action only if it is true, by definition, that to be at the highest level of moral development, one acts according to the reasons at the highest level.

Since stage six is based on the universalizability of ethical principles and the individual is to be evaluated only with respect to the reasons given in a dilemma, Kohlberg, like Hare, makes it possible for the sincere fanatic to be moral. The emphasis on the form of reasoning at the expense of content results in a principle of justice so abstract that it is not possible to solve moral problems with it.[45] By itself, the justice principle can be invoked to universalize anything.

In order not to interfere with moral autonomy and to avoid indoctrination in moral education, Kohlberg dismisses what he calls "the bag of virtues".[46] He does not achieve neutrality, however, because he claims that reasoning with universal principles is morality. Moreover, he cannot avoid the inclusion of content because it is not logically possible for moral education to proceed without some reference to content.

> At the first level . . . the child has an egocentric conception of rules. He abides by rules to avoid punishment and to obtain rewards. What, at this stage, one wants to ask Kohlberg, could possibly constitute the approach labeled "cognitive stimulation" if it is not precisely a clarification and exemplification of a body of rules? And how could this occur if the rules weren't taught?[47]

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[44]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Development as a Basis for Moral Education," in Moral Development, Moral Education and Kohlberg, ed. Brenda Munsey (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980), p. 81.
[45]Don Locke, "The Illusion of Stage Six," Journal of Moral Education 9 (1980): 103-109.
[46]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education: Five Lectures, eds. N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 63.
[47]Cornel M. Hamm, "The Content of Moral Education, or In Defense of the 'Bag of Virtues'", School Review 85 (1977): 224.

Kohlberg is aware of the difficulties which arise in the attempt to justify stage six without using stage six terms.[48] He thinks that he avoids the problem by showing the connection between stage six and "moral-philosophic criteria."

> assumptions of our psychological theory are naturally allied to the formalistic tradition in ethics for Kant and Rawls. This isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a psychologically more advanced stage of moral development is more morally adequate, by moral-philosophic criteria.[49]

The moral-philosophic criteria to which Kohlberg refers are, however, open to debate. It is part of the purpose of this work to show that this formalist tradition is an insufficient account of morality.

By claiming that morality is reduced to moral reasons and that one has reached the highest stage of morality when one understands these reasons, Kohlberg ignores any reference to an individual's character, desires, or emotions. He rejects benevolence as part of morality because benevolence does not resolve problems in which interests conflict.[50] He fails to recognize, as I shall argue in Chapter Three, that situations with conflict are not the only situations which are morally significant. Rather than ignore benevolence because it is inoperative in situations with conflict, one must recognize those situations without conflict in which benevolence is morally relevant. Kohlberg fails to do this because he stipulates that morality is restricted to conflict resolution. "Most social situations are not moral, because there is no conflict between the role taking expectations of one person and another."[51] I shall argue that, although justice is applicable to situations with conflict, sympathy for others is as much a component of justice as it is of benevolence. I also show that justice accounts for only some of the moral situations with which we are faced.

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[48]Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claims to Moral Adequacy of the Highest Stage of Moral Judgement," Journal of Philosophy: 633.
[49]Kohlberg, p. 636.
[50]Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 220.
[51]Kohlberg, p. 192.

In opposition to Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan argues in In a Different Voice[52] that 'caring', with its emphasis on affection, affiliation, context and relation is also a way to deal with moral conflicts. Gilligan's empirical work shows that females tend to deal with moral problems by referring to 'caring' rather than by referring to justice. In an attempt to account for this different experience of morality, Gilligan retains Kohlberg's stage theory and the view of morality as conflict resolution.

What is valuable about Gilligan is that she has identified an attitude or approach to morality which emphasizes connection with others; a "vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt."[53] While Gilligan claims that this morality of 'care' contrasts with Kohlberg's morality of justice, I argue that the just person is also a caring person and that, if we are to have a more complete understanding of morality, it will only partially consist in the inclusion of what Gilligan calls 'caring' attitudes in conflict situations. A more complete understanding of morality must also account for those situations in which others' welfare is affected and there is no conflict. As I show, these situations, as well as situations involving conflict, can be approached with 'care', although my explication of 'care' is different from Gilligan's. In Chapter Four I examine Gilligan's claim more thoroughly with respect to the differences she indicates in females' and males' moral responses.

Curiously, Kohlberg has added a seventh stage to his hierarchy. This seventh stage, he claims, accounts for the foundation of morality itself. Stage six principles are more likely to motivate if one sees that they reveal the very structure of the universe.[54] The question, "Why be moral?" asks whether there is support in nature for acting according to universal moral principles and, says Kohlberg, it is properly understood, not as a moral question but as a religious question.[55] "At stage 7 . . . individuals construct a 'natural theology' that is based on reason. Although rationally derived, one's metaphysical system at stage 7 is also supported by

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[52]Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
[53]Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 63.
[54]Robert E. Carter, Dimensions of Moral Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 99.
[55]Lawrence, Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I of The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Fransisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 368.

mystical experiences of union with the whole of reality."[56] The attention that Kohlberg abruptly gives to feelings and motivation is, however, "more artificial than necessary . . . . since so few reach the higher stages, a methodology which explains the importance of the integration of the capacities of the whole person only later may be much too late for most of us to ever appreciate or encounter."[57]

According to Kohlberg, stage seven includes supererogatory actions. He thinks that these acts of agapé, as he calls them, are distinct from acts of justice. In Chapter Three I show that acts of this kind are conceptually linked to both justice and benevolence.

Reflecting, Clarifying

Clive Beck's Reflective Ultimate Life Goals Approach to Values Education and programs in Values Clarification do not emphasize the formal features of morality. Each, however, emphasizes some kind of cognitive process which is thought to be central to moral education.

Clive Beck

Beck's emphasis is on personal reflection about ultimate life goals. According to Beck, morality is a means to achieve one's life goals but is never a goal itself.

> There are many areas of value apart from the moral, and all areas of value are equally subordinate to the ultimate life goals that lie beyond them. Morality, like other types of value, is a means toward "ultimate" ends; and moral principles . . . are intermediate principles, serving these ultimate ends.[58]

There will be situations, says Beck, in which our nonmoral values may not reach a "happy compromise" with our moral values and we will then act in a less moral manner.[59]

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[56]Kohlberg, p. 369.
[57]Carter, Dimensions of Moral Education, p. 101.
[58]Clive Beck, Ethics: An Introduction (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1972), p. 41.
[59]Beck, p. 109.

> . . . the sole purpose of morality is to serve fundamental life goals such as freedom, love, happiness, survival, self-respect, and so on. {The reflecting person} recognizes the importance of rules, processes, contracts, and principles, but treats them only as means to maximization of ultimate goals for himself and others.[60]

Reflection is the process of determining the "soundness" of one's life goals. The reflective process consists of considering whether one's values are based on correct information; considering if one's values are compatible with other values one has; making compatible one's means-values with one's end-value; and arriving at a set of fundamental life goals for which one can determine specific and intermediate values.[61] Anything, then, is allowed as an ultimate life goal particularly since Beck claims that reflection is appropriate only with respect to means and not to ends.[62] This, however, is contradictory to Beck's other claim that morality is only a means to an ultimate life goal and is not an ultimate life goal itself. One must wonder about the individual, who upon reflection, decides that morality is his or her ultimate life goal. Moreover, since reflection does not apply to means, one's ultimate life goal can as easily be "self-aggrandizement, mastery over others, and a sadistic impulse to destroy."[63]

The substantial difference between the reflection promoted by Beck and the rationality promoted by Peters and Wilson is that the latter contend that rationality commits one to morality. Beck's approach shows that rationality applies to self-interest as well as to morality.[64] It is possible for someone to be rational and egotistical as well as rational and moral.

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[60]Clive Beck, Moral Education and the Schools (Toronto: O. I. S. E., 1971), p. 12.
[61]Clive Beck, "A Philosophical View of Values and Value Education," in Values and Moral Development, ed. T. C. Hennessy (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1976), pp. 14-15
[62]Clive Beck, Educational Philosophy and Theory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 24.
[63]Ivan DeFaveri, "Moral Education: "The Risk of Oversimplification," Alberta Journal of Education Research 25 (1979): 303.
[64]See, for example, the debate between Helen Freeman and Harvey Siegel in Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vols. 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1977-1980.

Values Clarification

Values Clarification was designed to assist students to clarify their own values in discussion with other students and teachers and, in doing so, to behave in ways that are less apathetic and conforming and in ways that are more positive, purposeful, and enthusiastic.[65] The emphasis in Values Clarification is on the "process of valuing" rather than on value. In fact, there is no attempt to distinguish between what one does value and what is valuable. Values Clarification is a subjectivist program with respect to value, although, curiously, not with respect to the "process of valuing".

> Because life is different through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have. We therefore cannot be certain what values, what style of life, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for obtaining values.[66]

Something can be clarified as a value if it is chosen freely from alternatives, if the individual is happy with the choice, and if the choice is publicly affirmed and repeatedly acted upon. It is clear that almost any content can meet these criteria. Values Clarification can clarify and endorse drug dealing and prosititution as values, for example. If an individual does clarify either of these as a personal value and is asked "what is valuable about that?", the answer is, according to Values Clarification, "it is valuable because I value it".

The ultimate goal of Values Clarification is self-awareness and autonomy--it is the process of clarifying, not content, which is important. Nevertheless, if an individual "chooses a value that is unacceptable to the majority . . . we must deny him the right to carry the value to action."[67] In fact, it is suggested that, "a single vote, with no one talking but the teacher, can lead to a lot of clarifying thinking."[68] There is no attempt to distinguish moral from non-moral values. Consequently, questions about lying, stealing, kindness, and fairness are treated as if they are of the same type as questions about music, recreation or the food one

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[65]Louis Raths, M. Harmin and S. Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), p. 12.
[66]Rath et al., p. 28.
[67]Rath et al., Values and Teaching, p. 227.
[68]Rath et al., p. 153.

enjoys.

Although the emphasis in Values Clarification is on a thinking process, the process of valuing "constitute{s} a betrayal of reason and a retreat to irrationalism. How else can one characterize the unconditional acceptance of the child as the ultimate source of appeal for what is true, right or justified."[69]

Summary

As divergent as Wilson is from Beck and Hare is from Values Clarification, all approaches emphasize the importance of cognition to moral education. The cognitive process may be as rigid as Peters' transcendental argument for presupposed principles or as uncritical as Values Clarification. All reduce moral education to the acquisition of skills for some kind of deliberative process.

Each of these approaches to moral education has a difficulty with motivation. Beck and Values Clarification handle the problem by making values motivational by definition. Kohlberg, too, stipulates that the stage six individual necessarily acts on stage six reasoning. Wilson and Hare argue that understanding moral concepts, moral language and procedural principles are sufficient for moral motivation and Peters claims that understanding of moral reasons is one's motivation to act.

Alternatives in Moral Education

None of the writers to whom I will make reference in this section have written nearly as prolifically about moral education as those I have just examined. Neverthless, Mary Warnock, Anthony O'Hear, Nel Nodding, and Peter McPhail are representative of an alternative emphasis in moral education which has a parallel emphasis in moral philosophy and moral psychology. I will examine the moral philosophy of Rodger Beehler and Lawrence Blum and make reference to William Frankena and Iris Murdoch. I will also critique the moral

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[69]A. C. Kazipedes, "The Logic of Values Clarification," The Journal of Educational Thought 11 (1977): 104.

psychology of Carol Gilligan.

In this section I examine the philosophers of moral education, Warnock, O'Hear, Nodding, and McPhail, and indicate the influence Beehler and Blum have had on this study. I examine each of these writers with respect to the thesis I will develop.

Peter McPhail

The subject matter of Peter McPhail's Lifeline and Startline[70] programs of moral education is based on what children say is good or bad. From these findings, McPhail has concluded that "morality is basically about respecting and caring for all things."[71] His moral education program is directed at enhancing students' concern for others.

> Our aim is not to develop a theory of moral behavior, nor to increase children's capacity to argue morally, nor to improve their ability to say 'good things'. It is the practise of doing good things, of actually taking another's needs, feelings and interests into consideration as well as one's own, which concerns us first and foremost.[72]

According to McPhail, 'caring' behavior is learned in a social environment in which the individual is the object of 'caring' behavior. McPhail claims that the most important motivation for being considerate to others is that it is rewarding to the person who is considerate. I will argue, on the other hand, that 'care' is the motivation to affect the well-being of others. 'Caring' is not moral caring if motivation is only self-interested.

McPhail is critical of those who are concerned only with "verbal forms and the analysis of propositions in moral education."[73] However, he says that when a "response is emotional . . . and does not involve making a decision, it is strictly not moral"[74] which implies a curious alliance with someone like Wilson.

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[70]See Peter McPhail, J. R. Ungoed-Thomas and Hilary Chapman, Moral Education in the Secondary School (London: Longman, 1972) and Peter McPhail, David Middleton, David Ingram, Startline Moral Education in the Middle Years (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1978).
[71]McPhail et al., Startline, p. 6.
[72]McPhail et al., Startline, p. 5.
[73]McPahil et al., Moral Education in the Secondary School, p. 41.
[74]McPhail et al., p. 64.

According to McPhail, his programs are an "investigation of ways in which 'ought comes from is'"[75] because they have been developed from the opinions of children. This claim betrays McPhail's lack of philosophical sophistication about a controversial philosophic problem. One can only speculate whether he would have found these children's opinions acceptable if the opinions had been something which was "much less obviously moral".[76]

McPhail's work is important insofar as his emphasis on 'care' counteracts Kohlberg's emphasis on justice. However, just as it is a major omission for Kohlberg to ignore affective dimensions of morality, it is a major omission of McPhail's work to ignore justice. Moreover, by rejecting analysis as part of moral education, McPhail also rejects analysis as a means to be more clear about the dimensions of 'care'. The association of 'care' with desires, attitudes and emotions does not preclude 'care' from being analyzed.

Mary Warnock

Mary Warnock rejects the views of R. M. Hare, John Wilson, and R. S. Peters who, she thinks, have reduced morality to decision-making.[77] Morality does not consist only of decision-making, says Warnock, for "even a good decision needs . . . in Aristotle's words, to arise out of a 'steady and unalterable state of character'."[78] In fact, suggests Warnock, decisions may be less necessary, the more fixed and steady one's disposition is.[79] In Chapters Three and Four I argue this point by showing that those responding directly from the character traits of benevolence and justice do not need to pause to justify the morality of their responses to themselves.

Teaching a methodology, says Warnock, does not also teach someone to want others' interests to be looked after. The notion of 'doing' morality as described by Wilson, A. V. E. R. and to some extent by Beck and Values Clarification trivializes morality. What

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[75]McPhail et al., p. 49.
[76]Marion Smith, "Kohlberg and McPhail - A Comparison," Journal of Moral Education 3 (1973): 354.
[77]Mary Warnock, Schools of Thought, p. 130.
[78]Warnock, p. 132.
[79]Warnock, p. 132.

is important is that students experience someone, the teacher, who "plainly show{s} that he cares about such virtues as honesty and sympathy . . . who whole-heartedly defend{s} what he believes to be right."[80]

Anthony O'Hear

According to Anthony O'Hear, moral education begins with one's upbringing in which one comes to recognize oneself and others as centers of feeling and consciousness.[81] Moral education in the schools is also important because, says O'Hear, it is "intrinsic both to the conduct of teachers and teaching, and in various ways, to the content of the various subjects being taught."[82] Like Warnock, O'Hear thinks that moral education is not the sort of enterprise which can be presented during classroom sessions a few periods a week. Morality is not over and above other activities but "arises from the very act of teaching."[83] There are moral qualities implicit in the teaching of all subjects--impartiality, objectivity, the willingness to listen to others and to submit to evidence and reason.[84] There are also opportunities for teachers to explore the ethical implications of advances in science and technology and the facts of history.

According to O'Hear, moral education is the process by which someone comes to adopt a set of principles which reflect a regard for the rights and feelings of others.[85] Understanding that others have claims on me is to understand the situation from the other's point of view rather than to understand the situation as an opportunity to apply a principle. The basis of moral education, then, is a "sensitivity to one's own humanity being shared with that of others, and a corresponding sympathy with them."[86] According to O'Hear, moral education must focus on the natural sense we have to sympathize with others. Without sympathy, he says, one's

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[80]Warnock, pp. 140-141.
[81]Anthony O'Hear, Education Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 119.
[82]O'Hear, p.119.
[83]O'Hear, p. 121.
[84]O'Hear, p. 120.
[85]O'Hear, p. 127.
[86]O'Hear, pp. 127-128.

moral principles would not be rationally appealing.

Rather than find it troublesome that children must enter the moral life by acquiring moral habits, O'Hear contends that seeing the moral life in this way allows a view of morality in which 'virtue' is habitual and ongoing. O'Hear acknowledges a debt to Iris Murdoch who writes that the moral life "goes on continually, {and is} not . . . switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices."[17] What is important to the moral life, says O'Hear and Murdoch, is what one attends to between moral choices. Both O'Hear and Murdoch argue that art and particularly literature are important to moral education as a means to attend to those things of value and to take one's attention away from oneself.

Nel Nodding

In Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education[18], Nel Nodding argues that 'an ethic of care' is central to moral education. To care for another, according to Nodding, is to be engrossed in the other, to receive the other's concerns, and to displace one's motivational energy toward the other. Like Murdoch and O'Hear, Nodding writes of the importance of directing attention away from oneself and toward the other.

> Caring involves stepping out of one's own personal frame of reference into the other's. When we care, we consider the other's point of view, his objective needs, and what he expects of us. Our attention, our mental engrossment is on the cared-for, not on ourselves.[19]

Nodding refers to the "one-caring" and the "cared-for" and she claims that caring does not take place unless the "cared-for" acknowledges the attitude of caring on the part of the "one-caring".

> X does not feel that I care. Therefore, sadly, I must admit that, while I feel that I care, X does not perceive that I care, and, hence, the

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[17]Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 37.
[18]Nel Nodding, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
[19]Nodding, p. 24.

relationship cannot be characterized as one of caring.[90]

This is clearly a stipulation by Nodding, since someone can care about another even if the other does not respond to the care. Nodding does acknowledge this point in her statement that, "an ethic of caring locates morality primarily in the pre-act consciousness of the one-caring."[91] She also devotes an entire chapter of her book to "Caring for Animals, Plants, Things, and Ideas," of which only animals have the possibility of responding in the way Nodding suggests. Moreover, Nodding claims that the answer to the question "'why should I behave morally?' is 'because I am or want to be a moral person'"[92] which, contrary to her claims, does not put the emphasis on the "cared-for" in the 'caring' relationship.

Nodding contends that there is a basic relatedness between people which has its origins in the mother/child relationship but, she says, "an ethic of caring as a feminine ethic does not imply or claim to speak for all women nor to exclude men."[93] Nodding distinguishes between the natural caring of mother/child relationships and what she calls 'ethical caring'. Natural caring comes to us naturally and requires no "ethical effort" whereas 'ethical caring' does require an effort and comes to one as an obligation. The basis of this obligation is the desire to be a moral person.

> I care about myself as one-caring and, although I do not care naturally for the person who has asked something of me - at least not at the moment I feel the genuine moral sentiment, the "I ought", that sensibility to which I have committed myself.[94]

Like McPhail, Nodding thinks that care is motivated by a self-centered desire. I will argue that care is other-centered and that care is the motivation for a moral response.

Nodding is correct to differentiate situations in which one directly desires the well-being of another from situations in which one does not have a direct desire for the other's well-being. However, it is arbitrary for her to call only one of these ethical. In Chapter Three

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[90]Nodding, p. 68.
[91]Nodding, p. 28.
[92]Nodding, p. 50.
[93]Nodding, p. 97.
[94]Nodding, p. 82.

I show how a direct desire for another's well-being differs from the desire to do a duty to affect the other's well-being. In doing so, I argue that both are part of morality. The basis of both is the general desire for others' well-being and not some personal ideal.

We 'naturally care' about close relations and 'ethically care' about those in more formal relations, says Nodding. We are connected to those whom we do not know by "chains of caring".[95] Nodding claims that we are unwilling to extend our care to those we do not know.

> Indeed, the caring person . . . dreads the proximate stranger, for she cannot easily reject the claim he has on her. She would prefer that the stray cat not appear at the back door - or the stray teenager at the front. But if either presents himself, he must be received not by formula but as individual.[96]

When I deal with extraordinary, moral response in Chapter Three, I show that an extraordinary, moral response is performed by an individual whose 'moral care' extends beyond proximate others. Contrary to Nodding, the individual, who performs an extraordinary, moral response, does not hope that others who are remote or that proximate strangers will not enter one's life because of the obligation one will then have to 'care' for them.

According to Nodding, thinking is a necessary "adjunct" to moral education. She rejects the teaching of procedural principles because, she says, by teaching only procedural principles "we share only the justification of our acts and not what motivates and touches us."[97] "The primary aim of every educational institution and every educational effort," says Nodding, "must be the maintenance and enhancement of caring."[98] Moral education must include practise in caring because caring includes skills. Additionally, Nodding recommends closer contact between teachers and students, smaller classes, longer periods of time spent with a single teacher, opening the curriculum to controversial issues, and co-operative learning groups in which children learn from each other.

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[95]Nodding, p. 47.
[96]Nodding, p. 47.
[97]Nodding, p. 8.
[98]Nodding, p. 172.

Nodding's book is important because it is the first systematic attempt in the moral education literature to identify what 'care' is. Others, have stressed the necessity of changing the emphasis in moral education from procedural principles to 'care' but they have not attempted to explicate 'care'. My account of care will differ considerably from Nodding's account. I deal with care as a motivational concept and I show that moral care includes both the motivation for benevolence and the motivation for justice. Nodding, on the other hand, states that "caring reduces the necessity for justice."[99] I will argue that it is incorrect to think that moral situations are limited only to those for which benevolence is appropriate. If, as I argue, care includes both benevolence and justice, Nodding is correct to claim that moral education is education in caring. However, if care is the same as benevolence, a moral education program based on this will be deficient.

Rodger Beehler

Rodger Beehler's book Moral Life is also about 'care', although Beehler does not make an attempt, as Nodding does, to analyze the concept. The book rather "seek{s} to establish that if human beings did not care about one another there could not be what we speak of as morality, for the reason that morality is a manifestation of that caring."[100] Since I make reference to Beehler throughout this work, I only make some introductory comments about him here.

It is not clear from Beehler's work whether he intends 'care' to be identical with morality or whether 'care' is a necessary condition for morality.[101] My own position is that moral care is the motivating reason for a moral response. I will argue, however, that moral character traits, which are also part of motivating reasons, are also part of the moral response. Consequently, care is to be considered as both the motivation to be moral and the substance of morality. I avoid the charge of vacuity levelled at those who are interested only in formal

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[99]Nel Nodding, "Caring", Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (1981): 147.
[100]Rodger Beehler, Moral Life (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 1.
[101]Richard Norman, "Critical Notice Rodger Beehler: Moral Life", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1981): 159.

features of morality by arguing that morality is substantially the benevolent and just desires of human beings which are manifested in moral response. Morality is not the formal description of benevolence and justice; morality is being benevolent and just.

Beehler claims that a moral ought is only meaningful to those who do already care. Consequently, he says that it is superfluous to speak of obligation to those who already do care. Moral reasons are not necessary for the person who does care and they cannot, says Beehler, be given to the person who does not already care. The implication of this is that one is either entirely 'inside' the moral life or entirely 'outside' of it. The alternative I will suggest is that everyone is likely affected by the well-being of at least some other sentient beings and, because of this, moral education has some basis from which to begin.

Like Nodding, Beehler writes about caring as if it is synonymous with benevolence, although his account also seems to subsume justice. Beehler describes the response of the friend of someone who has defrauded some elderly people.

> Because the friend cares for N, is he suppposed to be unable to appreciate that what N has done it is wrong to do? I do not see why this should be so. The friend loves and cares about N. But I am supposing that he also cares about what has been done to these people. He cares that they have been wronged and will suffer.[102]

If care is like benevolence, it cannot accommodate justice but if, as I argue, moral care includes both benevolence and justice, then to desire that these people be treated fairly is also to care about them.

Beehler's chapter on moral education and moral understanding provides some direction, but not detail about the ways in which moral education might proceed. He writes, for example, that to teach a child to care is "to strive to present to the child the world in such a way as to awaken . . . love."[103] What 'striving' consists of is not made clear. Beehler rejects moral education as instruction since the effect of the reasons provided in instruction is dependent on whether one already cares. Moral education, then, "must take the form of being turned toward

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[102]Beehler, The Moral Life, p. 200.
[103]Beehler, p. 171.

certain possibilities, and appealed to to recognize certain differences and to place certain values on things."[104] Although Beehler does not explicitly use Murdoch's reference to attention, he does think that what one attends to is essential to the moral education process. In answer to his own question, "how is it possible for a child to be brought by someone else to care about others,"[105] Beehler emphasizes "loving the child first . . . love is only first called forth by love."[106] Since one must want to care for others, what is important is to assist the child in "understand{ing} better what one wants."[107] It is obvious then that Beehler neither restricts moral education to classroom sessions nor to the school.

> Any person contributes to the moral awakening of the child who does all he can to create a loving human environment for the child, and to call the child 'out of himself' to become involved with and to hold precious persons, feelings, ways of living, achievements, relationships, natural phenomena, so as in time to create claims upon the child which spring from the child's caring about these persons, creatures, states of life, and natural objects.[108]

Lawrence Blum

In Friendship, Altruism and Morality,[109] Lawrence Blum argues for the moral significance of friendship and for what he calls the altruistic emotions. In doing so, he indicates that rationality, choice, obligation, consistency, impersonality, and universalizability have limited applicability in morality.

Blum rejects what he calls "the schema of motive and act"[110] which attaches moral significance only to one's act. According to this schema, beneficent acts may be performed from self-interested motives. Blum claims, however, that "essential to being the act of

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[104]Beehler, p. 167.
[105]Beehler, p. 168.
[106]Beehler, p. 171.
[107]Beehler, p. 173 quoted by Beehler from Rush Rhees, Without Answers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 156.
[108]Beehler, p. 174.
[109]Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
[110]Blum, p. 141.

beneficence which it is--is that it is motivated by an altruistic emotion."[111] Moral significance is better assessed, says Blum, by taking into account the total response which includes both one's motive and one's act. This point is of considerable importance to my own account as I attempt to show that moral character traits are to be considered both as moral motivation and as moral response.

Blum's purpose is to examine the significance of friendship and the altruisic emotions to morality without reducing morality to friendship and morality. Blum acknowledges that his work does not include other aspects of morality which have moral significance. It is a shortcoming of his work, however, that he does not deal with justice for, as I show, friendships do not preclude conflicts. If conflicts in friendships are to be resolved, justice is essential.

Blum makes little differentiation among benevolence, sympathy, concern, care, and altruistic emotions and, when discussing moral motivation, he does not attempt to distinguish between or show the relationship between desire and emotion. I agree with Blum that moral emotions are motivating but I do this by indicating the conceptual link, for example, between benevolence as a desire and an ensuing emotion.

Although Blum does not specifically refer to moral education, he devotes the last few sections of his book to moral change. Blum has also been influenced by Iris Murdoch's emphasis on attention. He rejects choice as being crucial to morality. It is impossible, says Blum, to affect moral change by choosing. Moral emotions are not summonable by the will. Providing opportunites to 'attend' is not a matter of "placing ourselves in certain circumstances which cause us to have . . . feelings" of compassion or sympathy.[112] Attempting to influence moral change by coming into contact with others' suffering could as well produce "feelings of disgust, revulsion, or even contempt rather than sympathy."[113] If these kind of situations are to have an effect, they "cannot do so in abstraction from other elements of the person's moral

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[111]Blum, p. 142.
[112]Blum, p. 196.
[113]Blum, p. 196.

orientation."[114] If, as Blum says, an individual's "being-toward-others" is not developed, neither coming into contact with circumstances in which others suffer nor practising beneficent actions will result in the cultivation of the agent's affections. Change is not possible by selecting proper objects for our emotions either. Not only is this a limited understanding of how emotions are acquired, says Blum, it allows us only "to rid ourselves of inappropriate emotions, but not to acquire appropriate or desirable ones."[115] One can acknowledge that something is an appropriate object of a moral emotion but one's general "being -toward-others" provides the necessary context for the emotion to be felt. Blum shows that circumstance, practise, summonablity, and assessment of the object of one's emotion can have an effect on the acquisition of moral emotion and thus can tell us "something of the ways that we are capabable of moral change . . . what all fail to bring about is that our being-toward-others is fundamental to moral change." Since Blum's work is primarily concerned with moral emotions he does not explain what this "being-toward-other" entails nor does he examine its relationship to the moral emotions. I attempt to show this link by reference to character traits.

Summary

The alternative view of moral education regards moral education as a process which occurs throughout one's life. Except for McPhail, those I have examined as representative of this alternative view advise against separate classroom sessions for moral education. Nodding, Blum, Beehler and Warnock all emphasize the importance of shifting attention away from oneself and toward others as part of the moral education process. For the most part, these writers address the neglect of 'care' by the orthodox position by taking account of emotions, desires, dispositions, or attitudes. However, the alternative view equates 'care', primarily, with benevolence and neglects justice.

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[114]Blum, p. 197.
[115]Blum, p. 202.

Summary and Organization of the Remainder of the Study

I have summarized the predominant approaches to moral education, most of which have emphasized the importance of rationality through clarification, reflection, or the understanding of moral reasons and language. I have also examined an alternative contribution to the literature which attempts to account for 'care' in moral education. This study is an attempt to address the shortcomings of the othodox view of moral education while also taking into account, expanding, and in some instances taking exception to the alternative view of moral education. Before returning in Chapter Six to explore how moral education might account for 'care', in Chapters Two to Five I analyze 'moral care'.

I analyze 'moral care' by looking closely at ordinary language and by making extensive use of paradigm examples from experience. An exclusive appeal to ordinary language, however, is not sufficient since care, concern, sympathy, empathy, and benevolence are often used vaguely and interchangeably. Part of my purpose is to suggest ways in which these concepts might be better understood. What is important for the analysis of 'care' is whether I am able to make the case that there are these distinct concepts, particularly with respect to establishing that care applies to situations with conflict (situations of justice) as well as situations without conflict (situations of benevolence). Unfortunately, it often happens that when a distinction is noted a dichotomy is claimed. Moral philosophy and moral education both are replete with these dichotomies. For example, morality has been thought to be either benevolence or justice, either care or duty, either subjective or objective, either motivation or response, either emotional or rational, and even either female or male. Both traditional moral education and alternative approaches to moral education contain dichotomies and consequently, in many cases, they are inadequate. My work is an attempt to show how they are inadequate and how they might be remedied.

In Chapter Two I argue that to care that something is the case is to have a motivating reason to act to affect its occurrence. Motivating reasons, as contrasted with justifying reasons which provide the context within which actions make sense, consist of the individual's desires

and relevant beliefs. I go on to show that the desire portion of a motivating reason, if intrinsic and a fairly permanent feature of an individual, is a character trait. Moral character traits, as contrasted with immoral or nonmoral character traits, are those which have as their objects the well-being of others. Chapter Two is concluded with the introduction of the notion of empathetic distress from which the moral character traits of benevolence and justice may be acquired.

In Chapter Three I show that benevolence and justice are the character trait components of moral care and distinguish benevolence as moral care from justice as moral care. I indicate the difference between benevolence and justice as character traits and benevolence and justice as principles and defend a postion which contends that principles augment character traits.

In Chapter Four I argue for differences in the types of moral response based on the object of the moral agent's desire. I show that these differences are affected by the type of situation in which one finds oneself and one's ability to appraise the situation as one affecting the lives of sentient beings. In doing this, I differentiate four kinds of moral response: the benevolent response, the beneficent response, the direct just response, and the dutiful just response. The benevolent and beneficent responses occur in situations in which there is no conflict and another's welfare is affected. Both types of just responses occur in situations in which there is a conflict and others' fair treatment is at stake. The beneficent response and the dutiful just response entail justifying to oneself the appropriateness of the response because one does not have a direct desire for another's well-being. Both just responses include the provision of adjudicating reasons for treating others fairly in the particular situation. I conclude this chapter by making some comments on perceived sex/gender differences in moral response.

In Chapter Five I say something more about desire, belief, and appraisal with respect to how each might affect the moral response. I look at factors which affect desire, belief and appraisal and consequently the moral response. I examine the relative importance of reasoning

skills to the moral response and I describe practical and social skills which have an effect on the completion of a moral response. Finally I say something about the effect of circumstance on the moral response.

Just as understanding reasons or procedures does not make one morally educated, the understanding gained by analyzing 'care' does not make us 'caring'. In Chapter Six, I must then turn from analyzing 'care' to exploring how 'care' can be acquired.

Chapter II

CARE AS A MOTIVATING REASON

Generally, to say that one cares that something is the case is to say that it matters or makes a difference to the individual that it is the case; the individual is motivated to affect its occurrence, if possible. I am concerned with what it means to say that a human agent cares that X is the case when care that X is the case is linked in some way with the occurrence of X and this can be described as the agent's action. I examine whether the nature of this linkage is causal or logical and I offer an explanation which refers to each. I argue that, fundamentally, caring 'that' something is the case is to have a motivating reason to act in order to affect its occurrence. I show that a motivating reason consists of the individual's desires and relevant beliefs and that the desire portion of a motivating reason is a character trait if it is intrinsic and a fairly permanent feature of the individual. The chapter is concluded with an account of empathetic distress from which, I will show, the moral character traits of benevolence and justice may be acquired.

Justifying and Motivating Reasons

I want to reject the notion that reasons are a sufficient motivation for action if these reasons do not include a desire of the agent. Thomas Nagel's argument in The Possibility of Altruism is illustrative of the position that, if the truth of an ethical claim is recognized, the individual must accept the corresponding motivation.[1] Reasons are reasons, according to Nagel, by virtue of structural aspects of practical reasoning which depend on one's understanding of oneself as temporally extended and as one person among others, all of whom are equally real. To fail to be motivated to act by reasons based on this understanding, shows that one does not, in fact, have this understanding. According to Nagel, reasons motivate action because people accept certain principles which, then, govern their conduct. A consideration operates as a

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[1]Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 8. Nagel has reassessed this position in his article, "Subjective and Objective," in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 196-213.

motivating reason only if it has, or is thought to have, the status of a reason in the system of normative principles by which individuals govern their conduct. Such normative principles, therefore, specify significant features of the motivational structure.[2] Nagel's claim is that reasons motivate action because people commit themselves to a structure. The reasons are fundamental; neither these reasons nor motivation for action can be explained by desire. Nagel agrees that desires are present in any intentional pursuit of a goal but he thinks that desires are a logical consequence of a reason motivating.[3] Desires, he argues, are something one necessarily experiences when one acts as a result of being motivated by reasons. Consequently, desires are often motivated exactly as the action is -- by reason.[4]

According to Nagel, the individual must subsume oneself in the structure. To subsume oneself in the structure, however, is to desire that the structure govern behavior. Although one must understand the nature of the structure within which one attempts to act, one must also have a desire if the particular structure is to, in fact, structure one's actions. Elizabeth Anscombe puts the point this way.

> . . . whatever is described in the proposition that is the starting-point of the argument must be wanted in order for the reasoning to lead to any action . . . . 'Dry food' . . . 'suits anyone etc., so I'll have some of this' is a piece of reasoning which will go on only in someone who wants to eat suitable food.[5]

To indicate that desire motivates action is not to make the claim, as Nagel seems to think, that desires motivate reasons. These reasons explain the structure within which particular desires might arise. Nor do desires logically follow from these reasons. However, when a desire does occur, it derives its meaning from these reasons. For example, a player can understand that a game is constituted by its rules and that the rules provide the context within which it is possible to play the game without being motivated to play the game by its rules. An understanding of the reasons for playing a game by its rules does not motivate the player unless

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[2]Nagel, p. 15
[3]Nagel, p. 30.
[4]Nagel, p. 30.
[5]Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, reprinted 1966), p. 66.

he or she desires that these justifying reasons should govern behavior.

There is a difference between having a reason and acknowledging that one has a reason. "A consideration C . . . can give one a reason to do X quite independently of my desires respecting X. However, whether or not I will acknowledge that C gives me a reason for doing X is not independent of my desires."[6] Having a reason for wanting to do X which operates as a motive for the individual doing X is different from a reason in favor of doing X.[7] "There is no contradiction in saying that what gave one every ground, and was known to do so, failed to motivate one in any way."[8] These justifying reasons are necessary in order for the action to be meaningful but justifying reasons are not sufficient to motivate an individual to act. For example, if Dr. Alexander submits her grades to the registrar's office, this action is to be understood within the context of a university and in relation to the enterprise of evaluation. The reasons which justify submitting grades at a university give meaning or context to Dr. Alexander's actions. This meaning is absent if she attempts to submit grades during a walk in the park, for example. The provision of reasons which justify an action in relation to the purpose of a university and the enterprise of evaluation do not, however, also motivate the action. If Dr. Alexander does not desire to submit her grades, justifying reasons are not sufficient to motivate her to act. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between reasons which justify and reasons which motivate. Justifying reasons are necessary but not sufficient for an action; they describe the context within which the action takes place. Motivating reasons consist of the individual's beliefs about the justifying reasons as well as other relevant beliefs and the individual's desire with respect to these beliefs. Notwithstanding countervailing desires and akrasia, motivating reasons are sufficient to motivate action. Dr. Alexander submits her marks because she has beliefs about recording student evaluations at a university and because she desires that the evaluation of her students be recorded. This desire, together with her beliefs about recording evaluations at a university, constitute her motivating reason for action.

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[6]James Montmarquet, "Nagel on Motivation," Australian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1982): 26.
[7]W. D. Falk, "Action-Guiding Reasons," Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 709.
[8]Falk, p. 709.

Moreover, if she desires to submit her marks based on certain beliefs, she can be described as caring that her marks are submitted.

Desire and Belief

A motivating reason for a response consists of both one's desire and one's relevant beliefs. If I believe that putting my bank card in the bank machine will allow a transaction, then I have a reason for putting the bank card in the machine, but only if I also want to do a transaction. The belief that putting the card in the machine will allow a transaction is inert without the desire to do the transaction. Conversely, if I do not have a belief that putting the card in the machine will allow the transaction, the desire to do the transaction is also inert. Desire alone does not motivate action. Even a basic desire such as the desire for water requires beliefs about how the desire might be satisfied by a particular action.

Don Locke argues that, if an individual believes that a belief provides a reason for action, then the individual can be said to act for that reason.[9] Locke claims that, if some beliefs do not motivate, it is not because the individual is without a relevant desire; it is because these beliefs are not accompanied by other beliefs that, given the first beliefs, the action is the rational thing to do.[10] Locke agrees that believing, for example, that roses are red and that sugar is sweet is not sufficient to motivate one to do anything.[11] It is necessarry, he says, to have a second belief that the first belief makes action appropriate. Because we do many things out of habit or from custom, Locke dismisses desire as being essential for action since, he says, there is no <u>particular</u> desire involved.[12] It is not evident, however, that this is correct. If I habitually pick up my mail each day after work, I do so with the belief that the letter carrier

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[9]Don Locke, "Beliefs, Desires and Reasons for Action," <u>American Philosophical Quarterly</u> 19 (1982): 241-249.
[10]Locke, p. 247. There is an important truth in what Locke says here; it is not adequate to merely have a belief but one must also acknowledge or spell out to oneself the significance of the belief to one's actions. To do otherwise, as Herbert Fingarette suggests in <u>Self-Deception</u> (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) is to risk self-deception.
[11]Locke, p. 242.
[12]Locke, p. 243.

puts my mail in the mail box and with the desire to have my mail. Neither one's desire nor one's belief need be present before the mind in order for an action to take place. Indeed, if they did, then, Locke's beliefs about beliefs could not explain habitual action.

Locke's claim with respect to the bank card example would be:

1. I believe that by putting my bank card in the machine I will receive money.

2. I believe that given my belief about my bank card and the machine, it is appropriate to put my bank card in the machine.

Two belief statements of this kind, however, are not sufficient for action. I may have both beliefs but still not be motivated to act because I have, at this moment, a wallet full of money and do not desire any more. It is only if the second belief is, in fact, a desire that action can be motivated. This is not to say that desire and belief necessitate action; it is clear that people do have certain beliefs and relevant desires but do not act because of countervailing beliefs or because of akrasia.[13]

Locke does, in fact, account for 'wanting' but he does so by making a belief into a want. He says, "It isn't that you need a want to turn a belief into a reason; rather a belief's being a reason is precisely what a want is."[14] With that stipulation he is able to assert that "all we need . . . to explain people's action are their beliefs: people act as they do because they believe what they do."[15] Locke's thesis that action is motivated by having a belief that the first belief makes an action appropriate, can, given the reduction of wants to beliefs, be restated as indicating that someone believes that an action is appropriate if one believes that the action will

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[13]The difference between motivating reason and intention can be made clear with respect to countervailing desires and akrasia. Intention can be understood as the description of one's action represented by the agent to himself or herself. Intentions describe desires and beliefs of the agent; if I say that I intend to open the door, my intention describes what I desire to do as well as my beliefs about the appropriateness of the circumstances for my desires. The description of one's intention will include a description of one's desires and relevant beliefs but having desires and beliefs does not imply that one has an intention. I may desire to help someone whom I believe to require help but have no intention to help her because I desire my own welfare more which I believe will be diminished if I help.

[14]Don Locke, "Reasons, Wants, and Causes," American Philosphical Quarterly 11 (1974): 173.

[15]Locke, p. 173.

in some way achieve what one wants.

Although not sufficient to motivate a response, Locke's beliefs about beliefs are a necessary part of motivation. Beliefs about beliefs are appraisals. To appraise is to 'see' one's beliefs according to a particular description. In order to put my bank card in the machine, I must appraise this as a situation in which it is appropriate to put my bank card in the bank machine. As indicated, these appraisals or beliefs about beliefs are not sufficient for action. One must also desire to do the action.

It is not always necessary to mention both desire and belief when explaining someone's action. It is only necessary if the listener is not clear how either the belief or desire alone explain the action. Sometimes the explanation of my action will not refer to either my desire or my belief but can be inferred from the reason I give. If I am asked why I am running the tap water and I give as my reason--"to wash the dishes"--the listener can reconstruct that I desire to wash the dishes and that I believe that running the tap water will contribute to that action.

Reasons which justify a structure or a practise are insufficient for action, although they are necessary if an action is to have a context. Motivating reasons, understood as the combination of desires and relevant beliefs (which include appraisals and beliefs about justifying reasons) are both necessary and sufficient for action, in the absence of countervailing motivations or akrasia. If, based on relevant beliefs, one has a desire to respond, the individual cares that he or she responds.

A motivating reason is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain all bodily movements, however. Both actions and bodily movements can be explained by mechanical and physiological descriptions. Motivating reasons apply only to actions. Being an agent is to have at least some of one's bodily movements capable of explanation by motivating reasons.

Logical - Causal Distinction

To care that X is the case is to be motivated to affect the occurrence of X. I have indicated that 'care' is the motivating reason for action and that a motivating reason consists of

both desire and belief. The connection between desires/beliefs and action is thought to be logical by some and causal by others. I argue that a logical connection need not preclude causality. In doing so I opt for what has been called an 'essential explanation' of action.

The debate regarding the relation of motivating reasons to action focuses primarily on the following issue: if there is a logical relation between motive and action can there also be a causal relation? It is generally thought that if two events are related as cause and effect this relationship can be determined through empirical measures and not by a priori demonstration. Action, however, seems to satisfy both logical and causal requirements, thereby falsifying this thesis. For example, when one raises one's arm because one is motivated to raise one's arm, the cause (the motivation) seems to be derived a priori from the outcome. However, there also seem to be two distinct events with the outcome of raising one's arm having been caused by one's motivation to raise one's arm.

A. I. Melden is representative of the position that reasons are not causes of actions. Melden claims that, since a cause must be "logically distinct from the alleged effect,"[16] and, since a reason is not logically distinct from action, reasons are not, then, causes of action. A reason, he says, merely redescribes an action, thereby making it intelligible. Because a reason and an action are one event with different descriptions, there is no causal relationship. Causal relationships require two events.

> Since a motive, in explaining, an action, makes it clear what the action in question is, any description or account of the motive must of necessity involve a reference to an action being performed, and specifically to the kind of action that is thereby specified by the explanation given.[17]

Similiarly Melden asserts that there can be no causal relationship between desire and action.

> As Humean cause or internal impression, it must be discernible without reference to anything else - object desired, the action of getting or the action of trying to get the thing desired: but as desire this is impossible. Any description of the desire involves a logically necessary connection with the thing desired. No internal impression

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[16]A. I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 52.
[17]Melden, p. 90.

> could possibly have this logical impression. Hence, a desire cannot possibly be an internal impression.[18]

According to Melden, we only make reference to reasons and desires to more fully understand actions. Melden is correct insofar as a point of describing motivation is to more fully understand action but this need not be the point of these descriptions.[19] Often we ask for a description of reasons and desires not because we are unclear about the action but because we are unclear why the action occurred as it did.

> For example, suppose Mary sees John collide with someone else. She asks, "Why did John do that?" And the reply is, "he intended to knock the man out of the way of a flower pot that has just fallen from the sill above." This reply seems to identify the action as one which is caused in one way, and not, for example, in some other--it was not due to some reflex . . .[20]

A logical link between motivation and action does not preclude a causal link. "It is for example, a conceptual, and not merely contingent, fact that taking poison leads, other things equal, to sickness and even death, or that scars are the result of wounds but this does not conflict with the obvious fact that poisons cause sickness or that scars are caused by wounds."[21] It is a misunderstanding of Hume's notion of causal relationship to contend that he thought there to be no causal link between events if there is a logical link. ". . . {H}is whole point is that logical or conceptual links hold only between ideas, not between existences or occurrences."[22]

It is feared that if causality is part of the understanding of action, action is reduced to those explanations used by the natural sciences. Thus Richard Taylor advises that "the word 'cause' in such contexts has not the ordinary meaning of a certain relationship between wants, but has rather the older meaning of the efficacy or power of an agent to produce certain results."[23] All causes do not function as causes in natural science, however. ". . . {R}easons do

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[18]Melden, p. 114.
[19]Arnold S. Kaufman, "Practical Decision," Mind 75 (1966): 40.
[20]Kaufman, p. 40.
[21]Locke, "Reasons, Wants, and Causes," p. 175.
[22]Locke, p. 175.
[23]Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 109-12.

differ from other causes, like physical forces or the fear of death which causes a man to tremble, but these other causes also differ considerably among themselves."[24]

Including causality in the understanding of agency does not deny human freedom. Motivating reasons as causes do not function the same as those causes which necessitate. If someone is hit by an avalanche, the individual will necessarily be swept along with it. An agent's motivating reason, however, is not enough to ensure that an outcome will occur. Countervailing factors can intervene. This is not to say, however, that motivating reasons cannot be causes just as it is not the case that we refrain from attributing causality to natural events because there are times when some other condition has intervened to countervail the anticipated outcome.

Because it is possible to provide a cause for an action does not mean that there is a complete causal explanation for an action. "We can say that what a person wants and what a person believes are among the determining factors of those movements we call actions,"[25] but we cannot, at least at this point, give a complete causal explanation which contains law-like generalizations of how motivating reasons produce action. Just how motivating reasons move people to action is no more a philosophical question than the question of how flames ignite gases or why apples fall down rather than up.[26] We may not have a complete causal explanation of how motivating reasons produce action but this does not allow us to make the further claim that we cannot identify antecedent conditions which are the cause of a particular action.

Although we can refer to causes to explain human action, there are other forms of explanation. Irving Thalberg indicates that, whereas a causal explanation redescribes an occurrence as having resulted from certain antecedent happenings, an 'essential explanation' of an occurrence redescribes it in terms of properties that make it a certain kind of event.[27] Although both causal and essential explanations are explanations of the same occurrence, each

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[24]Locke, "Reasons, Wants, and Causes," p. 169.
[25]Kurt Baier, "Action and Agent," The Monist 49 (1965): 193.
[26]Don Locke, "Reasons, Wants, and Causes," p. 176.
[27]Irving Thalberg, Enigmas of Agency (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1972), pp. 75-76.

accounts for different features and in a different way. Essential explanation takes account of causes but it is not a causal explanation because of the absence of law-like generalizations with respect to the connection between motivating reasons and action. Thalberg gives the example of a lifeguard saving a drowning person and indicates that an essential explanation of the action would include such things as what it is to be a lifeguard, what it is to be drowning, and what it is about the action which makes it an instance of rescuing.[28] This is consistent with what I have said about justifying reasons providing the context from which desires can be understood. If someone's actions are to be fully explained, an account must be given of both the context and causes (justifying reasons and motivating reasons). This account is an essential explanation.

What must be conceded to Melden and other entailment theorists is that action, unlike mere bodily movement, entails reference to the individual's desires and beliefs. Furthermore, as I will discuss more fully later, desires are logically linked to objects. "It is no more possible for a person to be angry about nothing than for a person to have a desire that is not a desire for something."[29] The entailment theorists are also correct to indicate that non-causal forms of explanation are important for the understanding of action. What is not conceded is that a description of a motivating reason is just the description of an action, since examples show that individuals do have motivating reasons and do not act. This demonstrates that they are not, then, the same event. Moreover, the fact that action entails desires and beliefs does not preclude these desires and beliefs from being causes of action.

In summary, then, contrary to Melden, one can attribute causes to actions despite there being a logical connection between agency and action and motivating reasons and their objects. Motivating reasons are causes of action without also being complete causal explanations. As causes they do not necessitate action because there is the possibility of countervailing reasons and of akrasia. This is to say that, whereas desire and belief are necessary conditions of a motivating reason and as such motivate action, motivating reasons are not sufficient for action if there are other factors which inhibit the individual from acting.

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[28]Thalberg, pp. 78-79.
[29]Melden, Free Action, p. 205.

Character Traits

In this section I show that some desires, namely character traits, are intrinsic and fairly permanent and that these desires, when accompanied by relevant belief, are motivating reasons for certain kinds of actions. I differentiate moral and non-moral character traits and I differentiate moral from non-moral care. An initial attempt is made to establish that the character traits of benevolence and justice are developed from a feeling of empathetic distress.

Human beings have certain instinctual desires, the most obvious of which are hunger, thirst, and sexual desire. Individuals may have conditioned desires such as those which result from addictions of various kinds or from environmental conditioners. Desires can be contrasted to states, impulses, and compulsions each of which may affect what one desires and what one believes. There can be impulsive or compulsive desires as well as desires which occur as a result of particular emotional states.

Having a desire does not entail that it is present at all times.

> One may say, "Of course I want success, but not now; now I want to go to sleep." Of the last I am desirous; I am dwelling on the end as a possible achievement, and in dwelling on it I am under its spell. Of the first, the wanted success, I am not desirous here and now; that all the same I desire it is to say that I am disposed to be desirous of it, will desire it when I dwell on it, and, perhaps, not infrequently, dwell on it desirously.[30]

To say that someone desires something is to say that, given the appropriate conditions, the individual would be disappointed if he or she didn't obtain what was desired; the individual would feel joy if he or she did obtain what was desired; or that the individual would act in a way which was believed to bring about what he or she desired.[31]

Certain desires are intrinsic--the explanation of the desire is not derived from some other want.[32] Desires of this kind are character traits if they are also fairly permanent features of the individual.[33] Having an intrinsic desire is not to have the desire for the sake of having the

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[30]Falk, "Action Guiding Reasons," p. 716.
[31]Richard Brandt, "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 29.
[32]Brandt, p. 30.
[33]Brandt, p. 35.

desire. An intrinsic desire to be generous, for example, is not the desire to be generous for the sake of being generous. The desire is intrinsic because the individual has a desire to give without an accompanying desire to be well-liked.

Not all ascriptions of intrinsic desires attribute character traits to people. Desires which are differentiated by a "satiation phenomenom"[34] are not character traits. Desire for water, for example, is satiated after consuming a certain amount of water but a desire that others not suffer is not satiated after coming to the aid of a few suffering people. Character traits are not satiable, whereas an intrinsic desire for chocolate cake, for example, is.

We often describe people without attributing desires to them. When we indicate that someone is cheerful or excitable, for example, we are not saying that the individual has a desire. These "stylistic traits"[35] merely affirm that a corresponding form of behavior has occurred relatively frequently in the past. A conceited person, for example, is someone who overemphasizes his or her own abilities. Conceit is not a desire, although one does say that Jones acted out of conceit or as a result of conceit.[36] What is apparent about these examples is that traits such as being cheerful, excitable, and conceited do not have an end to which they are directed. As Melden correctly argues, if one desires, one must desire something. When one is benevolent, cowardly, honest, just, and so on, one desires a particular end. When one is timid, sarcastic, skeptical and so on, one exhibits a certain style.

I have argued that character traits are intrinsic, fairly permanent features of an individual which are directed at some end. This position needs to be defended against the view that character traits are not, in fact, a particular kind of desire. William Alston[37] claims, for example, that character traits are distinct from desires because character traits are manifested in behavior in some frequency and desires are not. According to Alston, to ascribe a character trait to someone is to indicate that the individual is disposed to behave in a way correlated to

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[34]Brandt, p. 29.
[35]Brandt, p. 27.
[36]N. S. Sutherland, "Motives as Explanations," Mind 68 (1959): 150.
[37]William Alston, "Toward a Logical Geography of Personality Traits and Deeper Lying Personality Characteristics," Mind, Science and History, eds. H. E. Keifer and M. K. Munitz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970), pp. 59-92.

the trait and that one behaves in this way relatively frequently.

> . . . unless P has obeyed some orders, it cannot be correct to call him obedient, unless P has actually shown appreciation, he could not be termed appreciative, unless he has conformed to social conventions, he is not conventional.[38]

Desires, on the other hand, says Alston, are not always manifested in behavior. One can desire to be liked, for example, but never do anything to get the other to like you.[39] It is, however, because character traits are desires that they do, in fact, have the features Alston ascribes to desires. As desires, they may not always be manifested in behavior. We do not refrain from calling an individual courageous who is faced with only one opportunity to save others nor do we necessarily withhold ascribing the character trait after only one instance of courageousness.[40] Furthermore, as I discuss more fully in Chapter Four, studying someone's behavior is not adequate for the assessment of that individual's moral response. For example, if an individual is unable to assist someone in a burning building, this does not necessarily indicate that the person is not compassionate.

Alston must explain why traits are manifested as they are. He attempts to do this by indicating that the manifestation of behavior to which a character trait is ascribed is explained by a number of different motives. A given trait is not thought to be identified with any particular desire; one may manifest a given trait, according to Alston, for very different motives. He contends that, although we may indicate that certain actions of an individual are polite actions, and, therefore, that the individual is a polite person, "we are inclined to say that the fact that he is a polite person doesn't really explain why he acts politely in a particular case."[41] The individual could want to ingratiate himself, for example. But, we do not say that someone is kind if we know that the person's frequent actions of assistance and words of assurance are done in order to improve the status or well-being of that individual. The actions alone do not establish kindness. One must act without a self-interested motive. The actions

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[38]Alston, p. 62.
[39]Alston, p. 62.
[40]Brandt, "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," p. 26.
[41]Alston, "Toward a Logical Geography of Personality Traits", p. 87.

must be done from an intrinsic desire to assist. Polite behavior cannot be explained by a number of motives. However, if the individual is polite, polite behavior can be manifested in a myriad of ways.

Character traits apply to persons. As a fairly permanent feature of a person, a character trait is what the person is. Someone cannot decide to have a character trait. As Beehler says, "if you don't have regard for, say, honesty now, how are you to decide to have one? My trouble is not: I cannot see what sort of thing would be a reason for deciding. My trouble is: is this the sort of thing you can decide?"[42] Character, like the moral life, "goes on continually", and is not "switched off" between "explicit moral choices."[43] One can, of course, try to become benevolent and just between moral choices and this can be of assistance at the "moment of choice" but deciding to <u>be</u> benevolent and just is impossible.

Moral and Non-Moral Care

I have argued that a motivating reason for action consists of desire and relevant belief and I have indicated that to have a motivating reason that something is the case is to care that this something is the case. I have said that a character trait, as an intrinsic, fairly permanent desire, in conjunction with relevant beliefs, comprise the moral motivating reason for action. This, in turn, is to say that moral character traits and relevant beliefs comprise moral care. Non-moral care, on the other hand, consists either of non-moral character traits together with relevant beliefs or it consists of other kinds of non-intrinsic desires together with relevant beliefs.

Since 'care' is any motivating reason for action, it is evident that not only are there various desires and relevant beliefs which comprise care, there are many varied objects of care as well. These objects are logically tied to particular desires. It is not possible, for example, to be kind to a utensil. Although not everything can be an object of moral care, objects of moral care can be objects of non-moral care if the desire the individual has is not an intrinsic desire

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[42]Rodger Beehler, "Reasons for Being Moral," <u>Analysis</u> 33 (1972): 16.
[43]Murdoch, <u>The Sovereignty of Good</u>, p. 37.

or, if the satisfaction of the intrinsic desire does not take into account the well-being of sentient beings. One might, for example, have the desire to look after one's aging parent because of the possibility of being named in a will or one might have, for example, the non-moral character trait of curiosity which, when acted upon, interferes with others' privacy.

'Carefulness' or 'carelessness' are stylistic traits which refer to the degree of involvement the individual has in a situation. It is unlikely that the individual who cares that something is the case would be careless in attempting to affect its occurrence. Someone is more likely to be careful if there is a strong desire that something occurs; someone is more likely to be careless if there is a weak desire that something occurs.

I am interested in those situations in which someone cares 'that' something is the case. Connected to caring 'that' are the notions of caring 'about' and caring 'for'. Caring 'for' is a task oriented concept which describes what might be involved in tending for someone or something else, whereas caring 'about' is acknowledgeing or paying attention to something. There is no logical connection between caring 'about' and caring 'for' since one can care for (tend to) something (or someone) and not care 'about' it and one can care 'about' something (or someone) and not care 'for' (tend to) it. If one cares 'that' another's welfare is enhanced, for example, then one cares 'about' the other. If one cares 'about' another, one is likely motivated to enhance the other's welfare, although not necessarily. Caring 'that' another's welfare is enhanced, for example, may or may not result in caring 'for' the other.

Empathetic Distress

Empathy is described in the psychological literature as the involuntary experiencing of another's emotional state.[44] Empathetic distress is displayed by very young children who become distressed at the misfortunes of others. Hoffman suggests that empathetic distress is basic to what he calls altruistic motivation (what I refer to in the next chapter as benevolent

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[44]Martin Hoffman, "Empathy, Role-Taking, Guilt, and Development of Altruistic Motives," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. Thomas Lickman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), p. 126.

and just motivation) "because its occurence shows that we may involuntarily and forcefully experience others' emotional states rather than only the emotional states pertinent and appropriate to our own situation -- that . . . distress will often be contingent not on our own, but on someone else's painful experience."[45]

In the next chapter I give a general account of the link between empathetic distress and sympathy and the link between sympathy and the character traits of benevolence and justice. The connection of empathy and sympathy to benevolence is more apparent than the connection of these to justice. I will argue, however, that benevolence and justice presuppose empathy and sympathy. Consequently, justice is not "prior to and independent of the goodness of a person".[46] Instead, justice is "bound up with the goodness of a person."[47] Or, as I will argue, justice and benevolence refer to a person's character.

Young children display empathetic distress but this is not the reason why empathy should be developed. It is evident that young children also show aggressive behavior toward others but it does not follow that aggression towards others should be developed. Despite the behaviors children do display, it must still be determined which behaviors are more appropriate to display. The development of empathy, unlike the development of aggression, is connected to morality. If someone asks, "Why should I be moral?" the answer is, "In order to minimize suffering and to enhance welfare and fair treatment." If someone asks, "Why should I want that?", there is no further answer which can be given. Stephen Toulmin calls a question of this kind a "limiting question" because, as he says, "I could only reply by asking in return, 'what better kinds of reason could you want?'"[48] If someone asks this second question, the person is asking for a reason why he or she should be motivated by this justifying reason. If these reasons do not already count with an individual, the provision of justifying reasons is unlikely

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[45]Hoffman, p. 132.
[46]Stuart Hampshire, "What is the Just Society?," New York Review of Books 18 (1972): 39, quoted in Andrea Teuber, "Simone Weil: Equality as Compassion", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982): 223.
[47]Hampshire in Teuber, p. 223.
[48]Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1964), p. 224.

to convince the person to be moral. This is not to make the further claim that morality is valuable because it is desired. One's motivating reason does not confer value upon morality; one accounts for the value of morality by providing justifying reasons which refer to the well-being of sentient beings until the request for reasons is limiting.

Before proceeding in the next chapter with an account of the character traits of benevolence and justice, I want to reject the notion that empathy is, in any way, a moral sense--a perceptual faculty which is sufficient for moral judgment. The experience of distress at another's misfortune is not also an ability to apprehend or to judge. David Hume argued that sympathy is a moral sense which both perceives what is morally correct and determines moral action. Adam Smith, although denying a moral sense, thought that the presence of sympathy is connected with approval and the absence of sympathy is connected with disapproval. Sympathy, to Smith, includes imagining oneself in the other's situation and having the emotional experience the other has, although it is not clear whether Smith intended sympathy to involve imagining what one would feel like if one were in the other's situation or whether he intended it to involve imagining oneself as the other person.[49] Sympathy is separate from the ability to aprehend that others suffer or imagine others' feelings when they suffer. An ability to apprehend others' predicaments is essential to the occurrence of a moral response but apprehension of a predicament does not presume sensitivity to the predicament. Similarly, although the desire to respond to another entails that one must be able to imagine the other and, in turn, contributes to the development of the imagination of others' predicaments, to imagine someone's predicament does not entail that one also empathizes with the other. The development of empathy into the character trait of justice may motivate one to make moral judgments, but it is not the ability to do so. Contrary to Smith, who thought there to be a necessary connection between being sympathetic with someone (understood as imagining what it would be like to be in the other's situation) and approval, empathy, as a simple response to others, does not imply the notion of approbation at all. I may, for example, be empathetic

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[49]Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 86.

with someone and be repulsed by the person's conduct.

Summary

I have attempted to establish the following:

1. To care that something is the case is to have a motivating reason to act in order to affect its occurrence.

2. The motivating reason consists of the individual's desire and relevant beliefs and is distinct from a justifying reason which provides an explanation of the context or structure within which the action has meaning.

3. The desire portion of a motivating reason, if intrinsic and fairly permanent, is a character trait. If the object of the character trait is the well-being of others, it is a moral character trait.

4. The basis of the moral character trait of benevolence and justice is to be found in empathetic distress.

In the chapter which follows I turn my attention to the features of benevolence and justice.

Chapter III

BENEVOLENCE AND JUSTICE AS MORAL CARE

In this chapter I argue that benevolence and justice are the character trait components of moral care. I show that, if an individual has the character trait of benevolence, he or she is benevolent and, if an individual has the character trait of justice, he or she is just. Benevolence and justice, as character traits, are what the individual is. Rodger Beehler writes about "approaching life and persons honestly, justly, forgivingly, and so on, where those things matter to you, where, in a sense, these things are what you are," [1] but Beehler calls all these approaches care. I have also argued that these approaches are care insofar as it matters or makes a difference that something is the case. This in itself is not very helpful. Nor is it helpful to claim that benevolence and justice have much in common because they are both developed from empathy. "A 'caring' which embodies a concern for justice may indeed grow on the soil of direct interpersonal sympathies, but it is still a new growth." [2] My purpose in this chapter is to distinguish benevolence as moral care from justice as moral care.

Beehler also writes about justice as if it is a principle. ("If J acts as justice requires this will be an acting from concern for these people . . ."[3]) Although Beehler does not make the distinction between justice as a trait and justice as a principle explicit, there is an important distinction between the two. There is also an important distinction between benevolence as a trait and benevolence as a principle. I will show that the morality of principles and the morality of character traits are complementary aspects of the same morality.

Benevolence and Justice as Character Traits

Benevolence and justice are developed from empathetic distress and sympathy, as I will show. They, nonetheless, are distinguished from each other as character traits by the object of desire specific to each. Benevolence is a fairly permanent desire to enhance and/or not

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[1]Beehler, "Reasons for Being Moral," p. 16.
[2]Norman, "Critical Notice of Rodger Beehler: Moral Life," p. 172.
[3]Beehler, Moral Life, p. 201.

diminish others' welfare. (From this point on, for the sake of brevity, I refer to benevolence as the desire for others' welfare.) Justice is a fairly permanent desire that others are treated fairly. The individual who is benevolent has a general desire for the welfare of others and, at least in some particular situations, desires another's welfare. The just individual has a general desire that others are treated fairly and, at least in some particular situations, desires that another is treated fairly.

For some character traits, such as courage, there may be only a few opportunities for someone to actually display the character trait. It would be unusual, however, if someone had only a few opportunities to display benevolence or justice in behavior. Most people live in some kind of social environment in which there are many occasions to respond benevolently or justly. One can, of course, live in a monastery or on an estate and, by doing so, remove the opportunity for benevolence and justice as well as the opportunity to be morally compromised. It is unlikely, however, that the sequestered individual can develop benevolent and just character traits. The individual on the estate may frequently respond benevolently toward his children but be indifferent to the suffering of those outside his extravagant existence. This exemplifies the inappropriateness of ascribing character traits merely on the basis of the number of responses.

In Chapter One I introduced the notion of empathetic distress as an affective response to others. Empirical work has shown that babies are capable of empathetic distress long before the development of a sense of either the self or the other.[4] Only after the child has developed the understanding of self and others can what the child feels be transformed from distress with the other to distress for the other. Distress for the other is sympathy. Although I cannot pursue these here, it is evident that there are many cognitive and affective differences in the continuum from empathetic distress to empathy and from empathy to sympathy. One of the most important differences between the feeling which is experienced in empathy and the feeling which is experienced in sympathy is that empathetic feeling is a reaction to others and

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[4]Hoffman, "Empathy, Role-Taking, Guilt, and Development of Altruistic Motives," p. 131.

sympathetic feeling is the result of a desire. Empathetic feeling is a sensation while sympathetic feeling is an emotion. Sympathetic emotion, as a feeling for another, is conceptually linked to the desire that others not feel the way they do or, depending on the situation, that they continue to feel the way they do. To feel empathy, then, is to be aware of how another feels and to feel the same sort of feeling. To feel sympathy is to be aware of how another feels and to have it matter that the other feels this way.[5] In Chapter Four I will substantiate the claim that emotion is conceptually linked to a desire of a particular kind.

The object of both empathetic distress and sympathetic distress is a sentient being--a being who has feelings and who can be harmed and, therefore, helped. It is not logically possible to feel with or to feel for something which does not have feelings.

Sympathy is presupposed by benevolence and justice. The individual who is generally benvolent and just (has the character traits of benevolence and justice) is also generally sympathetic. Unless one desires that others not feel as they do (or continue to feel as they do), one will not have an instrinsic desire for their welfare and fair treatment. On the basis of the sympathetic desire, one feels for another and, as a result of the sympathetic desire and emotion, the benevolent and just person desires to respond to affect the other's situation. Sympathy is as important a precondition for justice as it is for benevolence. Without feeling for the other, a desire to treat others fairly could be a desire that all groups, for example, receive fair distribution of torture. Feeling for others restricts morally fair treatment to those situations in which the well-being of sentient beings is affected.

Benevolent and just desires are directed at sentient beings. Because they are intrinsic desires, the benevolent individual desires anothers' welfare without accompanying desires that he or she may personally gain as a result of the improved welfare of the other. Similiarly, the just individual desires that others are treated fairly, not because this fair treatment may be of personal benefit, but for the sake of the sentient being(s) involved.

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[5]James Gribble and Graham Oliver, "Empathy and Education," Studies in Philosophy and Education 3 (1973): 12.

The benevolent desire and the just desire may be fairly permanent features of the individual's personality and because of this there is a consistency about the way benevolent and just persons react to situations when sentient beings are affected in certain ways. This is an important point, since consistency is often thought to be characteristic of universal principles and not characteristic of desire. A benevolent or just person is consistently moved by certain sorts of considerations. This is not to say, however, that the individual acts from universal principles. I develop this point in the next chapter.

Although the recipient of benevolent and just desires is, in both instances, a sentient being, what is desired for the sentient being is different in each case. The benevolent desire is directed at the welfare of others while the just desire is directed at fair treatment of others. It is possible that fair treatment of others may result in enhancement of welfare but just desire is not the desire for this. In some instances the desire for fair treatment may result in diminished welfare for one or more parties. "An action may be . . . just but not more beneficent in its effect than would have been any other action possible in the circumstances."[6] This is not to say that one does not care in this case. The just person experiences a sympathetic feeling for those he or she desires to treat fairly even though in some instances fair treatment may mean decreased welfare for some.

A benevolent desire is directed at another's welfare in those situations in which there is no conflict. A just desire is directed at others in situations in which there is a conflict between sentient beings or between sentient beings and a standard of some kind. Justice which is determined by reference to conflicts between sentient beings has been called comparative justice and justice which is determined independently of others has been called noncomparative justice.[7] Noncomparative justice does, however, involve a comparison--the comparison is with a standard of some kind. Non-comparative justice includes, for example, the desire that an innocent person not be found guilty or that a meritorious person not be disparaged. Both

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[6] G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1971), p. 83.

[7] Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 266.

comparative and noncomparative justice involve conflict. In comparative justice the conflict is between or among sentient beings. In noncomparative justice the conflict is between what an individual receives or how the individual is assessed and what is his or her due.

The just person, who has conflicting benevolent desires for two or more others, desires that there be fair treatment for each. Helen, for example, is present when two people are injured in an accident. Only one can be assisted at a time. Helen feels sympathy for both and because she is just, she desires that both are treated fairly. Her decision to help one before the other is based on the fact that one is more injured and not, for example, that one is of a particular race or religion. Conflicts of this type can be complicated particularly if one of the injuries is to a friend or family member [8] or if the injured other is an animal. [9] I say something more about these complex situations later but what is important, here, is that regardless of what considerations one takes into account when deciding between friends and strangers or humans and animals, the desire that they are treated fairly is the desire to give due regard to the interests of all in the conflict.

Generally, benevolent desire is for others' welfare in those situations in which there is no conflict between sentient beings or no conflict between a sentient being and some standard. The benevolent person desires that others are not injured, starved, homeless, distraught, lost, confused, friendless, ignorant, confined, or tormented and, if they are, that their situation is ameliorated. In certain situations, the desire for the welfare of others is also the desire that others flourish. Although one may have a general benevolent desire that all others not suffer and that they all flourish, the features of a particular situation may be such that it is only appropriate to desire one or the other. For example, if someone is preparing for Law School entrance exams, one desires that she do well or flourish, whereas if she has a terminal illness, one desires that she not suffer.

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[8]See Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, pp. 43-83 for a discussion of these types of conflicts.
[9]See Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 98-111.

Benevolence is manifested differently in different situations. If Lynn has a desire to share her possessions in order to enhance the welfare of another, she is benevolent, but, more specifically, she is charitable. Similarly, if Ron desires to listen to another's problems in order to assist him, he is benevolent, but, more specifically, he is kind. Benevolence, then, is distinguished with respect to the ways in which the beneficiary needs benefiting.

There are situations in which the desire to enhance another's welfare unfairly affects the welfare of another. In these situations, it is appropriate to desire that others are treated fairly. If Jane is to settle a dispute between two people, one of whom is a friend, she may desire to enhance the welfare of her friend. If this desire predominates over the desire for fair treatment and Jane takes her friend's position despite the evidence, the benevolent desire is inappropriate for this situation.

Although it is inappropriate to have a benevolent desire predominate in a situation in which there is conflict, it is nonsensical to have a just desire in a situation for which a benevolent desire is appropriate. It is extraneous to have a just desire in situations in which there are no conflicts either between sentient beings or between a sentient being and some standard.

I have argued that to be benevolent and just is to care that the circumstances of others are affected in certain ways specific to each circumstance. Benevolent and just desires are directed toward other sentient beings. One can care without the other being aware of the benevolent or just desires and without the other reciprocating the care. I may care that your welfare is affected and that you are treated fairly without you also caring that my welfare is affected and that I am treated fairly. This differs from the account of care given by Nel Nodding. Nodding contends that there is no care if the "cared-for" does not reciprocate the care. She bases this notion of reciprocity on an interpretation of Martin Buber's I-Thou relationship --a relationship which is possible only if both participate or share. "One should not try to dilute the meaning of relation; relation is reciprocity."[10] Buber claims that reciprocity

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[10]Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 58.

takes place 'between' two individuals. When two people relate to each other, says Buber, there is an essential remainder which is common to them which is the sphere of the between.[11] An I-Thou relationship is more than a reciprocal desire for each other's welfare and fair treatment. According to Buber, by participating in an I-Thou relation, one becomes a person. ("The saying of Thou by the I stands in the origin of all human becoming.") The notion of care as motivation which I have described is much less complex than the communion which takes place in Buber's I-Thou realtion. I-Thou relations require reciprocity whereas care does not. However, it seems that a reciprocal desire for the other's welfare and fair treatment is a necessary condition for an I-Thou relation to occur.

The Desire to Treat Others Fairly

Someone who desires to treat others fairly must be impartial. One's own preferences and attachments must be distinct from the desire to treat others fairly both in one's institutional roles and in any informal role one has as an arbitrator in disagreements. One can, however, be impartial while experiencing sympathy for those in a conflict. Sympathy is a partiality toward another as someone who can be harmed and helped. It is not a partiality with respect to the individual's personal features.[12] A just individual is someone who is partial to someone as a sentient being but impartial with respect to such things as hair colour, sense of humour, or country of origin.

Just desire entails partiality for the recipient of the desire as a sentient being. But when a conflict occurs, fair treatment also entails that each sentient being in the conflict is regarded impartially in relation to every other sentient being in the conflict or in relation to a standard. Because of the precondition of sympathy, impartiality is not just a device to treat others so that no one receives more consideration than another. Those in the conflict have a claim on the just person because he or she has sympathy for them.

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[11]Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 85.
[12]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 24.

The achievement of fair treatment is more complex when conflicts occur between species, especially between humans and animals or, for example, between mammals and insects. It is reasonable to work out our decisions in these kind of conflicts based on the supposition that suffering and enjoyment expand as nervous systems grow progressively more complex.[13] The appropriateness of desiring justice for animalsat all is at issue when the social contract is considered to be the paradigm for justice. Hobbes thought, for example, that "the definition of INJUSTICE is no other than the not performance of covenant".[14] John Rawls writes that the limits of a theory of justice are that "no account can be given of right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of nature."[15] Because it is thought that animals do not reason and because animals cannot talk, they are unable to enter into a social contract. Therefore, it is thought that justice does not extend to them. Fair treatment, however, is not restricted to mutual contract. As Jeremy Bentham wrote:

> . . . a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or week, or even of a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk?, but Can they suffer?[16]

There are, of course, opportunities for justice to be done to animals by those fulfilling contractual social roles. The forest ranger, for example, desires the fair treatment of animals under his or her purview despite the fact that animals do not enter into a contract to guarantee this.

To be impartial is to give others equal consideration with respect to their interests. Frankena, for example, thinks that justice is best understood as treating others equally.[17] As it stands this is not very helpful since it does not specify what is relevant to treating others

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[13]Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, p. 90.
[14]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. John Plameratz (Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1974), p. 156.
[15]John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambride: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971), p. 512.
[16]Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, intro. Laurence J. Lafleur (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), p. 311n.
[17]William Frankena, Ethics, 2d. ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Inc., 1973), p. 50.

equally. What is relevant, argues Frankena, is not whether we should treat others in proportion to merit, or ability, or need, or effort; ". . . as far as justice is concerned," what is relevant depends on whether treating others in proportion to merit, ability, needs, or effort "helps or hinders them equally in the achievement of the best lives they are capable of."[18]

> If helping them in proportion to their needs is necessary for making an equal contribution to the goodness of their lives, then and only then is it unjust to do otherwise. If asking of them in proportion to their abilities is necessary for keeping their chance of a good life equal, then and only then is it unjust to do otherwise.[19]

In a conflict between non-human sentient beings and human sentient beings, for example, equal treatment would entail that both are assisted with respect to the type of life appropriate to each. As Midgley asserts, "Overlooking somebody's race is entirely sensible. Overlooking their species is a supercilious insult. It is no priviliege, but a misfortune, for a gorilla or a chimpanzee to be removed from its forest and its relatives and brought up alone among humans to be given what those humans regard as an education." [20]

Other Conditions of Benevolent and Just Desires

We do ascribe the character trait of benevolence to individuals who do not specifically desire the welfare of every sentient being and we do ascribe the character trait of justice to individuals who do not specifically desire that each sentient being is treated fairly. This is essentially a practical realization that it is impossible for human beings to be able to respond specifically to all suffering because it is not possible to be aware of it all. It does not follow from this, however, that benevolent and just desires are possible only toward those with whom one has personal relationships.

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[18]Frankena, p. 51.
[19]Frankena, p. 51.
[20]Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, p. 99.

The Effect of Proximity

> If by "I love everyone" I mean that I would not without just cause harm anyone, that is acceptable. It is not trivial, for there are those who would harm others for their own worldly gain. But it is wildly ambiguous. If that is all I mean when I say that I love my child, or my husband, or my student, then each of these has, I think, been cheated.[21]

This practical recognition of Noddings that one "cannot do everything" has been acknowledged by others as well. Hume, for example, wrote that, "We consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those, who have any immediate connexion or intercourse with the person possess'd of it"[22] and J. S. Mill wrote that "the great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular person concerned."[23]

Proximity to another is an important factor if one is specifically to desire either the other's welfare or fair treatment. It is impossible to have a desire for someone of whom one is unaware. Proximity is a relative concept. Someone may specifically desire the welfare of another who is remote, while someone else may need to be in very close contact with others in order to even be aware of them. Being close to another sentient being allows a greater opportunity to be aware of the other and, as a result, one is more likely to have benevolent and just desires for those who are proximate. But proximity does not guarantee that such desires will be present. Moreover, benevolence and justice do not occur only in proximate cases. Consequently, any attempt to circumscribe morality within proximate encounters is arbitrary.

If proximity is to have an effect on one's benevolent and just desires, it must be possible to have a better understanding of another by virtue of one's proximate position to the other. This understanding involves more than being aware of certain information about the individual.

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[21]Nodding, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, p. 112.
[22]Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, pp. 652- 653.
[23]J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism , ed. Oskar Piest (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1957), p. 25.

> To care for another person, I must be able to understand him and his world as if I were inside it. I must be able to see, as it were, with his eyes what his world is like to him and how he sees himself. Instead of merely looking at him in a detached way from outside, as if he were a specimen, I must be able to be with him in his world, "going" into his world in order to sense from "inside" what life is like for him, what he is striving to be, and what he requires to grow.[24]

If Mayeroff's account is not to be merely metaphorical, what it means to identify with someone else in the way Mayeroff has described must be made more clear. Identifying with another so that one is "inside" the other's world requires the ability to imagine what the other's world is like. There are some problems with imagining another in the way described by Mayeroff. If I attempt to imagine what it would be like for you to be you, then it is not possible for me to know how I would find the experience, if I were you.[25] Futhermore, it is practically impossible for me to "sense from 'inside' what life is like" for another because "one remains intractably oneself"[26] with one's own perspective. However, it is not necessary to alter one's "ontological perspective" or identify with each characteristic of the other in order to identify with one whose welfare is affected or one who has been treated unfairly. By being aware of oneself as a sentient being (one who can be harmed and helped), it is possible to imagine other sentient beings being harmed and helped. I do not need to imagine what it is like for a member of another species to be what it is[27] nor do I need to imagine what it would be like for me to be a member of another species to be able to identify with the suffering of an individual from another species. It is not necessary to imagine what it is like for the starving Ethiopian to be the starving Ethiopian. It is enought that I, as as sentient being, am able to imagine what it is like for another sentient being to starve.

We can subjectively and objectively imagine another sentient being. Subjective imagination involves imagining the types of experiences the other has. One can, for example,

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[24]Milton Mayeroff, On Caring (New York: Perennial Library, 1971), pp. 41-42.
[25]Mary Bitner Wiseman, "Empathetic Identification," American Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1978): 107.
[26]Wiseman, p. 111.
[27]See Thomas Nagel,"What is it like to be a bat?", in Mortal Questions, pp. 165-180 for a discussion of the ontological impossibility of knowing what it is like for the bat to be the bat.

subjectively imagine seeing with one's eyes or one can objectively imagine seeing one's eyes. One can subjectively imagine anything which can have experience; "being a king, a beggar, a cripple, a child, or a cat . . . . What is impossible is to imagine being a thing with no experience; a stone or a coffee-pot."[21] Objective imagination is restricted to the representation of objects which can be sensed. I can subjectively imagine what it is like for those starving in Ethiopia despite not having lived in hunger and I can objectively imagine what it would be like to see and hear those starving in Ethiopia. It is essential to have the ability to imagine the kinds of predicaments and accomplishments others may experience but objective imagination is not sufficient if identification with another is to occur. Identification with another requires subjective imagination.

Benevolence is both the desire that others not suffer and that they flourish. Whether one desires that another not suffer or whether one desires that another flourish is dependent on the particular circumstances of a situation. Since, as sentient beings, we are able to identify with the suffering of other sentient beings, not as much information is required in order to identify with another who suffers as is required to identify with what might count as an instance of flourishing for someone who does not suffer. It is less difficult to identify with someone who suffers than it is to identify with someone whose circumstances are unlike one's own and whose interests and needs are not clear.

If I am to desire another's welfare or fair treatment, I must identify with the other. And, in order to identify with the other, the other must be seen as a concrete particular rather than generally as a member of humanity, persons, or sentient beings. In order to see someone as an individual rather than as a member of some group, one must be aware of the other's existence. Identification is easier in families because others are proximate and they can be readily particularized. Proximity to another in a family allows one to be more aware of the individual's problems as well as what counts as flourishing for the individual. This is why it is

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[21]Zeno Vendler, "Speaking of Imagination," in Language, Mind, and Brain, ed. Thomas W. Simon and Robert J. Scholes (Hillside, N. J. : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1982). p. 36.

far more likely that benevolent desires directed at family members will include the desire that the family member flourish as well as the desire that he or she not suffer. One does not know, however, what a stranger "strives to be or what he requires to grow". It is not possible, then, to specifically desire that the stranger flourishes.

There is a barrier which separates us from strangers. Often strangers are seen as objects among other objects. If someone approaches a senient being as an object, there can be no relation 'between' them because, as Buber says, there can be no relation 'between' an object and a subject.[29] "Stepping into the between" is to meet the other. In Buber's language, it is to relate to the other as a Thou instead of an It. Breaking down the barriers between oneself and a stranger is more easily done if we are in a state of what Marcel calls disponibilité--a state of availability or receptiveness. If I am not available to the stranger, there will not be an opportunity for an opening to appear in the barrier which separates us.
". . . it is only for the moment that this opening is affected that we can become Thou for each other, even in a still limited way."[30] This is not to say that one must seek out each individual in order to particularize and identify with him or her. Being available means that acts of communion are possible with strangers even if, to use Buber's example, they are as fleeting as the glance between two people in the air raid shelter or in the concert hall.

Identification with another's life is not merely the recognition of the other's life. The sadist recognizes another's life and harms the other. The caring person recognizes another's predicament; identifies with the other as it is imagined that the other experiences the predicament; feels for the other (has sympathy for the other); and, depending on the situation, desires the other's welfare or fair treatment.

If identification is not merely the recognition of another's life, there must first be a desire to identify with another. If there is a desire to identify with another, it is because one

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[29]Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), pp. 202-205.
[30]Gabriel Marcel, "I and Thou," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Schlipp and Maurice Friedman (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1967), p. 46.

generally desires others' welfare or fair treatment. When one does identify with another, one is then in a position to specifically desire the other's welfare. Identification is an ability the benevolent or just person has by virtue of being benevolent or just. Much the same point can be made about identifying with another as Iris Murdoch makes about 'choosing' moral action. As Murdoch says, the periods between action are of more importance to the 'choice' of virtuous action than the 'moment of choice' immediately prior to action. One who is benevolent does not choose at the moment to be benevolent. Nor does one who is benevolent choose to identify with someone in order to desire the other's welfare. Because one is benevolent, one identifies with others. One does not identify in order to be benevolent. Murdoch writes that the predominant objects of attention between actions are what affect what one is and the type of choices one will make. The person who cares, attends to and identifies with others so that in a particular moment he or she desires the other's welfare or fair treatment.

Scope and Strength of Benevolent and Just Desires

Although proximity makes it easier, it is obvious that one does not only particularize and identify with family and friends. Indeed, there are people who are able to particularize and identify with individuals about whom only their sentience is known. Any being who can feel and suffer is an object of benevolent and just desire. The propensity to suffer is not restricted to family and friends any more than it is restricted to human beings. We can and do desire the welfare and fair treatment of babies, mental deficients, and animals. The inability of babies, mental deficients and animals to reason and enter into social contract does not preclude them from being objects of our specific benevolent and just desires. As Mary Midgley indicates, "it is not obvious why the absence of close kinship, acquaintance or the admiration which is due to human rationality should entirely cancel the claim."[31] Sentient beings can suffer and, therefore, they are potential objects of benevolent and just desires. Whether they become objects of

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[31]Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, p. 31.

benevolent and just desires is dependent upon whether the individual particularizes them and identifies with them. Although she acknowledges the importance of proximity in this process, Midgley argues against understanding the scope of morality as a series of concentric circles with oneself at the middle and working out to family, personal friends, age-group, colleagues, race, social class, nation, species, and the biosphere.[32] Those at the beginning of the list have the advantage of proximity but proximity is not, as already noted, sufficient for a benevolent or just desire to occur. Something which suffers in the biosphere, if known, is a possible recipient of benevolent or just desire. As Midgley correctly asserts, "the Samaritan is not a man brought up to be above such notions as neighbourhood, nor one who thinks that everybody is always his neighbour. He is one who has understood this idea so fully that he knows how, on occasion, to extend it." [33] In other words, the Samaritan is one who recognizes that a particular other suffers, identifies with the other's suffering, and desires the other's welfare or fair treatment.

Not only are benevolent and just desires to be understood with respect to their extension; they are to be understood with respect to their intensity. Benevolent and just desires can be strong or weak. I am not able to suggest what the threshold is for each but it is clear that if either desire is weaker than a countervailing desire, the other desire will necessarily take precedence. I may, for example, desire to assist someone who is lost but if this desire is weaker than my desire to beat the rush hour traffic, I will not respond. If one's benevolent and just desires are always weaker than one's other desires and one never acts on one's benevolent and just desires, we would infer that this person is not benevolent and just.

Benevolence and Justice as Principles

An individual who has a general desire for others' welfare or a general desire that others are treated fairly may, in specific situations, have no particular desire to enhance the welfare of those in that situation. The other individual may be remote or there may be something particularly abhorrent about him or her (child molester) which makes it difficult to

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[32]Midgley, p. 29.
[33]Midgley, p. 23.

identify with him or her. I propose that, in these particular situations, the benevolent individual replaces a particular desire to enhance the other's welfare with a particular desire to apply the principle of beneficience and that the just individual replaces a particular desire that others are treated fairly with a particular desire to apply the principle of justice. In other words, the benevolent individual, who has a general desire for others' welfare, will, in situations for which benevolence is appropriate, utilize a principle or duty to affect others' welfare and the just individual, who has a general desire that others are treated fairly, will, in situations for which justice is appropriate, utilize a principle or duty to treat others fairly. The actions performed in both instances may be identical but in one instance the desire is directed at the other while in the other instance the desire is directed at a recognized duty.

> . . . the conscientious man will do exactly the same thing a man with . . . virtue will do. He does not do them for the same reason; and he is not brave or honest or kindly; since he acts for the sake of doing his duty, not for the sake of doing the brave or honest or kindly thing. But he will do what the brave, and kindly man does. [34]

Traditionally a contrast has been made in moral philosophy between ethics as character and ethics as dutiful application of principles. I argue that the morality of duty and principles and the morality of character are complementary aspects of the same morality [35] but I also want to show that the morality of duty and principles complete the morality of character.

> {one} could. . . insist that our only obligation in life is indeed, to make ourselves - honest, grateful, trustworthy, kind, etc. - and that we are, without any sense of obligation, to do what we please. For then we will please to speak truth, return benefits, pay debts, keep promises, and not harm one another and what more could be desired from a moral point of view.[36]

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[34]P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 258.
[35]Frankena, Ethics, p. 65.
[36]William Frankena, "Prichard and the Ethics of Virtue: Notes on a Footnote," The Monist 54 (1970): 17.

Duty of Beneficence

If one is benevolent and, in a specific situation, has a desire for another's welfare, it is superfluous to indicate that one ought to desire the welfare of another. If someone has the character trait of benevolence, and in a particular situation, is able to particularize and identify with another, the desire to enhance the other's welfare together with relevant belief is the motivation for action. (It is not superfluous for the benevolent person to say that he or she ought to desire the welfare of another when reflecting about a response. The recognition of an obligation is not necessary, however, at the time of the response.) If in a specific situation an individual, who is generally benevolent, does not have a specific desire for another's welfare, it is appropriate to recognize a duty to enhance the welfare of the other. Although one can be obligated to do certain actions, one cannot be obligated to have a desire. Consequently, one may have a duty of beneficence but not a duty of benevolence. One cannot be obligated to have a desire because one does not acquire desires by recognizing an obligation. Desires are largely a function of our habitual objects of attention. An individual may recognize an obligation to direct his or her attention to certain objects and in this way acquire benevolent and just desires. But this obligation will only be recognized by the individual if he or she already has some specific benevolent or just desires.

Mary Midgley[37] claims that kindness done from duty is still kindness. My contention is that the action may be the same but a distinction can be made between an action which is done for the sake of the individual involved and an action which is done in order to comply with an acknowledged duty. It is interesting to note that in the quotation above, Nowell-Smith does not make the distinction in this way. He writes about doing the action for the sake of virtue. If the action is done strictly for the sake of duty or for the sake of virtue without even a general desire for others' welfare, importance might be attached merely "to doing what it is

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[37]Mary Midgley,"The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 169. Kant, on the other hand, claimed that only kindness done from duty is kindness. Since the Kantian person has no specific benevolent desire for another's welfare, he or she is not benevolent and, since beneficence is meaningful only with respect to the generally benevolent person (one who at least in some situations desires another's welfare), he or she is beneficent only in an extended sense.

right to do . . . {while being} indifferent to human suffering or happiness and so indifferent to what is done."[31] Although the action of someone who acts out of a duty of beneficence has more moral worth than the action of someone who has neither a general nor a specific benevolent desire, the beneficent action is less worthy if it was possible to perform a benevolent action.

It is not possible to have a specific desire to enhance the welfare of others in all situations because it is not possible to be aware of all others in order to particularize and identify with them. In these cases, it is appropriate to recognize a duty of beneficence. I have suggested that the benevolent person, who has a general desire for the welfare of others but, in a particular situation is unable particularize and identify with some, utilizes the duty of beneficence. There is only an indirect desire for others' welfare when one desires to do a duty of beneficence.

Duty of Justice

Just as one cannot have a specific benevolent desire for all sentient beings, it is not possible to have a specific desire that all others are always treated fairly--one is not in a position to be aware of all who are treated unfairly. In some situations it may be particularly difficult, even when one is aware of the other, to specifically desire the other's fair treatment. One may, for example, not specifically desire that the morally repulsive person be treated fairly. In these instances, if the individual is just, he or she recognizes a duty to treat others fairly. As with the duty of beneficence, the focus of one's desire shifts from the individual(s) concerned to the duty itself. There is, then, an indirect desire for others' fair treatment.

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[31]Beehler, The Moral Life, p. 30.

Conscientiousness

The desire to do one's duty is the moral character trait of conscientiousness. Conscientiousness has both moral and non-moral uses. For example, we refer to conscientious students or conscientious workers. In these cases conscientiousness as a desire is directed at non-moral objects. Conscientiousness as a moral character trait is directed at duty. Since conscientiousness is understood in relation to duty and there is no duty to desire to enhance another's welfare or to treat others fairly, conscientiousness is not associated with specific benevolent and just desires. However, when the generally benevolent or just person does not have a specific desire toward a particular other, there is a desire to do one's benevolent or just duty. This desire is conscientiousness.

Conscientiousness augments benevolent or just desire. This claim is contrary to Kant who thought that conscientious behavior is the only behaviour which is morally praiseworthy. It is also contrary to W. D. Ross[39] who wrote that conscientiousness, or as he called it, the sense of duty, is morally superior.

> Suppose that some one is drawn towards doing action A by a sense of duty and towards doing another, incompatable, act B by love for a particular person. Ex hypothesi , he thinks he will not be doing his duty in doing B. Can we possibly say that he will be acting better if he does what he thinks is not his duty than if he does what he thinks is his duty? . . . what is properly meant by the sense of duty is the thought that one ought to act in a certain way . . . . And it seems clear that when a genuine sense of duty is in conflict with any other motive we must recognize its precedence. If you seriously think that you ought to do A, you are bound to think you will be acting morally worse in doing anything else instead.[40]

But, as Nowell-Smith states, if we think of conscientiousness as acting from a sense of duty without also thinking of it as a term of praise, it makes sense to ask why the conscientious person should be praised.[41] Since my claim is that a duty only augments benevolent or just desire in those situations in which the individual has no specific desire, acting conscientiously when one can act from a benevolent or just desire is to act "morally worse".

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[39]W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
[40]Ross, p. 164.
[41]Nowell-Smith, Ethics, p. 256.

> To see . . . conscientiousness as a substitute for . . . virtue brings out two important things. First, it indicates the absurdity of denying the value of that for which conscientiousness is a substitute . . . . Secondly, it shows that it is in its capacity to motivate a man to perform the same actions that a man with . . . {virtue} would be moved to do that the unique, though not supreme, value of conscientiousness lies. [42]

While acknowledging Mercer's point, it is worth looking at the type of situation suggested by Ross in which a conflict occurs between a benevolent or just desire and a desire to do one's duty. On Ross's thinking, the desire to do one's duty always takes precedence. If a duty takes precedence over a particular desire toward another, it does not take precedence merely because it is a duty. If it does take precedence it is because the features of the particular situation are such that it is better for the sentient beings who will be affected that one desires to do one's duty. Conversely, if acting according to a benevolent or just desire rather than duty is better for the well-being of the sentient beings in that situation, acting conscientiously would be inappropriate. An example of this is when the desire to treat others fairly conflicts with a duty of beneficence. Since the duty of beneficence is appropriate only in situations without conflict, it would be inappropriate to act on the desire to do one's duty if by doing so others are treated unfairly.

Conscientiousness includes desires to do duties which one is disinclined to do. For example, if Tom does not have a benevolent desire toward someone in an accident and also does not have a beneficent desire, he may overcome the temptation to walk away by desiring to overcome his temptation. The desire to overcome the temptation to walk away is not the same as desiring to do one's duty when one recognizes that one has not a benevolent desire for the other. Although we may call this conscientious behavior, conscientiousness need not involve this kind of struggle.

Lawrence Blum thinks that Nowell-Smith is incorrect in his claim that the conscientious person does exactly the same thing as person who is kind because Blum thinks that conscientiousness and kindness "work in different areas of our lives."[43] Blum seems to make

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[42]Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics, p. 116.
[43]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 167.

the distinction between kindness and conscientiousness that I make between benevolence and justice. Benevolence and justice "work in different areas of our lives" because the features of the situation for which each character trait is appropriate are different. Conscientiousness, however, is necessary for both the benevolent and the just person when he or she does not have a specific benevolent or just desire.

Extraordinary, Moral Action

I want to say something about those moral actions which involve great risk or sacrifice to the agent. Deontic thinkers have referred to these actions as supererogatory--actions which one does beyond one's religious or moral duty and in which one incurs a substantial risk or sacrifice.

> . . . supererogation is primarily attributed to acts or or actions rather than to persons, traits of character, motives, intentions, or emotions. Secondly, these acts are optional or non-obligatory , that is distinguished from those acts which fall under the heading of duty. Thirdly, they are beyond duty, fulfil more than is required, over and above what the agent is supposed or expected to do. This means that although they are distinguished from obligatory acts, they are not just a different moral category but stand in specific relationship . . . to obligatory action. Finally, this relationship implies that supererogatory acts have a special value; they are morally good and praiseworthy.[44]

Supererogatory action, according to this, then, includes acts of beneficence, volunteering and risk-taking. Because of the conceptual connection to duty, ethical systems which do not account for duty do not allow for the concept of supererogation. I have accounted for the duty of beneficence and the duty of justice insofar as they augment specific benevolent or just desires. It is important to consider whether supererogation has any basis in my account.

David Heyd argues that the following identify a supererogatory act:

> 1) It is neither obligatory nor forbidden.
> 2)Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction or criticism--either formal or informal.

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[44]David Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 1.

> 3)It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequence and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty).
> 4)It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else's good, and is thus meritorious. [45]

Heyd claims that it is possible that the motive of a supererogatory act be self-regarding while the intention is other-regarding.[46] If, by definition, supererogation refers only to acts and not to persons, this is not disputable. On this account, a benevolent person, for example, could perform a supererogatory action, if when going beyond duty, the individual was motivated by self-interest. It is clearly inconsistent with the position I have argued, however, to suggest that a moral action has no connection to the desire for another's welfare either directly through benevolent desire or indirectly through a duty of beneficence. If supererogation only concerns the performance of certain actions without a concomitant desire for the welfare of another, supererogation makes no sense in relation to what I have argued.

The same point can be made with respect to justice. If supererogation has no relationship to desire, then there is no notion of supererogation in relation to the desire to treat others fairly which may be augmented by the desire to do one's duty of justice. Justice is difficult to account for in any understanding of supererogation. The difficulty is that supererogatory actions are thought to be those actions which bring more beneficence and not more justice. Consequently, if justice is interpreted as "a total comprehensive, all embracing notion . . . there is no room left for supererogation."[47] If justice is limited only to actions governed by institutions, there is room for supererogatory action which is beneficent but not for supererogatory action which is just. Because I have argued that benevolence and justice are distinguished by the type of situation for which each is appropriate, supererogatory action with respect to justice is a just act and not a benevolent act.

Even if there is an accounting for desire in the concept of supererogation, supererogation can have no basis in my thesis. In order to explain this I call these actions extraordinary, moral actions instead of supererogatory actions. I have argued that the duty of

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[45]Heyd, p. 115.
[46]Heyd, p. 137.
[47]Heyd, p. 97.

beneficence augments the general desire for others' welfare in those situations in which one lacks a specific desire for a particular other's welfare and the duty of justice augments the general desire that others are treated fairly in those situations in which one lacks a specific desire to treat another fairly. If this is so, the conceptual connection of extraordinary, moral actions is to character and not to duty. If extraordinary, moral actions are the result of a particular desire (together with relevant beliefs) to enhance the welfare of another or treat another fairly in difficult cases. it does not make sense to speak of these extraordinary actions as going beyond duty. The sequence instead is:

(1)	(2)	(3)
particular desire for those in proximate situations who can be particularized and identified with	particular desire for those in situations in which particularization and identification is difficult --- extraordinary, moral action	duty of beneficence duty of justice

One cannot go beyond duty if one has not already accepted a duty. The individual who performs extraordinary, moral actions has the ability to particularize and identify with others in a wider range of possibilities and does not need to augment his or her behavior with a duty of beneficence or a duty of justice. Extraordinary, moral actions cannot occur beyond duty because, in order to account for the extraordinary action as moral, reference must be made to the particular desire and beliefs of the agent. If one has a particular desire in extraordinary circumstances, he or she is able to particularize and identify with others in situations which are not proximate, when features of the other are abhorrent, and so on.

It does not make sense that someone would have the intrinsic desire to enhance another's welfare, for example, in a proximate case and an intrinsic desire to enhance another's welfare in a remote case but would require a duty of beneficicence to enhance another's welfare in instances in between. If one does not desire the enhancement of another's welfare in a

particular situation and refers to the duty of beneficence to augment one's general benevolent desire, one is not likely to have a particular intrinsic desire to enhance another's welfare in situations in which duty does not extend.

The same point can be made with respect to justice, although it is more difficult. The just person is one who has a general desire that others are treated fairly. I have argued that it is not possible to specificallly desire that all others are treated fairly because one is not aware of all others. An extraordinary, just action would be one in which the individual seeks out situations in which one's desire for fair treatment is not part of one's institutional role or one's usual informal role as arbitrator of disputes between friends and acquaintances; it is rather an action in which one comes into contact with individuals whom one does not ordinarily confront and seeks justice for those individuals. Howard, for example, a white, middle class male performs an extraordinary, just action when he places himself in a position in which he not only works for the fair treatment of Blacks, women, or the under-privileged but he renounces his own privilege.

The individual who does extraordinary, moral actions, then, is one who has extraordinary abilities to particularize and identify with others. In reference to Heyd's four criteria, it is correct to indicate that we do not have a duty to do these extraordinary, moral actions but this does not, then, make these actions supererogatory. The individual, who, for example, has a specific desire to help others in extraordinary situations does not perform the action out of duty; the individual performs the action out of a specific desire to help the other. If the individual has no specific desire to help someone who, for example, is drowning, he or she may augment this lack of desire by a desire to do what he or she thinks is one's duty, or the individual may not recognize any relation to the other at all. We would not ordinarily say that the individual has a duty to help the other if he or she has no desire to help the other in an extraordinary situation. We would not, then, say, however, that, if the individual does have a desire to help the other the desire is to go beyond duty. Since there is no duty involved initially, there is no duty to go beyond and, hence, there is no supererogatory action.

Heyd's fourth criterion does apply to extraordinary, benevolent action since the action is done for the other and because one desires the other's welfare. The criterion applies to extraordinary, just action if it is agreed that treating others fairly is for the good of all involved in the particular conflict. With respect to criterion three, the extraordinary action is morally good because one's intention is directed at another and because the individual desires the other's welfare or fair treatment--not because it is an extension of duty. Heyd's second criterion implies that we do not disapprove of individuals who do not undertake extraordinary, moral actions. This may be so in cases such as throwing oneself on a hand grenade to save one's comrades, but if, as Heyd suggests, acts of beneficence are also extraordinary, moral (supererogatory) actions, it is not clear that the omission of these types of actions does not morally reflect on the individual. According to this postion, there are only certain kinds of responses which are our duty, and beneficent responses are not included in these. As J. S. Mill wrote, "No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues toward any given individual." [48] Peter Singer suggests, however, that it is an artificial line which is drawn between what a person ought to do and what other people ought to blame the individual for not doing.[49]

> The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.[50]

Since the duty of beneficence and the duty of justice only augment benevolent desire, I suggest that it is an artifical line which we draw between disapproving of an individual for not desiring the welfare or fair treatment of some and not disapproving when an individual does not desire the welfare or fair treatment of others. Disapproval seems to be in order for individuals who are in a position to particularize and identify with others but who, nevertheless, do not desire their welfare or fair treatment. We disapprove of the parent, for example, who only feels a

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[48]Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 62.
[49]Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 235-236.
[50]Singer, p. 232.

duty to care for his or her children and does not desire their welfare.

> . . . let us consider the case of a man who finds himself unable to enjoy himself spontaneously with his child; though he goes out of his way to entertain the child out of his duty as a father. May he not quite well regard his relative lack of sympathy . . . as a moral failing? Can he not, without confusion, regard himself as a 'worse man' . . .? [51]

Heyd indicates that acts of beneficence are instances of extraordinary, moral actions (supererogatory actions) and hence do not deserve sanction if not performed. We do think, however, that, if an individual does not desire someone's welfare when he or she is in a position to particularize and identify with this other, this morally reflects on the individual. I have argued that character is not something one chooses but is something one is by virtue of regular attention away from oneself and toward moral situations. It is inappropriate, then, to praise or blame someone for having or not having a character trait; praise and blame in this context implies that one has chosen one's intrinsic desires. It is more appropriate to approve or disapprove the presence or absence of a character trait.

> It is still bad for the racist man to hate black persons, to discriminate against them, to treat them badly, to regard them as moral inferiors. These are morally bad actions, responses, ways of regarding person. A person is thought ill of for having them . . . a person cannot use the fact of his racist upbringing to excuse himself from moral criticism for discriminating against blacks, responding to them in contemptuous ways, etc. If these reactions are truly part of his actual attitudes and vaules regarding blacks, then he cannot absolve himself from moral assessment . . . [52]

Contrary to Heyd, who thinks a beneficent action is an extraordinary, moral action, a beneficent action is not an instance of an extraordinary, moral action if the individual is in close proximity with another and particularization and identification is not difficult. What makes an action an extraordinary, moral action is the ability of an individual to particularize and identify with others in circumstances in which lack of proximity and other factors (abhorrence of the deeds of the other; personal risk) make it difficult to particularize and

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[51]Peter Winch, "Moral Integrity," Ethics and Actions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 81.
[52]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 189.

identify. If the individual does not desire the welfare or fair treatment of another in these situations, we do not think that he or she is morally deficient unless the lack of ability to particularize and identify is the result of laziness. Disapproval is only legitimately withheld if the circumstances of the extraordinary situation make it very difficult to particularize and identify with the other. This line cannot be drawn as exactly as those writing about supererogation suggest. The circumstances of each situation need to be known in order to determine if the individual is able to desire the other's welfare.

Summary

The following has been argued in this chapter:

1. Benevolence and justice are moral character trait ascriptions. As general ascriptions, they indicate that the individual has specific intrinsic desires to respond at least in some specific situations.

2. Care, empathy, sympathy, and benevolence are not synonymous concepts.

(a) Empathetic distress is an affective response to the misfortunes of others which, with the development of cognitive ability becomes empathy or feeling with an another.

(b) Sympathy is more developed than empathy and is a feeling for others.

(c) Benevolence presupposes sympathy but is connected with action as neither sympathy nor empathy are. Benevolence is the intrinsic desire that another's welfare is affected.

(d) To care is to have it matter that something is the case--the individual is motivated to affect its occurrence, if possible. Care is composed of a desire and relevant beliefs which entail the motivating reason for response. More specifically, moral care consists of the moral character traits, benevolence and justice, as well as relevant beliefs. Contrary to Nodding, Gilligan, and perhaps Beehler, when I say to you that I care, I am not restricted to saying that it matters to me that your welfare flourishes or, at least, does not diminish. I also indicate that it matters to me that you are treated fairly. Whether this moral care is manifested as a benevolent or a just desire is dependent on the features of the situation in which the other's well-being is at stake.

3. Benevolence and justice are distinguished from each other by the type of situation for which each desire is appropriate. Benevolence is the desire to enhance and/or not diminish others' welfare in those situations without a conflict. Justice is the desire to treat others fairly in situations with conflict. Situations with conflict may occur between sentient beings and between sentient beings and a standard.

4. If an individual is benevolent and just but does not have a particular benevolent or just desire in a situation, he or she desires to fulfill a duty of beneficence or a duty of justice. This desire to do one's duty is conscientiousness.

5. The range of an individual's specific benevolent or just desires is affected by proximity to others. It is not practically possible to specifically desire the welfare or fair treatment of each individual because we are not aware of all individuals. If one is unaware of an individual, one cannot particularize and identify with him or her. It is, however, possible to make oneself available to the other in the event the one does become aware of the individual and so that awareness is more likely.

6. If someone desires the welfare or fair treatment of others and responds in cases in which the other is remote, abhorrent, or in which personal risk is involved, the individual performs an extraordinary, benevolent or just response.

I am now in a position to say more about the nature of benevolent and just responses.

Chapter IV

MORAL RESPONSE

The benevolent and just person desires that the circumstances of sentient beings change in order that their welfare or fair treatment is affected. There is, then, a conceptual connection between benevolent and just desires and the response to change the circumstances of another. Benevolent and just desires are part of the motivation for a response and part of the response itself. Having either a benevolent or just desire toward another is to morally respond to the other. In many cases, having only the desire to change another's circumstances without an attempt to do something about the circumstances will be an insufficient response. But, in cases in which an action is impossible, the desire that another's circumstance change is morally significant and is part of the response. For example, if George visits Sam in the hospital, the moral significance of George's visit is greater if George visits because he desires Sam's welfare than it is if George visits either from duty or because he has designs on Sam's fortune. Similiarly, there is greater moral significance if Joel desires that Lynn be treated fairly than there is if he merely desires that he be ingratiated with her by ensuring that she receives fair treatment. The moral response cannot be understood merely as behavior or action. To properly assess the moral significance of a response, it is necessary to know under what description the response is being considered.[1] George helping Sam because he desires to help Sam is a different description of the response than George helping Sam because it is in his self-interest to help Sam. The action and the motive for the action are both part of the description of the response. I return to this later.

My claim that a particular desire and, consequently, a particular response is appropriate for certain situations is not to be confused with the "situation ethics" of the Values Clarification approach which I outlined in Chapter One. In the Values Clarification approach, the acknowledgement that situations are different from each other is to claim that morality is "relative, personal, and situational".[2] Recognizing that certain situations differ according to

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[1]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 145.
[2]S. Simon and H. Kirschaenbaum, Readings in Values Clarification (Minneapolis:

salient features is not to further claim that these features can be interpreted as the individual wishes. On the contrary, these features are conceptually connected to certain desires and are what make the benevolent or just desire appropriate for a particular situation. Since desires are logically linked to objects, it is not logically possible for an individual to decide that benevolence is more appropriate than justice as one adjudicates, for example, between two people getting into graduate school. The individual can, of course, be mistaken about the situation. He or she cannot, however, decide that the fair treatment of others is not at issue in this type of conflict any more than he or she can decide to be kind to a utensil. There are no instances in which benevolence is more important than justice in situations with conflict and there are no instances in which justice is more important than benevolence in situations without conflict.

One cannot decide for oneself whether benevolence or justice is appropriate for a particular situation but, on occasion, one may have to choose between responding to a situation for which benevolence is appropriate and responding to a situation for which justice is appropriate. In conflicts of this kind the individual must consider the ways in which the sentient beings in each situation will be affected by the decision to respond to one situation rather than to the other. When efforts are directed to one situation rather than the other, this does not mean that there is no response to the other situation; "the item that was not acted upon may, for instance, persist as regret."[3] The individual does partially respond to the other situation by virtue of the benevolent or just desire directed toward the other and the regret felt for not being able to completely respond. Both the desire and the emotion are morally significant.

There are situations in which features such as proximity, abhorrence of another, and personal harm can affect desires directed toward another. In these cases, the conscientious desire to do one's duty of beneficence is the appropriate desire. A benevolent response differs

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[2](cont'd) Winston Press, 1973), p. 11.
[3]Bernard Willliams, "Ethical Consistency," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1973), p. 179.

from a beneficent response in three important ways. The first difference is that the desire component of each is focussed on different objects. The benevolent desire is directed at the welfare of the other while the beneficent desire is directed at doing one's duty of beneficence and, therefore, only indirectly at the other. Second, the benevolent response includes both a feeling for others and a moral emotion of some kind. The beneficent response does not include either feeling for others or a moral emotion. Third, the benevolent response is a direct response and does not include the provision of reasons at the time of the response. The beneficent response does include the provision of justifying reasons for one's response at the time of the response.

The direct just response and the dutiful just response are both responses of the generally just person to situations in which sentient beings conflict with each other or with some standard. They differ in that the direct just desire is directed toward the individuals in the conflict while the dutiful just desire is directed at one's duty and only indirectly at those in the conflict. The direct just response includes feeling sympathy for others and a moral emotion, while the dutiful just response includes the provision of reasons to justify doing one's duty. In each case, the determination of what is fair treatment is part of the just response. This involves the provision of reasons why those in the conflict are to be treated in a certain way. These adjudicating reasons are not the same as the justifying reasons the dutiful individual provides for undertaking the moral response. Justifying reasons are reasons which show why a certain response is a moral response. Adjudicating reasons are reasons which specifically adjudicate why one individual is treated the same or differently from another. Before elaborating the role emotion and the different types of reasons play in the benevolent, beneficent, and just responses, I must say something more about emotion and reason.

Emotion

I am concerned with emotions as occurrent temporary states rather than as dispositions. Dispositional emotions are more like stylistic traits. The frightened individual has

no desire to be fearful, for example, nor does he or she have a fearful desire for some end. Having a dispositional benevolent emotion, for example, is the propensity to have benevolent emotions in certain situations.

In order to determine the relationship between desire and occurrent emotions and, more specifically, the relationship between benevolent and just desires and emotion, I address the following major issues: the relationship of emotions to feelings and to behavior; the relationship of emotions to desires, beliefs, and evaluations; and whether emotions can be motives. In doing this, I argue that, when one has a particular desire, an emotion is a feeling one experiences if one believes that certain conditions are present and one evaluates these beliefs in a certain way. Anger, for example, is the feeling one experiences when one desires not to be thwarted and one evaluates that one is being thwarted. Fear is the feeling one experiences when one desires not to be harmed and evaluates that one is being threatened.

The Relationship of Emotion to Feelings and Behavior

Although one feels an occurrent emotion, emotion cannot be reduced to the feeling involved in physiological or mental changes. I reject, for example, William James's view that, "bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and . . . our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion."[4]

There are a number of reasons, both empirical and conceptual, why emotions and feelings are not identical. Experimental evidence shows that "the same visceral changes occur in very different emotional states and in non-emotional states".[5] Furthermore, it is possible to drug induce feelings of anger or fear without the individual being angry or fearful. If emotions were reducible to feeling states, it would not be possible to make the conceptual distinctions that we do make between emotions which have very similar feelings. The physiological or

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[4]William James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1890), pp. 449-50.
[5]Magda Arnold, "Feelings and Emotions as Dynamic Factors in Personality Integration," in The Nature of Emotion, ed. Magda Arnold (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 46.

mental feelings associated with envy and jealousy, for example, do not differ much, if at all, and consequently they are not what distinguish envy from jealousy. R. S. Peters has suggested that emotion would not be so readily reduced to feeling if fear and anger which have "palpable signs of changes in the autonomic nervous system" had not typically been used as paradigms of emotion.[6] What "highly specific physiological changes, of the sort that often occupy fear and anger, occupy remorse?"[7]

Although not synonymous with emotion, feeling is part of what it means to have an occurrent emotion. It is self-contradictory to say that I am anxious about Laura driving from Vancouver but I don't feel anything about it or that I regret having treated her poorly but I'm not feeling anything. Pitcher gives an example, however, in which he claims to show that someone could have an occurrent emotion and have no characteristic feelings.

> If P comes upon Q just as Q is setting fire to P's house, and P rushes at him in blind fury, it seems singularly inappropriate to insist that P must be having certain sensations. In fact P, in such circumstances, probably experiences no sensations of any kind, and yet he is undoubtedly extremely angry.[8]

It may be inappropriate to insist that P has certain sensations because it is superfluous to do so. P may not be aware of his feelings because his attention is directed at punishing Q. But, if P does not experience any out of the ordinary feelings, P does not experience an emotion. Erol Bedford[9] also argues that a person may have an emotion without also having a feeling.

> For if we have good grounds for the assertion that a person is jealous, we do not withdraw this assertion on learning that he does not feel jealous, although we may accept this as true. It is, after all, notorious that we can be mistaken about our own emotions, and that in this matter a man is not the final court of appeal in his own case; those who are jealous are often the last, instead of the first, to recognize that they are.[10]

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[6]R. S. Peters, "Motivation, Emotion and the Conceptual Schemes of Common Sense," in Psychology and Ethical Development, p. 108.
[7]Peters, p. 108.
[8]G. Pitcher, "Emotion," in Education and the Development of Reason, p. 380.
[9]Erol Bedford, "Emotions," in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V.C. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).
[10]Bedford, pp. 112-113.

Bedford confuses occurrent emotions with dispositional emotions. One may not be aware that he or she has a dispositional emotion. But, if one is not aware of one's occurrent emotions it is because one does not spell out to oneself that one is experiencing an emotion. This, however, is not to make the further claim that one does not experience the emotion.

The reduction of emotion to certain types of behavior can also be dismissed on experiential and conceptual grounds. Emotions are not always expressed either facially or as overt actions. This is not to say that behavior is not helpful in interpreting another's emotions. "A fortiori we would not believe that someone has a certain emotion if he has often acted in a way that is rationally incompatible with that emotion. . . . we do look upon behavior as an 'external' or public indicator of 'inner' or private states . . ."[11] There is, however, no one set of behaviours or changes in facial expression which are indicative of a particular emotion.

> . . . while an angry man may 'pound the table, slam the door, or pick a fight', he may not. He may stand stock still, go red in the face, tense, purse his lips, and then go out with studied calm. In short it is an impossible programme to find a list of behavioral items, some or all of which must be present if the behavior in question is to be dubbed angry behavior. [12]

Specific behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient as a criterion for an occurrent emotion. Conceptual distinctions can be made between wonder and grief, neither of which have behavioral manifestations other than, as Peters suggests, quiesence. Furthermore, there are some situations in which an emotion is present and there is no action possible. A person may be afraid, for example, but be unable to run because there is nowhere to run.

The Relation of Emotion to Beliefs, Evaluation and Desires

An emotion is a feeling one experiences when one has a particular desire, believes that certain conditions are present and evaluates the beliefs in a certain way. These three conditions must be satisfied if an emotion is to occur. Feelings without these components are not emotions--they are moods or sensations. The individual must desire something; for example, I

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[11]William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 155.
[12]Lyons, p. 22.

desire not to be harmed. The individual must have certain beliefs about the situation; I believe that there is a rattlesnake on the rock next to me. The individual must evaluate this description in a certain way; I assess the presence of the rattlesnake to be threatening. When these three conditions are present, the individual experiences an emotion; I feel fear. These conditions may also serve as part of the causal explanation of my fear. A mother bear, her cubs, and I on a narrow path meet the conceptual requirements of fear, if I desire not to be harmed and evaluate the presence of the mother bear to be threatening. These same conditions can also be the causes of my fear.

There is a formal relationship which exists between the conceptual understanding of a particular emotion and its object. The 'object' of one's pride is something which is one's own, as some sort of achievement or advantage.[13] The 'object' of one's embarrassment is something which is awkward or unpleasant. The 'object' of one's fear is a something which is threatening. We may sometimes feel sad or angry without knowing what we are sad or angry about or we might be mistaken about the objects of these emotions.[14] This does not mean, however, that there is no object of these emotions.

Neither a formal nor a particular object is sufficient to understand the concept of an emotion. The individual must have relevant beliefs about the object. In order for Jane to be angry at Terry for spilling his supper on the rug, Jane must believe that there was something spilled on the rug and she must believe that Terry did it. If it was Cathy who spilled her supper on the rug and not Terry, this does not mean that Jane does not experience anger even if it is based on a false belief.

Relevant beliefs include appraisals. When an individual feels an emotion as a result of an appraisal, the particular appraisal is an evaluation. An evaluation reflects an individual's preferences or attitudes.[15] Ortega's description of four people by a dying man's bed is

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[13]Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 113-114.
[14]Francis Dunlop, "The Education of the Emotions," Journal of the Philosophy of Education 18 (1984): 250.
[15]Nowell-Smith, Ethics, p. 170.

illustrative of the way in which only some may experience an emotion in the same situation.[16] Present are the man's wife, his doctor, a reporter, and a painter--there is a different "emotional distance between each person and the event they all witness."[17] The painter appraises the situation as one which has a certain combination of spatial and optical components. The reporter appraises the situation factually. The doctor appraises the situation professionally. Only the wife evaluates the situation as one in which someone who is dearly loved is about to die. She experiences intense emotion.

Different evaluations of the same beliefs result in different emotions. The 'object' of fear, for example, is something which is threatening but only if one appraises the situation as being threatening. I may believe that there is a mother bear on the path but assess it as agreeably dangerous and experience excitement rather than fear.[18]

> . . . emotions are not differentiated by means of the object or even the subject's factual beliefs about the object but by means of the subject's evaluative beliefs about the object . . . . For your emotion is, say, not one of embarrassment unless you evaluate or view the situation as awkward or unpleasant. If you were thick-skinned and did not mind in the least meeting people whom you had rejected or failed in some way, then you would not evaluate such meetings as awkward and unpleasant, and so would not be embarrassed in such situations.[19]

I believe that this is a bank machine and that by putting my bank card in the bank machine I will receive money. If I evaluate the process to be demeaning, I experience resentment. On the other hand, if I evaluate the process to be indicative of human progress, I experience pride. If I appraise the process as necessary in order for me to buy gas for my car, I experience no emotion. Emotions occur only under certain evaluative descriptions. One must 'see' a situation as fulfilling the conditions for which a particular emotion is appropriate and one must also have a "personal preference" with respect to the evaluative description.

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[16]José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Anchor Books, 1956), p. 14.
[17]Ortega, p. 14.
[18]Lyons, Emotion, p. 35.
[19]Lyons, Emotions, p. 50.

Because emotions involve evaluation of beliefs, emotions can be reasonable or unreasonable. If an individual understands, for example that a bug is harmless but the individual is still afraid of the bug, this does not show that emotion is irrational. It shows instead that the person experiences an irrational emotion.[20] One's emotion can be unreasonable if it is based on an unfounded belief or a superstitious belief, if the object of the emotion is unsuitable, or if the intensity of the emotion is abnormal for the situation.[21] If one's beliefs are inappropriate, one may have unfounded or superstitious emotions. If the evaluation of one's beliefs is inappropriate, one has an irrational, unsuitable or abnormal emotion. If one's emotion is based on an unreasonable belief or an unreasonable evaluation, one experiences an unreasonable emotion.

Two people can see a situation as equally dangerous yet one may be afraid and the other not. Being afraid cannot consist, then, only in evaluating something as dangerous even if there is no variation in the perceptual evaluation.[22] The difference between the two responses is to be found in what each individual desires. Two people who come across a bear and her cubs on a narrow path and who both evaluate the situation as threatening will have different experiences of fear if one, for example, desires to live and the other sees this as her opportunity to commit suicide undetected. If there is an emotion, there must be a desire.

William Lyons has proposed a "causal-evaluative" theory of emotions in which one first has beliefs upon which the individual makes his or her evaluation. The evaluation, says, Lyons, then causes the desire which leads to behavior.[23]

> To take a simple case of fear, the sight of a ferocious dog might cause Fred to evaluate it as threateningly dangerous to him such that he wants to run away and escape, and so he takes to his heels.[24]

It is correct to indicate that emotionmay create desires to do certain things but it is important

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[20]Bernard Williams, "Morality and the Emotions," in Problems of the Self, p. 224.
[21]Pitcher, "Emotion," p. 373.
[22]William Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. II, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and the Free Press, 1967), p. 485.
[23]Lyons, Emotion, p. 57.
[24]Lyons, p. 57.

to also account for the desires that someone has prior to the evaluation. Because Fred evaluates that the dog is threatening and he desires not to be hurt, he feels afraid. Beliefs, evaluation of those beliefs, the desire not to be hurt, and the resultant feeling of fear are what motivates Fred to run away.

If one has a particular desire and one's evaluation of one's beliefs are of a certain type, a corresponding emotion occurs. I desire not to be harmed and I believe that this is a dog with very sharp teeth. If I also evaluate this dog as threatening, I experience fear. Fear just is the desire not to be harmed when evaluating something as threatening. This is not to say that all combinations of desires and appraisals have a corresponding emotion. Not all appraisals describe a situation which is the object of an emotion. Not all desires and appraisals have corresponding emotions but all emotions entail a corresponding desire and evaluated beliefs.[25]

Emotion as Motivation

R. S. Peters has argued for a conceptual distinction between emotion and motive, although both, he says are the result of appraising or evaluating a situation.[26] Emotions and motives are distinct, he argues, because motives connect appraisals with action while emotions connect appraisals with things that come over us.[27] An emotion and a motive may be the result of the same appraisal but, because emotions are passive, says Peters, the only actions initiated by emotions are involuntary--our knees knock, we perspire, we blush. Just because emotions are not chosen, this does not mean that they are merely reactions. As we have already seen, the evaluative component of an emotion is not a reaction to an appraisal; the evaluation is part of what it is to be an emotion. Some emotions do not lead to action but other emotions do because of the nature of the desires to which they are connected.

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[25]The exception to this might be emotions which are conditioned such that a person responds with an emotion on a certain cue but conditioned emotions are not unlike drug induced emotions in which the person could, for example, feel angry but not be angry.

[26]R. S. Peters, "The Education of the Emotions, in Psychology and Ethical Development, p. 178.

[27]Peters, 178.

Since the combination of desire and belief is the motivating reason for a response and certain combinations of desire and evaluated beliefs entail certain emotions, there are both emotional and non-emotional motives.

> For example, his killing the stranger who entered his house at night was motivated by fear if, say, it was the case that he believed that the stranger was going to attack him and that he was in danger of his life, this belief so affected him that his physiology was stirred up and he was moved to rid himself of the danger by shooting the stranger. On the other hand, his killing the stranger was the result of a pure non-emotional motive, if it was the case that he coolly decided that strangers ought not to enter people's houses at night and needed to be taught a lesson.[28]

Benevolent and Just Emotions

I have argued that emotions are feelings which are to be understood with respect to a particular desire and an evaluation of beliefs about a particular object or set of circumstances. The sympathetic desire that others not feel the way they do, combined with the evaluation that someone is having an agonizing expereience, for example, entails that I feel for this person. The sympathetic emotion experienced is affected by the circumstances in which the other is affected. One feels compassion, for example, if the other grieves; one feels commiseration if the other is frustrated or disappointed. An evaluation of a certain kind must occur if one is to experience sympathetic emotion. For example, having a belief that someone is frequently looking at street signs is not enough to feel commiseration. One must desire that the other does not feel confused and one must also evaluate that the individual is lost. "Having the belief alone is compatible with indifference, malicious delight . . . or intense intellectual interest . . ."[29]

The emotion experienced as a result of a benevolent or just desire that another's circumstance is changed depends on whether changes occur in the other's circumstances. If one

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[28]Lyons, Emotion, p. 52.
[29]Lawrence Blum, "Compassion," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 509.

desires the welfare or fair treatment of another, and the individual is thwarted, one feels anger; if the other is in danger, one feels fear; if the other flourishes, one feels joy. One feels remorse, shame, regret, or guilt, if one's benevolent or just desires are not intense enough to override countervailing desires.[30] One feels regret or sorrow if it is not possible to act on one's desires. For purposes of brevity, I will refer to the emotions which result from benevolent and just desires as moral emotions, although sympathetic emotion is also a moral emotion.

One of Kant's major objections to recognizing any of the emotions as morally significant was that he thought emotions to be natural to some but not to others. Consequently he thought that this would make "the capacity for moral worth a species of natural advantage" which would be "both logically incompatible with the notion of the moral, and also in some ultimate sense hideously unfair."[31] It is the benevolent and just person who experiences moral emotions and, as I have argued previously, the benevolent and just person is one who has fairly permanent intrinsic desires for others' welfare and fair treatment. Benevolent and just desires are affected by what one attends to in one's life between 'moral situations'. Attention can be developed and, consequently, so can benevolent and just desires and moral emotions.

Reasons

Justifying Reasons

In Chapter Two I said that justifying reasons are those which provide the context or the structure within which actions have meaning. If justifying reasons are to be moral justifying reasons rather than prudential or self-interested justifying reasons, they must make reference to the well-being of sentient beings. It is contradictory to think that one can give a moral reason to justify a self-interested response.

> Now if the man adopts the moral point of view because it is in his

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[30]See, for example, Amélie Rorty, "Agent Regret," in Explaining Emotions, pp. 489-506; I. Thalberg, "Remorse", Mind 72 (1963): 545-555; Robert Rosthal, "Moral Weakness and Remorse," Mind 76 (1967): 576-579; William Neblett, The Role of Feeling in Morals (Washington, D. C. : University Press of America, Inc., 1981).
[31]Williams, "Morality and Emotions," p. 228.

> interest to, has he not already adopted the self-interested point of view? If he hasn't, how is the fact in question (that acting from the moral point of view will be in his interest) to be a reason for him to adopt that point of view? If a man undertakes to do something because it is in his interest to, that means that he is concerned to do or secure what is in his interest. But to be concerned to do or secure what is in your self-interest is to be self-interested. How then are you to adopt EITHER the moral view OR the self-interested view? You are already self-interested[32]

Doing one's duty because it might bring a reward is not a moral justifying reason. As Beehler indicates, "only some kinds of reasons, only some kinds of considerations are moral reasons . . . . Of course, if one doesn't find these reasons compelling, well, one doesn't. But that does not make the reasons one does find compelling, moral reasons--by default . . ."[33] Moreover, as I have shown, understanding that certain justifying reasons are moral reasons does not compel someone to be motivated by them.

In this section I argue that the benevolently dutiful or justly dutiful response includes a process of reminding oneself of the jusifying reasons for the appropriateness of doing one's duty in a particular instance. These justifying reasons provide the context within which one may then desire to do one's duty. Because the benevolent or just person has certain desires directed at the other, this person does not need to remind himself or herself of justifying reasons at the time of the benevolent or just response. The beneficent response and the dutiful just response do require the provision of justifying reasons at the time of the response because, although the individual is generally benevolent or just, he or she does not in the particular instance have a specific desire for the other's welfare or fair treatment. The benevolent and just individual, who does not have a direct desire for the other, acknowledges the justifying moral reasons for his or her behavior and then desires to act according to duty.

A justifying reason is a judgment about the ways in which one's response is consistent with what either a benevolent or just person would do in the situation. In other words, if one is to provide a justifying reason for helping someone in a particular situation, one must make a judgment regarding the appropriateness of the response. If Maureen judges that, in this

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[32]Beehler, Moral Life, p. 153.
[33]Beehler, Moral Life, p. 60.

situation, she ought to help another who suffers, this is the justifying reason for her response. If Maureen is generally benevolent, she will then desire to do her duty of beneficence. This desire to do her duty together with relevant beliefs constitute Maureen's motivating reason for her response.

Because one's justifying reason consists of a judgment that one ought to do something, justifying reasons are considered to be reasons which any benevolent or just person would accept if he or she was in the same situation. They are not reasons that everybody would accept, since I have argued that, if someone is not already benevolent or just, these reasons will not motivate that person. Whereas R. M. Hare utilizes universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness as measures of whether an action is moral, universalizability is utilized by the benevolent or just person to justify that the response is one that someone who is benevolent or just would perform. The major criticism of utilizing the principle of universalizability to clarify morality is that, because the universalizability principle is a formal principle, it is consistent with any content. The principle of universalizability utilized by the benevolent or just person, escapes this criticism because the benevolent and just response is what is universalized. Universalizability, used by the generally benevolent or just person, determines that the reasons for responding are consistent with the response of a benevolent or just person. Because they are reasons which are consistent with the ways in which a benevolent or just person would respond, the provision of justifying reasons, as part of the beneficent and dutiful just response, is not merely a momentary justification. Again referring to Iris Murdoch on this point, they are acknowledged as justifying reasons because of what the individual has attended to prior to the provision of justifying reasons.

Adjudicating Reasons

The just person provides reasons for his or her adjudication when working out a conflict in a particular way. These are not justifying reasons for being just; they are adjudicating reasons which specify how the individuals in a particular circumstance are to receive fair treatment. The following example illustrates the three types of reasons I have outlined.

Karen has been asked by two waiters at her restaurant to settle a dispute about the distribution of tip money. Karen is not fond of either waiter because she suspects them of pilfering cutlery and her first inclination is to settle the dispute by pulling straws. But, because she is a generally just person, she acknowledges that she has a duty to be just in this instance. The acknowledgement consists of providing justifying reasons why a just person should act justly in this situation. On the basis of these justifying reasons, Karen desires to do her duty to treat the waiters fairly. This desire together with relevant beliefs about the waiters' predicament is the motivating reason for Karen's response. After weighing the evidence from each waiter, Karen gives reasons about the way in which the predicament may be solved fairly. This adjudication process is essential to the just response if those in the conflict are to be treated fairly. The reasons Karen provides to settle the dispute are, as we have seen, impartial and relevant to the dispute. She does not decide in favour of one because of his nationality nor because of any personal feelings she has. Using Frankena's contention that justice demands that one "helps or hinders them equally in the achievement of the best lives they are capable of",[34] Karen takes into account such things as the original agreement about tips, or, if there was no agreement, she considers how such things as need, merit, ability, and/or effort affects each person with respect to the other.

Because one's adjudicating reasons are impartial with respect to the personal features of those in the conflict, the universalizability of adjudicating reasons is also important. However, because of the complexity of each conflict, universalizability may be very difficult.

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[34]Frankena, Ethics, p. 51.

> In order to accept the principle {of universalizability}, we should have to establish that human predicaments exhibit sufficient sameness, and this we cannot do without abstracting away from concrete situations those qualities that seem to reveal the sameness. In doing this, we often lose the very qualities or factors that give rise to the moral question in the situation.[35]

In summary, all moral responses include motivating reasons. Moral responses motivated by the desire to do one's duty include justifying reasons for the response. All just responses, whether motivated from a direct desire for the others' fair treatment or by a desire to do one's duty, include adjudicating reasons for the ways in which fair treatment can be achieved.

Benevolent and Beneficent Responses

Benevolent Response

Throughout this work I have argued against understanding morality solely with respect to action. The moral response is not merely an action. Motivation must also be considered in the assessment of the response. There are situations, for example, in which an action is impossible but in which someone may still respond in a morally significant way. It does seem odd to claim that benevolent and just desires are part of the moral response and that they are also character trait ascriptions. If an individual has the character trait of benevolence, for example, then he or she is benevolent. To be benevolent one must, however, at least in some particular situations, desire the welfare of others. It is this particular desire in a particular situation which is part of the response to the other. Benevolent desire, then, is part of both the response and the motivation for the response and, as such, it is morally significant. Lawrence Blum cites the work of R. M. Titmus who compares the voluntary donation of blood to the 'market' system and concludes that voluntary donation is better because of the "intrinsic value in the social sentiments, attitudes, and emotions . . ."[36]

They are good in themselves, beyond the good attached to them or

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[35]Nodding, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, p. 85.
[36]Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, p. 220n.

> derived from being productive of beneficent acts. It is good to us merely that someone . . . cares about our weal and woe.[37]

An action is not necessary for a response to be morally significant since benevolent desire is part of the benevolent response. Kant claimed, on the other hand, that, "If. . . there is no way in which I can be of help to the sufferer and I can do nothing to alter his situation, I might as well turn coldly away . . ."[38] The dying patient does, however, receive some good knowing that I desire his welfare even though he realizes that I can do nothing. Benevolent desire alone is morally significant and deserves approbation because the object of the desire is the welfare of the other.

Since benevolent desire is part of the benevolent response and moral emotion is conceptually connected to benevolent desire, moral emotion is also part of the understanding of the benevolent response. The individual who has a benevolent desire feels for the other because sympathy is presupposed by benevolence. If there is an evaluation with respect to the change in the other's circumstance, the individual also experiences a moral emotion of some kind. This emotion is a morally significant part of the benevolent response. The individual in the burning building who cannot be saved or the dying deer at the side of the road may be unaware of the sympathetic and moral emotions experienced by those who have encountered the misfortune. Nevertheless, there is moral significance to the response of the individual who desires that the victim not suffer and who feels anguished by the victim's pain and feels regret that he or she cannot help. The response of the individual who desires the welfare of the person in the fire is not the same as the response of one who watches the fire indifferently. The following example of Blum's illustrates how a response is deficient if a benevolent emotion is absent.

> Suppose I have a flat tire by the side of the highway, my jack is broken, and there is no phone nearby. I am dependent on a passing car to stop. When, eventually, Manero stops to help me, I am greatly relieved that my tire is changed so I can get on the road again, and I value Manero's act of beneficence for this reason. But, in addition, I would naturally value Manero's act as expressive of the human

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[37]Blum, p. 221n.
[38]Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. by L. Infiled (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 200.

> sympathy and compassion it showed in Manero's taking the trouble to stop and help me. If I had reason to believe that the act was not expressive of such sympathy and compassion - e.g., if Manero had a kind of business connected with his auto repair shop, in which he carried tire-fixing equipment around with him and offered for a fee to fix the tires of persons in my sort of situation - then I would regard, and value, the act differently. Though it would still have the substantial value to me of relieving my helpless situation and enabling me to drive my car . . . it would lack the element of human sympathy or compassion. For Manero would be doing the act purely . . . as a business proposition. The good to me of the two different acts would differ.[39]

Although Blum intends his example to refer to emotions, it can be understood with respect to both benevolent desire and the sympathetic emotion presupposed by benevolent desire. The act in each instance is identical but the response is different. One response includes the desire for the other's welfare and a sympathetic emotion while the other response includes neither desire nor emotion. If Manero's action is done out of a business interest, it is not, in fact, a beneficent act; it is, rather, a prudential or self-interested act. A beneficent act is a moral act and one cannot do a moral act from self-interested desires.

In summary, I have argued that the benevolent response necessarily consists of a feeling for others presupposed by a benevolent desire as well a corresponding moral emotion. The response may include an action in those situations for which an action is possible. If someone desires another's welfare and feels an emotion but does not act when an action is possible, the response, while still benevolent, is, nevertheless, deficient.

Beneficent Response

In Chapter Three I argued that it is not practically possible for an individual, who is generally benevolent, to specifically desire the welfare of all sentient beings in all situations. In those situations in which one does not have a specific desire for another, the benevolent individual will desire to do his or her duty of beneficence. This desire to do one's duty, I have said, is conscientiousness. The beneficent response has quite different components from the components which comprise the benevolent response and, hence, it has different moral

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[39]Blum, p. 144.

significance. Beneficence is only indirectly concerned with the other's welfare. There is no sympathetic feeling for the other since sympathy is presupposed by benevolent or just desire.[40] Because there is no benevolent desire there is also no moral emotion.

In situations in which the generally benevolent person does not have a benevolent desire for another, he or she acknowledges a duty of beneficence. The acknowledgement of a duty involves providing justifying reasons for one's response at the time of the response. For example, Wendy is climbing the stairs of the Physics building just as Hank, one flight above her drops the fifteen file folders he had been carrying down the stairs. Wendy is in a hurry to deliver her guest lecture on levers so she fails to notice Hank's despair. She does notice, however, Hank's papers on the stairs. Wendy has no direct desire to assist Hank and consequently she does not experience a sympathetic emotion for him. She is, however, a generally benevolent person and she appraises the situation as one in which someone requires help. She acknowledges a duty to help Hank and desires to do this duty.[41] In order to acknowledge a duty to help, Wendy recognizes that there are reasons why anyone is obligated to help who encounters a situation in which someone has dropped papers down the stairs. Wendy appraises that there is someone in trouble (although she does not see Hank as an individual in trouble). She acknowledges that in this type of situation anyone ought to help. This is her justifying reason for helping. This justifying reason is part of her beneficent response.

I have argued that the desire and emotion which are directed at the welfare of another is morally significant. It is morally significant because of the good portrayed to the other or, if it isn't perceived by the other, because of the contribution to "the growing good of the

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[40]In the previous chapter I described conscientiousness as the desire to do one's duty either with or without a struggle. In the latter case, one may have a 'feeling' which is the experience of struggling with countervailing desires or, in the former case, it may be as Kant described, an experience of reverence for the moral law. "What I recognize immediately as a law for me, I recognize with reverence, which means merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of my senses." Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans, H. J. Paton (London: Hutcheson, 1962), p. 69.

[41]Wendy may not do her acknowledged duty if her desire to get to her class overwhelms her desire to do her duty.

world."[42] This good is absent in the beneficent response because one responds directly to duty and only indirectly for the other. The process of providing justifying reasons for one's response at the time of the response detracts from the morality of the response in many instances. The response is necessarily delayed because of the time required for the provision of justifying reasons.

> The conscientious attitude is one which involves the thought of good or of pleasure for someone else, but it is a more reflective attitude than that in which we aim directly at the production of some good or some pleasure for another, since in it the mere thought of some particular good, or of a particular pleasure for another does not immediately incite us to action, but we stop to think whether in all the circumstances the bringing of that good or pleasure is what is really incumbent on us.[43]

For example, Judy sees an elderly man trip and fall in front of her; she desires his welfare, feels a sympathetic emotion for him, and attempts to help. Contrast Judy's response to Kate's response. Kate sees the elderly man fall and pauses to consider whether the reasons she might have for acting are universalizable to everyone. If Kate determines that her reasons are universalizable and she acts on this, her lack of spontaneity to the man's predicament allows a longer time for him to suffer. Moreover, her pause to reflect indicates that she is not so much concerned with the welfare of the man as she is with doing the right thing. This is not to say that Judy may not deliberate about the best way to help the man but she does not deliberate about whether she ought to help him.

I am not suggesting that there is no moral significance in the process of justification but the significance arises in those situations in which a direct benevolent desire is not possible or is difficult. The generally benevolent individual cannot respond with a benevolent desire in all situations. In those situations in which it is possible to respond benevolently and the individual only recognizes a duty to be beneficent, the response is morally deficient. The deficiency of this type of response is most evident in perfunctory replies to someone's

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[42]George Eliot, Middlemarch (London: The Zodiac Press, 1967), p. 795.
[43]Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 163.

discomfort or injury: for example, the individual, who, when shown a scraped knee, replies with effort, "Oh, isn't that unfortunate". There is likely no moral significance to this type of dutiful response. It might be better understood as an indifferent response. A dutiful response is morally superior to the indifferent response or even to the response of non-indifference recommended by G. J. Warnock.[44] There is no desire of any kind directed at another in the indifferent response but non-indifference is consistent with a desire to harm the other.

The fact that a direct benevolent response is morally significant demonstrates that one does not need to reflect on the morality of one's response in order to lead a moral life. As Iris Murdoch says, "an unexamined life can be virtuous . . . it must be possible to do justice to . . . the virtuous peasant." [45]

Just Responses

Direct Just Response

The direct just response is similar to the benevolent response in that they both presuppose a sympathetic emotion. As I have argued earlier, the just person can, without contradiction, both feel for another and treat the individual impartially. The claim that this is not possible is reflected by Naomi Scheman who writes that what we need from the people who adjudicate conflicts

> . . . is attentive listening (asking the right questions, taking the answers seriously), careful consideration of possible causes of action . . . We don't expect them to have any particular feeling for us . . . . If their thoughts and emotions are elsewhere, if they don't even like us especially well, if they forget about us as soon as their work is done--fine. [46]

One can, of course, respond only because one feels badly for someone but that is not to respond justly. On the other hand, if one only responds impartially without also feeling for the other, the response is deficient. It is not better if the adjudicator does not feel for us. It is

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[44]Warnock, The Object of Morality, p. 167.
[45]Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, pp. 1-2.
[46]Naomi Scheman, "On Sympathy," The Monist 62 (1979): 322.

morally significant if the adjudicator feels for us while retaining the impartiality necessary to provide adjudicating reasons.

Feeling for others involved in a conflict is morally significant to the just response but it is irrelevant to what counts as an adjudicating reason. In other words, if Bill desires that Joe and Fred are treated fairly in a dispute which he is to settle, feeling for Joe and Fred is not relevant to the reasons Bill must provide to adjudicate the dispute although it is relevant to the moral response. If Bill desires to be just to Joe and Fred, he may have to decide in favour of one, despite feeling for both of them. Bill may have a direct just desire for Joe but not for Fred. Because he is generally just, the adjudicating reasons reflect his impartiality. The response to Joe in this instance is different from the response to Fred and the total response, therefore, is quite complex. The response to Joe includes the sympathetic emotion presupposed by a direct desire for his fair treatment as well as adjudicating reasons. The response to Fred includes a dutiful desire for his fair treatment, justifying reasons which justify doing his duty, and adjudicating reasons. Moreover, if Bill is prevented from adjudicating the problem between Joe and Fred, he may experience either disappointment or anger as a moral emotion.

Justice requires that adjudicating reasons are provided in the determination of what is to count as fair treatment. (ie. Karen tells the waiters why the tip money should be distributed in a certain way). In some cases, the provision of reasons is sufficient for the response. In other cases, it is necessary that adjudicating reasons are given and that some action is performed. It is inappropriate, for example, if a school principal provides reasons why fair treatment entails that both boys and girls benefit from physical education programs and he does nothing to ensure that both actually do benefit.

Dutiful Just Response

In situations in which the just individual does not have a specific desire to treat another fairly, he or she will desire to do his or her duty of justice. The dutiful just response includes all three types of reasons outlined earlier. Since it is not motivated by a direct desire for another's fair treatment, the dutiful just response includes justifying reasons for responding justly. The desire to do one's duty based on these justifying reasons, together with relevant beliefs, is the motivating reason for the response. These and the adjudicating reasons one gives in the particular situation make up the dutiful just response. There is no specific feeling for the other in the conflict, although there may be other emotions experienced if the individual is, for example, angered at the disregard for the principle of justice. Because of the absence of any feeling for the other and the presence of justifying reasons for the response, the dutiful just response has less moral significance than the direct just response.

We often recognize duties to keep certain rules which ensure that our social group operates fairly. When an instance of a particular rule arises, we respond according to the initial desire that rules which insure fairness are kept. Over time, the response may become habitual. Driving in traffic is illustrative of this type of response. People driving cars in lanes which must merge, habitually alternate turns because of a previous acknowledged desire to be fair. Habitually doing one's duty does not entail giving reasons at the time of the response.

Sex/Gender Differences in the Moral Response

Recent work by Carol Gilligan, Nel Nodding, and others has suggested that the moral experience for females and males is different. If based on biological (sex) differences, the strong claim is that to be moral is different for females and males and neither can understand what the moral life is like for the other. The weaker claim is that any differences in experiencing morality occurs because of deep-rooted psychological and sociological factors which make it very difficult for each gender to have access to the other's moral life.

Although it is not Gilligan's claim that there are separate moralities for males and females, she has indicated that 'caring' is predominately found in females' experience of morality.[47] Since my purpose is to analyze care, I want to examine Gilligan's findings in light of what I have argued to this point. It is beyond the scope of this work to determine whether differences in moral responses are sex-linked or gender-linked. Whatever the basis, the differences tend to be manifested in the following ways, as indicated in this synopsis of Gilligan's findings:

> For men, moral problems arise from competing rights; moral development requires the increased capacity for fairness; and the resolution of moral problems requires absolute judgments arrived at through the formal, abstract thinking necessary for taking the role of the generalized other. Men characteristically worry about people interfering with one another's rights, and objective unfairness appears immoral to men whether or not it subjectively hurts. In contrast, for women moral problems arise from conflicting responsibilities to particular, dependent others; moral development requires the increased capacity for understanding and care; and the resolution of moral problems requires awareness of the possible limitations on any particular problem resolution arrived at through the contextual and inductive thinking characteristic of taking the role of the particular other. Women worry about not helping others when they could help them, and subjectively a felt hurt appears immoral to women whether or not it is fair. [48]

One of the major distinctions I have made is between those situations for which benevolence is appropriate and those for which justice is appropriate. One way of distinguishing these situations is by the presence or absence of conflict. When there is conflict present between two or more sentient beings or between sentient beings and a standard, the just person responds by providing adjudicating reasons for his or her response. Gilligan criticizes Lawrence Kohlberg for limiting the type of reasons appropriate for adjudicating a conflict to those which emphasize autonomy and separateness of the moral agent. Gilligan follows Kohlberg, however, in restricting moral situations to those which involve conflict and consequently she, like Kohlberg, does not recognize that there are also moral situations which do not involve conflicts.

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[47]Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice, and "New Maps of Development: New Visions of Education", Philosophy of Education Yearbook (1982): 47-62.
[48]Sandra Harding, "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey of Issues." Dialectica 36 (1982): 237-238.

The moral response for Gilligan, as well as Kohlberg, includes the provision of adjudicating reasons. Kohlberg's adjudicating reasons stress autonomy and separateness; Gilligan's adjudicating reasons stress relations and what she calls 'care'. The differences between adjudicating reasons which reflect separateness and adjudicating reasons which reflect relatedness are important insights into the types of reasons females and males find appropriate to adjudicate conflicts. It is not correct, however, to indicate that the one approach reflects 'care' while the other does not. To care is to have it matter that something is the case. Consequently, adjudicating reasons which reflect separateness and adjudicating reasons which reflect relatedness are both instances of care. What marks each out as instances of moral care is whether the desire portion of the motiviating reason (care) is directed at another's well-being.

The provision of adjudicating reasons is appropriate and logical only in situations in which there is conflict. In situations in which there is conflict, the adjudicating reasons must be impartial and may be motivated by a direct desire for others in the conflict. In other words, the person who has a direct just desire has a relatedness to others but also separates himself or herself from the personal features of the others. When there is separateness or no relatedness (no direct desire for the other), the response is a dutiful just response which involves a pause to provide justifying reasons for the response. If Gilligan's claim is that males tend to act dutifully with respect to justice (no claim has been made by Gilligan about benevolence), then a male tends to justify, at the time of the response, why, as a moral person, he ought to respond in a certain way when he has no benevolent or just desire directed at another.

One of the traditional criticisms of women in philosophical literature is that women are incapable of living fully moral lives because "women are incapable of fully taking account of the 'demands of universality'."[49] Whether females are incapable of using the universalizability principle is certainly problematic but the accuracy of the claim cannot be determined by reference to the extent to which it is used. What might be suggested is that, if females do not

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[49]Lawrence Blum, "Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1982): 291.

use the universalizability principle, it is because they tend to directly desire the fair treatment of others rather than pausing to determine whether someone ought to be just in the situation.

The importance of relatedness to females' sense of self indicates that females might also tend to directly desire others' welfare in situations without conflict. As already indicated, however, Gilligan does not address these kinds of moral situations.

> I do not think Gilligan's ethic of care should be seen as an alternative within this narrow focus, as an alternative conception of the right. It is, rather, an alternative to this focus, a conception which revolves around another aspect of morality. If we display the attitude of care for someone, we are not orienting toward how we ought to act if our interests should conflict. Rather, the well-being of the other is felt as one's own and this feeling motivates one to do the best thing, to make the world a better place to live for that person.[50]

Gilligan does not recognize this "other aspect of morality" because she deals only with conflicts. Ironically, it might be thought that females would perform better in this "other aspect of morality" because there are no justifying reasons (if a direct desire) and no adjudicating reasons required.

"How ought we to act?" is a question which occurs not only in just situations. It occurs also in benevolent situations when the individual has no direct desire for the other's welfare. Perhaps Gilligan's work shows that males tend to see both benevolent situations and just situations as ones in which one ought to do one's duty of beneficence or justice because they tend to lack the relatedness which is essential for a direct moral desire.

The following questions might be asked: 1)Do females do poorly on Kohlberg's test of moral development because females tend to directly desire other's welfare rather than utilize the principle of universalizability which is characterisitic of Kohlberg's highest stage.[51] 2)Do females tend to appraise moral situations as if they are all benevolent situations? That is, do females not impartially adjudicate reasons for sorting out conflicts between others? ("Women

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[50]Dwight Boyd, "Careful Justice or Just Caring: A Response to Gilligan," Philosophy of Education Yearbook (1982): 67-68.

[51]Given what I have said about a response being deficient if universalizability is utilized when a direct desire is possible, it is clear that I disagree with universalizability being a defining characteristic of the highest moral stage.

worry about. . . subjectively-felt hurt . . . whether or not it is fair.") 3)Do males tend to appraise moral situations as if they are all situations of justice and, therefore, fail to respond to others when they suffer? ("Moral problems arise from competing rights.") 4)Do males tend not to directly desire others' welfare or fair treatment but regard moral situations as instances in which one must do one's duty? These are empirical questions which might be better examined with some of the distinctions I have made in this work.

It should be clear from what I have argued about morality being based in empathy and sympathy and differentiated into benevolence and justice, that I reject the notion of there being separate moralities for females and males. As Kurt Baier says,

> Morality is not the preserve of an oppressed or priviliged class or individual . . . An esoteric code, a set of precepts known only to the initiated and perhaps jealously concealed from outsiders, can at best be a religion, not a morality . . . . 'Esoteric morality' is a contradicition in terms.[52]

Even if studies show that females and males do respond differently to moral difficulties, this does not demonstrate that there is a separate morality for each. Rather, it indicates a role that education might play in aiding the individual to discriminate among moral situations and respond accordingly.

Summary

In this chapter I have argued for differences in types of moral response based on the object of the moral agent's desire which is, in turn, affected by the type of situation in which the agent finds himself or herself. In doing this, I differentiated four kinds of moral response; the benevolent response, the beneficent response, the direct just response and the dutiful just response.

1. Benevolent and beneficent responses occur in situations in which another's welfare is affected and there is no conflict.

2. Both types of just response occur in situations in which there is a conflict and others' fair

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[52]Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 101.

treatment is at stake.

3. The beneficent response and the dutiful just response entail providing justifying reasons for doing one's duty.

4. Both just responses include giving adjudicating reasons for treating others fairly in the particular situation.

5. Since both the benevolent response and the direct just response presuppose direct desires for another's welfare or fair treatment and also involve feeling for the other, they have a greater moral significance than the beneficent response or the dutiful just response which have no feeling for the other and include a pause to reflect about the appropriateness of the response.

6. In Chapter Three I said that the morality of principles and the morality of character traits are complementary in that, if an individual has no direct desire for another's welfare or fair treatment, the individual can still be benevolent or just by recognizing a duty to be benevolent or just. In this chapter I have shown that motivation and response are conceptually connected; it is not possible to give a full account of the morality of a response without also taking into account its motivation. This is to say that one cannot assess the moral response without also assessing character. Likewise, when someone assesses a character trait in a specific situation, one also assesses the moral response because the desire for another's welfare or fair treatment is morally significant.

Chapter V

FACTORS AFFECTING THE MORAL RESPONSE

I have argued that a moral response includes the agent's motivating reason. Since a motivating reason is composed of a desire and relevant beliefs, the moral response can be affected if either the desire or belief component of the motivating reason is affected. The motivating reason can be affected if there are contervailing desires which are more intense than one's benevolent or just desires. If these countervailing desires are intrinsic and fairly permanent desires (character traits), the benevolent or just response will occur infrenquently and inconsistently. The belief component of the motivating reason is affected by the type of facts one understands and, by recognizing a situation as being of a particular kind. Any sympathetic or moral emotion which might occur is also affected if one's motivating reason is affected by countervailing desires or inappropriate beliefs or evaluations, since emotion is conceptually connected to desire and the evaluation of belief. If the emotion is affected, the moral response is also affected. Desires, beliefs, and appraisals are affected by what is attended to which, in turn, is affected by and affects the ability to imagine and identify with others.

An individual's ability to provide justifying reasons in dutiful responses and adjudicating reasons in just responses also affects the moral response in situations in which these reasoning skills are appropriate. Additionally, there are skills and know-how which an individual requires in a particular situation in order for the moral response to be as complete as possible. For example, an individual may have a benevolent desire toward someone who is drowning in a pool; she may evaluate the situation as one in which someone is suffering, experience a moral emotion but do nothing because she has no life saving skills. Although the benevolent desire and emotion are morally significant, the response is not complete if nothing is done to help the drowning person. The skills and know-how which may be significant to the moral response include practical skills and know-how which are necessary for members of a social group, as well as social skills which allow people to initiate and sustain communication.

In this chapter I say something more about desire, belief, and appraisal with respect to how each might affect the moral response; I look at factors which affect desire, belief, and appraisal and, consequently, the moral response; I examine the relative importance of reasoning skills; I indicate those factors which are distinct from desire, belief, appraisal and reasoning but which have an effect on the completion of a moral response; and I say something about the effect of circumstance on the moral response.

The Effect of Desire, Belief, Appraisals and Reasoning on the Moral Response

Belief

Facts and Concepts

In order to desire something, one must have some factual beliefs about it. Having factual beliefs entails understanding certain concepts which, in turn, affects whether one will recognize that a situation is of a particular kind. If, for example, someone has been struck by a car, and Ron does not have a belief that a car striking a person can be harmful and/or if he does not understand the concept of harm, he will not be motivated to respond to the injured other. If someone does not know what it is to be harmed and does not possess some rudimentary facts about what, in this world, is likely to contribute to harm, the individual will not desire to help. John Wilson[1] suggests that the following facts are important to potential moral responses:

> i)Facts relating to health, safety, etc. {This} includes such things as what drugs are addictive, elementary biology, contraceptive devices, the danger of certain machines (cars, electrical devices), what to do in case of fire, and so on.
>
> ii)Laws, social norms, conventions, etc. This includes what may be called 'social facts': not only the law of the land, but also the conventions and etiquete of particular social groups with whom S may be in contact, the particular powers and scope of various authorities, the workings of particular instituions, social rules, and so on.
>
> iii)Facts about individuals or groups in need. S needs to know, not just what is . . . required in general to satisfy others' interests, but also about the existence of various others who are in

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[1]John Wilson, The Assessment of Morality (Windsor Berks: NFER Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973).

> need. It is relevant that there are old people, starving people, etc. in other countries, or in some other way removed from S's immediate environment.[2]

Although one requires an understanding of facts and concepts relevant to a moral situation, this is not to say that one must be a moral expert.[3] Neither is it necessary to be able to give a full articulation of the facts or an explication of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concepts involved in the belief. It is necessary, however, as Peters makes clear, to have an understanding of interpersonal relationships and social institutions. "A child, strictly speaking, cannot be guilty of theft, who has not developed the concept of himself as distinct from others, of property, of the granting of permission, etc."[4] A moral agent must understand the nature of conflict, the concepts of harm and help, the concepts entailed by social instituations, the concepts associated with the facts of each particular situation, and how these relate to the essential concepts of help and harm.

Appraisals

Not only is it necessary to have an understanding of facts and the concepts which make up these facts, one must also be able to appraise these facts as instances of a certain kind of situation. If I do not see this as a situation in which it is appropriate to put my bank card in the bank machine, my beliefs about bank cards and bank machines do not lead to a response. If I see someone walking the halls, looking at room numbers, I will not ask the person if I can help unless I see the situation as one in which the other is lost. Appraisal of a situation according to a particular description is essential to the moral response, although it is not sufficient.

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[2]Wilson, p. 56.
[3]For a discussion on moral expertise see, Peter Singer, "Moral Experts," Bela Szabados, "On 'Moral Expertise'" and Kai Neilsen, "Moral Expertise - A Reply," in Contemporary Moral Issues, ed. Wesley Cragg (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1983), pp. 580-598.
[4]R. S. Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education,"in Moral Development and Moral Education, p. 57.

The ability to see the predicaments of others is not restricted to the benevolent or just person. The sadistic person also has this ability, although the description of the situation is different for the sadistic person. The benevolent person sees the situation in which a man is hanging from a precipice as one in which another suffers and as an occasion for assistance, while the sadist sees the situation as one in which another suffers and as an occasion to take pleasure in the suffering.

As suggested in the last chapter, documented differences in females' and males' moral responses may be the result of the different ways each gender tends to see the moral situation. Females may tend to see moral situations as if they are situations requiring a benevolent response and males may tend to see moral situations as if they are situations requiring a just response or, perhaps, a dutiful response. Appraising the situation according to inappropriate descriptions will necessarily prevent the appropriate moral response. For a benevolent response to occur one must see that the other is in a situation without conflict and in which the other's welfare is affected. For a just response to occur, one must see that there is a conflict which requires adjudication between two or more sentient beings or between sentient beings and a standard.

The benevolent or just person is more likely to see the situation for what it is than the individual who does not have these character traits.

> . . . the man of sympathy and the unsympathetic (indifferent) man of duty are faced with the same or equivalent situations - persons who are in distress whom it is in each of their power to help . . . . the indifferent man of duty is much less likely than the man of sympathy to apprehend the other person as in distress in the first place. This is part . . . of what is involved in saying that he lacks sympathy for others.
>
> Suppose . . . that a Kantian agent holds the principle, "Help those who are in pain". This principle is properly applied in situations in which others are in pain. But the mere fact of holding the principle will not tell an agent when someone is in pain.[5]

We would be reluctant to say that an individual is benevolent or just if someone is only able to respond benevolently or justly when the situation is pointed out to the person. As Blum

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[5]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, pp. 136-137.

indicates, the moral agent is able to apprehend these situations and this is part of the understanding of what it is to be a moral agent.

If someone does not respond to a moral situation, the lack of response is not necessarily the result of the individual being "unmoved". Some fail to respond because they do not see a difficulty while others fail to respond because, although seeing the difficulty, it does not affect them. Rather than suppose that everyone perceives situations in the same way and that some respond while others fail, "moral failure is often . . . the result of . . . the narrow range of a person's perception and discrimination."[6]

A person "who has an honest or generous character, does not have to be at all innocent of the possibilities there are for meanness or dishonesty in human life . . . . It just never occurs to him to do these things in his relations with others . . ."[7] For example, as Wendy walks up the stairs of the Physics building, she may see Hank and files on the stairs as an instance of someone on the stairs with files around him; she may see it as an instance in which she has an obligation to do her duty; she may particularize Hank and see his predicament as an instance in which she can help; she might particularize Hank and see his predicament as one she will quickly attempt to dismiss; she may particularize Hank and see his predicament as an instance in which she can kick some of the files down another flight of stairs. What she 'sees' is affected by her character.

The correct appraisal is more likely to consistently occur, if the individual is benevolent or just and if the individual has an understanding of certain facts and concepts which, in turn, affect one's specific desires in specific situations. In what follows I say more about factors affecting general and specific benevolent and just desires.

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[6]Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), pp. 208-222.
[7]Beehler, Moral Life, p. 122.

Desire

Character Traits and Other Desires

Although benevolence and justice are the cardinal moral character traits, they are not the only character traits an individual may have. Other character traits may affect the moral response by being countervailing intrinsic desires (immoral character traits); by assisting benevolence and justice in completing a response (nonmoral character traits); or by manifesting themselves in relation to benevolence and justice (moral character traits).

The object of one's desire might adversely affect the well-being of others. For example, if an individual has a fairly permanent intrinsic desire to acquire excessive wealth, in particular situations this greed will likely countervail any particular desire the individual may have for another's welfare. Someone may, on one occasion, desire more wealth and, on another occasion, desire another's welfare but neither desire is representative of a character trait unless the desire is fairly permanent. Since greed, as the desire for more for oneself, is in opposition to benevolence and justice, an individual will not be both benevolent or just and avaricious.[1] An individual may, however, experience a number of desires which are conflicting from one time to another. Conflicting desires cannot be permanent features of the individual. If the benevolent or just individual does not respond morally, it is not because the individual has another character trait which is in opposition to the character traits of benevolence and justice. It is because occasionally (not permanently) one has a desire to enhance oneself, the intensity of which is greater in that particular situation than one's benevolent or just desire. In some instances these countervailing desires are clearly immoral--for example, the desire to loot the belongings of those who have just sufferred through a tornado. In other instances the desire to enhance one's own welfare is not inappropriate because of the extraordinary, moral desire required to do otherwise. For example, if Cathy specifically desires the welfare of those starving in Ethiopia but her desire to further her career is more intense than her desire to go to

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[1]See John King-Farlow, "Akrasia, Self-Mastery and the Master Self," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 47-60 for a discussion on how contradictory "personae" might coexist in the same self.

Ethiopia to help, her desire to further her career is not an immoral desire. Those who do go to help may have an extraordinary, benevolent desire which is more intense than legitimate desires for self-maintenance.

If one is avaricious, then obviously there will be no moral response except in those isolated and unexpected instances in which the avaricious individual does desire the welfare or fair treatment of others more than he or she desires his or her own aggrandizement. A particular situation may have certain poignant features which make it possible for the greedy person to particularize and identify with the other, or the situation may involve the very few others for whom the greedy person does have benevolent and just desires. This individual does not have the character traits of benevolence and justice. Almost everyone, however, desires the welfare or fair treatment of some sentient being at least in a few situations. Having even an occasional desire for another's well-being, makes it possible for the individual to be benevolent or just.

> . . . this man is capable of thinking in terms of others' interests, and his failure to be a moral agent lies (partly) in the fact that he is only intermittently and capriciously disposed to do so. But there is no bottomless gulf between this state and the basic dispositions of morality. There are people who need help who are not people who at the moment he happens to want to help . . . . To get him to consider their situation seems rather an extension of his imagination and his understanding, than a discontinuous step into something quite different, the 'moral plane'. And if we could get him to consider their situations, in the sense of thinking about it and imagining it, he might conceivably start to show some consideration for it . . .'

The important point here is that, if one is not benevolent or just, this does not mean that one is totally outside the moral domain. Particular benevolent and just desires can be extended and made more intense and can, consequently, counteract self-centered desires. Over time, if one attends more often to others as well as to different others, one's particular and isolated benevolent and just desires may come to occur more consistently.

'Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 10.

There are other character traits which are nonmoral. These character traits may be necessary in certain situations if the benevolent or just response is to occur but they have non-moral or immoral ends. These character traits which include courage, industry, prudence, fortitude, patience, and temperance, are necessary conditions in some situations if the moral agent is to respond fully.

> If, for instance, the dominant object of my life is to maintain, by fair means or foul, my personal power and ascendancy over some group . . . I may well display, and need to display, exceptional industry in maintaining and defending my system of despotism, great courage in resisting the pressures and machinations of my opponents and enemies . . . . Thus, while the dispositions here in question are undoubted virtues, they are virtues . . . which a very bad man might have; and while probably such qualities are admirable even in a bad man, he is not . . . morally the better for his possession of those admirable qualities.[10]
>
> Courage will aid the thug, determination the pirate, patience the cracksman, gentleness the jewel thief and so on. To possess temperance or prudence is not necessarily a matter of moral praise, for these attributes can make a bad man more effective in the same way as they fortify the good man in what he attempts.[11]

These character traits are moral only insofar as they assist benevolence and justice to complete a moral response. Courage is an important trait to have in those situations, for example, in which another's welfare is adversely affected and in which there is personal risk to anyone attempting to help. Ted may desire the welfare of Tim who is hanging from a precipice and feel a moral emotion for Tim but Ted may not do anything to help because of fear for his own welfare. If, however, he has the character trait of courage, he is able to attempt to help. Patience is an important trait in those situations, for example, in which the fair treatment of others can be obtained only over a lengthy period of time. As arbitrator, Bob may desire the fair treatment of those in a child custody dispute but because he is not patient, the fair treatment of those involved may not be achieved.

There are still other character traits which are moral character traits but are excercised only in relation to benevolence and justice. Honesty and fidelity, for example, are corollaries

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[10]Warnock, The Object of Morality, pp. 78-79.
[11]David G. Attfield, "Problems with Virtues," Journal of Moral Education 7 (1978): 76.

of benevolence and justice,[12] although it may not always be appropriate to be honest or faithful if one is to be benevolent or just. In some cases, benevolence and justice would be hampered if, for example, the desire to tell the truth or the desire to keep one's promises always prevailed. There are instances in which to save a life, for example, one may need to tell an untruth. I may tell you a lie when you are drugged, hysterical, or otherwise mentally incapacitated if, by doing so, I am able to prevent you from harm. These paternalistic lies are based on the assumption that I understand better than you what counts as your welfare or fair treatment. Some situations affecting welfare and fair treatment are morally trivial and to secure these by being dishonest is not to be benevolent or just to the person being deceived. In many other situations, it is clearly not the prerogative of someone to be dishonest with another on the basis of what is thought to be the other's welfare or fair treatment. If I desire that your welfare not be diminished, I do not tell you untruths nor do I break my promise to you because, everything else being equal, promising that you can count on me and then not following through is to diminish either your welfare or your fair treatment.

> . . . my failure to keep my promise leaves you standing on the station platform. By saying that I'll be there, I encourage you to rely on me to see to it that an interest of yours is met. By not keeping my promise, I let you down. . . . I keep a promise I have made not only (or merely) so as not to let down the rational side of my being, I also keep it so as not to let someone else down.[13]

In some instances of benevolence and justice, one must directly desire to be honest in order to respond benevolently or justly.[14] For example, Helen has told Hilary that she will return Hilary's downhill skis before Hilary leaves for the mountains. To desire Hilary's welfare is to desire to keep one's promise to Hilary. If Helen needs to pause to justify whether she should keep her promise, the provision of these justifying reasons indicates that she desires to do her duty to keep her promise to Hilary. Similiarly, when Helen adjudicates a dispute

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[12]Frankena, Ethics, p. 68.
[13]Teuber, "Simone Weil: Equality as Compassion," pp. 230-231.
[14]This is not to say that honesty as a character trait is derived from benevolence or justice. Honesty is the desire for truth. In some instances this desire for truth makes it possible for benevolence or justice to also be achieved.

between two tenants in her building, if she directly desires their fair treatment, she also directly desires to tell each the truth about the details of the confliict. If she must pause to recognize a duty to tell the truth, her desire for justice is dutiful desire. Honesty, then, is a moral character trait but it is a collorary of both benevolence and justice.

Reasoning

I have shown that there are three types of moral reasons--moral motivating reasons, moral justifying reasons and moral adjudicating reasons. Since they are distinct, different reasoning skills are required for each. Although motivating reasons (desire and relevant beliefs) causally explain benevolent and just responses, an individual's ability to recount one's motivating reason is not part of the moral response. However, the components of the motivating reason are significant to the response. Both the ability to appraise one's beliefs and one's benevolent and just desires are morally significant. The reasoning skill associated with moral motivating reasons is essentially the ability to appraise one's beliefs.

The provision of justifying reasons for dutiful responses involves the utilization of the universalizability principle. According to some, including Kohlberg, the universalizability principle is indicative of a higher level of cognitive ability. The implication is that the presence of justifying reasons in the beneficent response and the dutiful just response makes these responses more difficult and, therefore, superior. Universalizability, as a reasoning skill, is an asset to the individual only in those situations in which he or she does not have a direct desire for the other's welfare or fair treatment; it is required less by the individual who has a wide scope and intensity of benevolent and just desires.

Adjudicating reasons are part of both the direct and dutiful just response and absent from both the benevolent and beneficent response. The reasoning skill involved entails being able to determine features relevant to the fair treatment of those involved in the conflict. Adjudicating reasons do not not make the just response superior to the benevolent response. If reasons are appropriate to the response and the individual provides reasons, this response is

superior to the response in which no reasons are provided when they are required. However, the response is inferior if the individual provides reasons when none are required.

> An exclusive focus on {moral reasoning and fact-finding} leads to an insufficient recognition of the multifarious practical skills required by a morally good life . . . . Simple good folk are not walking anomalies but one of our sources of moral inspiration. Plainly, being highly moral is not the same thing as being clever or well informed. . . . it is important to remind ourselves that intellectually taxing moral problems and dilemmas do not exhaust the range of moral life, although they constitute a significant part of it.[15]

Although reasoning skills are not necessary for some moral responses, this is not to make the extreme claim that Blum makes; "from reason alone can one at most generate the correct set of principles."[16] Since we can differentiate motivating, justifying and adjudicating reasons, it is clear that reasoning skills have more applicability than claimed by Blum. The generation of principles may be a reasoning skill but it is not one that necessarily contributes to the moral response. Reasoning skills which are not grounded in benevolence and justice are not moral reasoning skills. The generation of principles can, in fact, produce questionable results if they do not have their basis in benevolence and justice. The same is true of any obligations which may be generated through a reasoning process. In his discussion of the ethical syllogism, for example, Haefner gives the following example of an ethical syllogism as illustrative of how one arrives at an obligation.

> Major premise (tripartite): I believe that (B) praiseworthy motorists, (A) when they kill an animal on the highway, (C) are expected to stop and remove the carcass from the thoroughfare.
> Minor premise A: I find that I have just killed a squirrel on the highway.
> Minor premise B: I want to be known as a praiseworthy motorist.
> Conclusion C: Therefore, I ought to stop and remove the dead squirrel from the road.[17]

Haefner's example refers to both beliefs and desires. However, not just any combination of beliefs and desires entail a moral motivating reason. In this example, the individual desires to

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[15]Szabados, "On 'Moral Expertise'", p. 585.
[16]Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, p. 139.
[17]Alfred Haefner, "The Ethical Syllogism," Ethics 71 (1961): 289.

be thought well of; he does not desire the welfare of the animal or those who may come across the animal. Haefner's syllogism is not, after all, an ethical syllogism.

The ethical syllogism has its place in the justification process of the dutiful response, but it is not, as the A. V. E. R. writers suggest, all there is to the moral response. Its effectiveness is limited to those situations in which one must justify why a particular situation is an instance of benevolence or justice. It is impotent with respect to "the person who sincerely wonders why he should enter the domain of rational morality in the first place, or who has no inclination to do so."[11]

Factors Affecting Desire, Belief, Appraisal and Reasoning

Attending, Imagining, and Identifying

I earlier explained that a specific desire for another's welfare or fair treatment is affected by one's identification with another which, in turn, is affected by the ability to imagine another as being harmed and helped. I said that identification with other sentient beings is possible because one understands what it is to be harmed and helped from one's own experience as a sentient being.

One's subjective imagination is closely associated with the ability to appraise a situation according to a particular description but appraisal is also necessary for the efficacy of the subjective imagination. For example, one's subjective imagination of what it is like to be lost can be of assistance in 'seeing' a situation as one in which someone is lost. Once this appraisal is made, subjective imagination is essential to the identification with the person as one who is lost.

I have emphasized that what one attends to between moral situations affects one's desires, one's beliefs, the evaluation of one's beliefs and, hence, one's emotions and the moral response. Appraising a situation according to a particular description is affected by what is looked at or attended to. Attention is affected by and affects one's ability to objectively

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[11]DeFaveri, "Moral Education: The Risk of Over-Simplification," p. 297.

imagine other life situations and subjectively imagine what the experience of living that life is like.

Murdoch argues that one must direct one's attention away from oneself ("the fat relentless ego").

> The chief enemy of excellence in morality . . . is personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside me . . . . We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of something else, a natural object, a person in need.[19]

By attending to the lives of others, we can objectively and subjectively imagine their circumstances and identify with them in their predicaments and accomplishments.[20] Without this process, desire for others' well-being is unlikely.

Subjective imagination is part of both the dutiful and direct moral response. In the direct response the individual is able to subjectively imagine because he or she is benevolent or just while in the dutiful response the individual consciously attempts to subjectively imagine the other. The process of subjective imagination in the beneficent and dutiful just responses is a conscious process prior to desire. The benevolent and just individual is able to subjectively imagine because or she has benevolent or just desires.

The interrelatedness of imagination and attending to each other as well as to desire, belief, and appraisal is evident. The individual who does not now have a direct desire for others' welfare or fair treatment may come to have these desires by virtue of the conscious imagination of others in order to universalize the judgment. This process of diverting attention away from oneself and towards others, may come to be something the individual does consistently without an effort and may become a direct desire for others' well-being.

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[19]Murdoch, p. 59.
[20]Although, Murdoch makes reference to attending to others, she thinks that ultimately the object of attention is away from oneself and toward The Good.

Skills and Know-How

I have been considering the components of the moral response and those factors which have a direct effect on these components and, therefore, the moral response. I now consider factors which are not part of the moral response but which might affect the moral response if they are absent.

Practical and Social Skills and Know-How

It is conceivable that a person with no countervailing desires could have a benevolent or just desire directed at another, relevant beliefs, an emotion and still not act even when an action is possible. In these cases the individual does not act because he or she is without some know-how relevant to the completion of the moral response. The individual who desires to help the victim who is choking, drowning, cut, burned, or frost bitten but who knows nothing about life saving or first aid will experience his or benevolent desire and emotion but he or she will not be able to help the other. Although it is morally significant that the individual has a benevolent desire and feels for the victim, the victim, if given the choice, would likely prefer the response of someone who expects a reward but who knows first aid. In some cases one may have the requisite skills to assist another but be so overwhelmed by one's own emotions or by the sight of blood or disfiguration that one is unable to utilize these skills. The individual requires the ability to shift one's attention away from himself or herself or from the injury and back to the suffering other. If someone focusses on the screams or blood of the victim, he or she may be unable to utilize acquired first aid skills. The skills are extraneous if one is not also able to shift one's attention to using the skills to help the victim.

The skills which are necessary to respond to animals are affected by the feasibility and cost of treating all injured animals. We do think it is appropriate to apply life saving skills to pets or to take them to pet clinics where some qualified person can assist them. Other domestic animals, such as race horses, are usually destroyed if an injury in a race makes it impossible for them to run again. It is not obvious whether the appropriate response to a wild animal struck

on the highway is to 'put it out of its misery' or to rush it to an animal clinic. The fact that we destroy some domestic animals and that we do not have animal clinics for wild animals may be indicative of the narrow scope of our benevolent desires.

The individual who desires to assist another who is lost, lonely, confused, embarassed, bereaved, disappointed, discouraged, unhappy, and so on, but who has no social skills to be able to approach the other, to communicate concern and to assist, if possible, responds benevolently but deficiently. For example, George sees Tan standing apart from the group and recognizes his discomfort. George desires to encourage Tan to join the group but, because Tan does not know how to speak English well, George does not know how to approach Tan without seeming forward or, perhaps, condescending. Social skills unlike life-saving and first aid skills, are limited to relationships with people. Although some non-human sentient beings can be lost, lonely, disappointed, and unhappy, it is odd to think of having social skills to approach a chimpanzee or a dog.

Although the benevolent or just person does not have an obligation to desire others' welfare and fair treatment, there is an obligation to do one's duty of beneficence and justice in those situations in which one does not have a specific desire toward another in a specific situation. A benevolent or just person may also have an obligation to acquire any practical and social skills which make it possible to not only experience morally significant desires and emotions but also perform morally significant acts. In fact, once an individual acquires facts about what it is to live in a society and understands how things can go wrong for others, if the person is benevolent and just, these skills and know-how cannot be taken for granted. It is inconsistent to say that I 'care' that others not suffer from injuries but I don't 'care' to know how to alleviate the injuries when they do happen. Similiarly, it is inconsistent to say that I 'care' that others not suffer emotionally but I don't 'care' to know how to approach them and comfort them.

Certain skills and know-how are required to complete a moral response. There are also skills and know-how which are important so that one does not over-respond. Williams refers

to the "stupid sentimentality"[21] of the person who overdoes a response of kindness. He thinks that excessive response can either be the result of improper evaluation or insincerity. Excessive response may also be the result of inadequate social skills. For example, Fay sees that Joy has burnt her hand; Fay desires to assist Joy but because she does not know Joy well and feels uncomfortable because of this, Fay bombards Joy with what seem to be irrelevant and interfering remarks.

Not only can one overdo the emotional part of a response, one can overdo helping behaviors which confound or confuse the situation.

> . . . if everyone embroils himself persistently, however well-meaningly, in other people's concerns rather than his own, a considerable measure of chaos and cross-purposes is likely to ensue.[22]

It is not necessary nor helpful for everyone to go to Ethiopia. It is inappropriate to intercede in all instances in which someone is personally attempting to remedy a situation. Overzealous 'helping' may also interfere with another's agency. For example, if Ann regularly retrieves Ingrid's forgotten books and lost keys and regularly reminds Ingrid of her appointments, Ingrid may soon come to rely on Ann to do this and not, then, assume responsibility for her own belongings or commitments. In some cases it is more appropriate to let someone face the consequences of his or her lack of responsibility and organization. Ann's desire for Ingrid's welfare is better served if Ann has the ability to imagine Ingrid's long-term welfare as well as her short-term welfare. Ann's ability to imagine Ingirid's long-term welfare and to act on this may also be an indication that Ann is prudent. This nonmoral character trait may be necessary for Ann to attempt to enhance Ingrid's welfare.

Circumstance

The factors I have considered so far are ones which are either features of the moral agent or abilities the individual has. We do not necessarily praise or blame the individual for

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[21]Williams, "Morality and the Emotions," p. 225.
[22]Warnock, The Object of Morality, p. 81.

the presence or absence of these factors. If, however, the moral response is deficient as a result of the absence of one or more of these factors, this does morally reflect on the agent. There are other factors which affect the moral response and which, paradoxically, also reflect morally on the agent despite not being under the control of the agent. An individual may, for example, have the benevolent desire to help someone; she may evaluate the situation as one in which someone requires help and she may have the requisite practical and social skills to do the action. She may not do the action because of social circumstances beyond her control which might make the response other than what the agent intends. The following episode is illustrative of this point:

> At Nevins Street, Brooklyn, we saw her preparing to get off at the next station - Atlantic Avenue - which happened to be the place where I too had to get off. Just as it was a problem for her to get on, it was going to be a problem for her to get off the subway with two small children to be taken care of, a baby on her right arm, and a medium sized valise in her left hand . . . .
>
> I could perceive the steep, long concrete stairs going down to the Long Island Railroad or into the street. Should I offer my help as the American white man did at the subway door placing the two children outside the subway car? Should I take care of the girl and the boy, take them by their hands until they reached the end of the steep long concrete stairs of the Atlantic Avenue Station? . . .
>
> But how could I, a Negro and a Peurto Rican, approach this white lady who very likely might have preconceived prejudices against Negroes and everybody with foreign accents, in a deserted subway late at night? . . .
>
> Here was I, way past midnight, face to face with a situation that could very well explode into an outburst of prejudices and chauvinistic conditioning of the "divide and rule" policy of present day society . . .
>
> I passed on by her as if I saw nothing. As if I was insensitive to her need. . . . I just moved on half running by the long subway platform leaving the children and valise and her with the baby on her arm.[23]

By not helping, this individual has not completed a response which he is capable of completing. On the other hand, an attempt to complete the moral response might have resulted in a situation which is not perceived by the woman to be helpful. Social and political factors which

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[23]Jesus Colon, "Little Things are Big," in Ethics in Education 4 (1985): 9. Excerpted from Jesus Colon, Peurto Rican in New York and Other Sketches (Solem, N. H.: Ayer Co., 1975).

make it difficult for people to fully respond to others for fear of being sued, attacked, ridiculed or rejected are very often out of the individual's control. However, the individual is still morally assessed if he or she does not respond fully. This is an instance of not knowing the significance of the moral response until one knows how things turn out. This may or may not, however, be an instance of moral luck[24] since it is possible for the individual to have some effect on the reconstruction of social and political life. It is evident that social and political factors can affect the moral response to the extent that the agent may not have the opportunity to develop important practical and social skills which assist in moral responses. Moreover, the agent's life may be such that what he or she attends to most of the time is severely restricted by poverty, war, starvation, ignorance, oppression or repression.

Nagel writes that "where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck."[25] Moral luck is paradoxical in that an individual is held responsible for a response which is not in his or her control.

> However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him. Similiarly there is a morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. What we do is also limited by the opportunities and choices with which we are faced, and these are largely determined by factors beyond our control. Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for business reasons in 1930.[26]

In situations affected by moral luck, the moral response is determined by how things turn out. When one gives justifying reasons for a response, for example, one does not know until after

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[24]See Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" in Mortal Questions.
[25]Nagel, "Moral Luck", p. 26.
[26]Nagel, pp. 25-26.

the response has occurred whether one's reasons are justified.[27] The moral significance of the justifying reason that one ought to help the person hanging from the precipice is affected if a gust of wind causes the rescuer to lose his footing and his grip, and the victim falls to his death.

It is possible to sequester oneself so that one's moral response is not affected by circumstance. One could lead a life which is without blemish but this type of life is morally insignificant because there are few occasions to respond at all. By sequestering oneself, one may avoid situations in which one's response may turn out badly but one is also likely to avoid situations in which one's response might turn out well. When there is no benevolent or just response there is also no specific benevolent or just desire. If one never has specific benevolent or just desires, one is not benevolent or just.

Summary

Moral desires, moral emotions, moral reasoning in some instances, and action are morally significant parts of the moral response. There are a number of ways in which each can be affected.

1. Moral desires are affected by countervailing desires particularly if these desires are fairly permanent. If an individual has countervailing traits, the character traits of benevolence and justice are precluded from taking hold.

2. Moral desires are affected by and affect appraisals. If an appraisal is inappropriate, the desire and, consequently, the response will be inappropriate. If one does not have moral desires, one is less likely to 'see' moral situations.

3. Even when the appropriate desire for the situation predominates over other desires, an action may not be forthcoming if the individual is without certain practical or social skills to complete the response.

4. The individual may not be able to develop the appropriate desires, beliefs, and skills because of uncertainty and disruption in social conditions. Circumstances also may affect the response

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[27]Williams, "Moral Luck," pp. 24-25.

when one is unable to predict whether an action will be helpful or harmful and not then know the moral significance of the response until it is complete.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS

The literature in moral education has focused primarily on the formal features of morality while neglecting content, moral motivation and the emotional dimensions of the moral life. Those writers who have attempted to include these in their accounts have usually done so by equating benevolence with moral care and excluding any reference to justice. Moreover, there has been a tendency by some of these writers to reject analysis as a means to a philosophical understanding of morality. Consequently, the features of the affective dimension of morality have not been rigorously marked out by those who have proposed alternatives to traditional moral education.

It has been my purpose in this work to analyze the concept of moral care in order to make the concept more clear and in order to determine its role in moral education. I began by showing that care is essentially a motivational term; if someone cares that X is the case, then it matters or makes a diffference to that person that X occurs. To care that something is the case is to have a motivating reason to act in order to affect its occurrence. It is clear from this, then, that there is both moral and non-moral care depending on the object of the care and the nature of the motivating reasons. Morevover, it is evident that moral care is not restricted to benevolence.

I have argued that the motivation for a moral response cannot be explained only with reference to the reasons which justify the response. Justifying reasons, which provide the context within which actions make sense, do not explain the causes for the agent's response because justifying reasons make no reference to the agent's desires. To explain someone's motivating reason is to describe the individual's desires and relevant beliefs in light of the context provided by justifying reasons. For example, a justifying reason for assisting an accident victim is that someone is harmed. The motivating reason for assisting is that one believes that the other is harmed and desires to assist.

Most of our desires can be explained by other desires. For example, someone may desire to earn a living because she desires not to rely on her family. Or, someone may desire to assist others because he desires to gain approval from them. If a desire is intrinsic (not derived from some other desire) and it is fairly permanent, it is a character trait. Character traits have objects. Stylistic traits, on the other hand, have no objects. Being sarcastic or skeptical, for example, are styles for which there are no objects.

Since my purpose has been to analyze moral care, I have been interested in moral character traits rather than immoral or nonmoral character traits. The object of moral character traits is the welfare and fair treatment of sentient beings. Moral care, then, consists of relevant beliefs and either benevolent or just desires directed toward sentient beings. The desire the individual has depends on the circumstance in which another sentient being is affected and one's relevant beliefs about the circumstance. A benevolent desire is appropriate for situations without conflict; a just desire is appropriate for situations with conflict. Relevant beliefs are those the individual has about the context of the situation in which a response is appropriate. I must have some beliefs about the enterprise of banking, for example, in order to put my bank card in the banking machine. These are beliefs about the justifying reasons for the action. Relevant beliefs also include appraisals. An appraisal is the recognition by the agent that a particular circumstance is an instance of a certain type.

To have a moral motivating reason is to care that others' welfare flourishes or does not diminish (benevolence) or that others are treated fairly (justice). Both benevolence and justice have their basis in empathetic distress and sympathy. Empathetic distress is an affective response to the misfortunes of others which, as cognitive abilities develop, becomes feeling with others or empathy, and then feeling for others or sympathy. Both benevolence and justice presuppose sympathy, since one must feel for another before one can desire the other's welfare or desire the other's fair treatment. Because sympathy is presupposed, fair treatment is restricted to those situations which account for the sentience of beings.

In my criticism of orthodox moral education, I said that one seems to achieve far too much by outlining only the formal features of morality because it then appears possible to legitimize any content as long as one is consistent with the formal features. But, in fact, formal features, such as Hare's universalizability and prescriptivity principles, are not adequate to prevent the justification of immoral activities such as torture and genocide. It is only, as Hare himself concedes, if those using these principles are benevolent and just, that these formal principles can avoid justifying behavior which harms sentient beings. The content of morality is benevolence and justice as these traits are manifested in people. The origin of this content is in actual feelings of empathetic distress which develops into empathy, sympathy and then further into benevolence and justice. Understanding the formal features of morality allows us to understand the moral life better. But, understanding these features does not suffice to allow us to live the moral life. Living the moral life is the content of morality and, as I have argued, to live the moral life one must <u>be</u> benevolent and just.

It is not because empathetic distress may be a natural human property that it should be developed. The development of empathy, unlike the development of aggression, which we may also naturally possess, is important for the welfare and fair treatment of sentient beings. If someone asks why welfare and fair treatment are important, we must say, with Toulmin, that this is a <u>limiting question</u>, since it is not evident what other kinds of reasons would count as answers to this question.

I have said that the generally benevolent and just person must, at least in some particular circumstances, desire the welfare and fair treatment of others. I have also argued that it is not possible for anyone to specifically desire the welfare and fair treatment of all sentient beings. One must be aware of another as an individual in order to desire the other's welfare or fair treatment. But, it is impossible to be aware of all sentient beings in the world. Furthermore, I may be aware of another, but if I have not yet identified with the individual or if I find the individual abhorrent, I will not have a specific desire for the other's welfare or fair treatment. In these cases, if one <u>is</u> benevolent and just, the individual desires to do his or her

duty of beneficence or justice. The desire to do one's duty is conscienctiousness. Because duty augments character, the ethics of character and the ethics of duty are complementary rather than unrelated.

Actions normally thought to be supererogatory (going beyond duty) are, in fact, the extraordinary, moral actions of someone who is able to particularize and identify with others in very difficult circumstances and, then, desire their welfare or fair treatment. Individuals who perform extraordinary, moral actions desire the welfare and fair treatment of those who are in notably difficult situations. The benevolent or just person, who has these extensive moral desires, acts from these desires rather than from duty. Since duty augments desires, it does not make sense to claim that benevolent and just desires to do extraordinary actions enable us to go beyond duty.

In Chapter Four I argued that the motivation for a response and the response itself are conceptually connected; the moral significance of the response cannot be fully understood without also taking into account its motivation. Since there are four types of moral desire--the benevolent desire, the beneficent desire, the just desire and the dutiful just desire--there are also four types of moral response. Each moral response is also distinguished by the presence or absence of emotions and reasons. Contrary to some accounts which would link emotions with benevolence and reasons with justice, I have argued that emotions are part of both the benevolent response and the direct just response and that justifying reasons are part of both the beneficent response and the dutiful just response. Feeling for the other is presupposed by both benevolent and just desires and it is part of both responses. There are other moral emotions which are distinguished by the evaluation of how a particular circumstance turns out.

When making reference to moral reasons, it is important to specify the moral reasons to which one refers. There are moral motivating reasons which explain which direct or dutiful desires and relevant beliefs the individual has for the response. Motivating reasons are part of the moral response because one's desires are part of the response. This does not imply, however, that the agent must explain his or her motivating reason at the time of the response.

There are moral justifying reasons which show why welfare and fair treatment are important. It is not necessary to remind oneself of the justifying reasons for one's response at the time of the response either, if one has a direct desire for the other's welfare or fair treatment. If, however, one has a beneficent or a dutiful just desire, then, as part of the response, one does remind oneself of the justifying reasons for doing one's duty. Both the direct and dutiful just responses include adjudicating reasons which specify how those in a particular situation are to receive fair treatment. The benevolent response and the direct just response have greater moral significance because they involve direct desires for the other as well as a feeling for the other. The beneficent response and the dutiful just response, on the other hand, do not include feeling for the other and they include a pause to reflect about the appropriateness of the response.

Review of the Components of the Moral Response

A number of components are necessary if a moral response is to occur. Some, like benevolent and just desires and beliefs are part of the response. Other components like attention, imagination, the ability to identify with another and various skills, directly affect desire and belief and, consequently, the moral response. Most of the latter are common to both benevolence and justice. The development of benevolent and just desires is affected by the ability to attend to certain objects, to appraise situations, to imagine others, and to identify with others. The moral response is also affected by practical and social skills and reasoning ability. It is not my purpose either in this section or the next to elaborate methods for the ways in which moral education can affect the acquisition of these components. Instead, I want to make some general remarks about the relationship of these components to moral education.

O'Hear, Warnock and Beehler are all critical of limiting moral eduation to moral education classes. Their claim is that moral education is an intregral part of other school subjects and, more importantly, that moral education occurs throughout the individual's entire life. I agree with this point as I elaborate in the next section. I do think, however, that reasoning skills, social and practical skills, and the acquisition of certain beliefs should be

scheduled into the school curriculum. These scheduled sessions should not be moral education classes since it is too easily inferred that acquisition of these skills and beliefs is all there is to moral education. The mistake of A. V. E. R., for example, has been to reduce moral education to reasoning, and to a particular kind of reasoning at that. McPhail's Lifelong and Startline programs have made the mistake of reducing moral education to interpersonal skills. In order that moral education is not misunderstood, it is preferable to introduce social, practical and reasoning skills either as distinct courses or as parts of other courses. Life saving skills, for example, are an important part of health education courses as well as some physical education courses. Artificial respiration is better included as part of a swimming class than as part of a moral education class. Social skills are better enhanced in the social atmosphere of the school than in contrived encounters in a classroom. Cooperative and competitive games as well as other school activities can provide opportunities for students to work and play with others since there are many moral situations which may be encountered in group interaction. Teachers can facilitate the acquisition of social skills in a social environment by pointing out instances in which better communication might alleviate differences or help to involve those on the group's periphery. Teachers can also create situations which might not otherwise be encountered so that there are more opportunities for people to communicate with each other.

Reasoning skills are best handled in a critical thinking or informal logic course which include both moral and nonmoral examples. Universalizability, prescriptivity and the notion of relevant reasons can be understood without reference to morality. There is no need to deal with moral reasoning as either Hare or A. V. E. R. do because, in isolation, such attempts are empty and misleading. The reasoning skills acquired are of moral benefit only if the individual is already benevolent and just. Kohlberg is correct to argue that cognitive development must be taken into account in the acquisition of reasoning skills. This is not unique to moral reasoning, however. We do already take cognitive development into account when mathematical and scientific reasoning skills are acquired, for example.

Beliefs which are pertinent to moral situations are also better acquired in other school subjects. Beliefs about what can harm sentient beings and about social institutions and enterprises can be acquired in science, history, and literature. Beliefs about the nature of rules can be understood by playing simple and complex games in physical education classes. The moral significance of these beliefs to the individual will be dependent upon whether he or she also develops moral character traits. Attention to those beliefs which can be acquired in schools can contribute to the development of benevolent and just desires. It is important, then, that teachers point to the moral implications of these beliefs. For example, the individual engaged in a game may have beliefs about the game's rules but not understand either the logical or moral restrictions of the rules. Game environments provide a good opportunity for individuals to come to understand both the logical and moral significance of keeping rules because of the number of occasions in which rules might be broken in a game. Discussions with game players about the reasons why rules are kept can be an important insight for the players into the difference between prudential and moral rules. (I keep this rule because I don't want to receive a penalty, or I keep this rule because my teacher said I should rather than, I keep this rule because I made an agreement with other people that I would play this game as constituted by its rules). Kohlberg is helpful, here, as well, since it is superfluous to discuss the nature of constitutive rules and contracts with someone who is not cognitively able. But as I have often indicated, being cognitively able will also be superfluous if the individual does not desire others' welfare and fair treatment.

In summary, there are some skills and beliefs which affect moral care and which can be directly taught and included in the curriculum. Reasoning skills can be taught as critical thinking or informal logic courses rather than as part of a moral education course. It is preferable to handle these components in this way than to isolate them in a moral education class since these components comprise only a small part of moral education. The character traits of benevolence and justice are the essential components of moral care; these cannot be acquired soley in moral education courses.

The Acquisition of Moral Character Traits

Moral character traits are the most essential part of moral care. If one has benevolent and just desires, education to expand beliefs, improve social and practical skills and reasoning ability can be approached quite systematically. If, however, the individual does not have benevolent and just desires, education in these other areas does not contribute to moral education. Questions about the acquistion of benevolent and just desires are also questions about the ways in which people are motivated to care. How does one come to intrinsically desire others' welfare and fair treatment? Beliefs and skills can be taught directly; intrinsic desires cannot. Although desires are the content of morality, they do not have a specific subject matter which can be presented. The presentation of life saving skills, for example, is an attempt to motivate the individual to acquire these skills and to be motivated to use them to help others. The motivation to use the skills to help others is not gained by acquiring these skills. Skills can be presented and the individual can decide to acquire them or not. One cannot, however, choose to see their point--one cannot choose to be motivated by them.

I have argued that one acquires character traits by attending to certain objects and experiences over a period of time. As Murdoch says, attention goes on continually and it builds up structures of value around us[1] so that "by the time the moment of choice has arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature of the act."[2] For Murdoch attending is positive "looking at"[3] or "a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality."[4] If attention refers only to positive 'looking at', the notion of attention, although helpful in showing the continuity of the moral life, is not helpful in showing how benevolence and justice can develop. According to Murdoch we do also look at the unreal or the false which results in bad or negative dispositions. I understand Murdoch as intending that benevolence (loving) and justice result from looking at certain kinds of objects, and immoral character traits or no

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[1]Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 37.
[2]Murdoch, p. 67.
[3]J. S. Malikail, "A Philosophy of Mind Adequate for Discourse on Morality: Iris Murdoch's Critique", Journal of Educational Thought 15 (1981): 63.
[4]Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 34.

character traits result from looking at other kinds of objects and experiences.

The question about the acquisition of character traits is much the same question as Meno asked Socrates. Meno wanted Socrates to tell him whether virtue is something that can be taught, whether it comes by practice, natural aptitude or something else.[5] Plato's answer to the question suggests, among other things, that virtue can be taught as long as teaching is not understood as the mere presentation of information to someone. A 'teacher' of character traits is someone who can help direct the individual's attention towards those experiences which exemplify the moral life. This is a long term process and involves many 'teachers'. This is why learning life saving skills or social skills can facilitate the direction of one's attention toward the misfortune of sentient beings but only constitute a small part of a lifelong process.

I have argued that it is practically impossible to specifically desire the welfare of all sentient beings because one cannot be aware of them all. Moreover, it is unlikely that one is able to desire the welfare and fair treatment of all those of whom one is aware, even if one is generally benevolent and just. As long as there are individuals about whom one does not care, there is the opportunity to direct one's attention towards them or towards other experiences which exemplify their lives. This process of directing one's attention is a lifelong process. Moral education courses in a school curriculum cannot possibly substitute for this lifelong process.

What one attends to is of critical importance if one's specific benevolent and just desires are to expand. Attending to others' life situations is the first step in a process which also involves imagination, particularization and identification. These are essential if someone is to specifically desire the individual's welfare or fair treatment. Attention, imagination, particularization, identification and appraisal are all essential if a specific desire is to occur but they do not entail or cause benevolent and just desires and they are, in turn, affected by these desires. What is important about this is that if an individual has had only minimal experience with these processes or with desiring the welfare and fair treatment of others, it is possible that

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[5]Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (New York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1980), 70A.

the individual's specific benevolent and just desires, although few and weak, can be expanded and intensified until the individual has these desires fairly permanently. Even if one's early habits of attention are toward the "fat, relentless ego" or toward what is destructive and base, it is not impossible to draw one's attention away from these and toward other sentient beings.

Murdoch argues that regular attention to certain objects and experiences between actual moral choices affects what 'decision' one will make. Similarly I argue that the benevolent and just person desires the welfare and fair treatment of others as a result of what he or she attends to between moral situations. Attention affects what one desires and consequently affects what the person is. As one's attention and desires become regular they are like habits. Murdoch comments that, "our ability to act well 'when the time comes' depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention".[6] My claim is that benevolent and just desires are developed by virtue of habitual attention to certain objects and experiences which I outline later. The very notion of a character trait, as a fairly permanent intrinsic desire, implies that it is consistent or habitual. If individuals are to become habitually benevolent and just they must first habitually attend to certain objects and experiences and then habitually desire others' welfare and fair treatment. As Aristotle wrote, it is not adequate to exercise 'virtuous' action, one must exercise these actions as the 'virtuous man' would exercise them.

> Actions . . . are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who does them as just and temperate men do them.[7]

A significant part of moral education is the assistance of others to habitually attend to certain objects and experiences in order that habitual intrinsic desires might develop.

Habitual attention does not preclude understanding the justifying reasons for morality. Benevolent and just desires are developed not just by 'looking at' certain objects and experiences. They are developed by 'seeing' these attended objects and experiences in a certain

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[6]Murdoch, p. 56.
[7]Aristotle, Nichomechean Ethics, trans. and intro. by David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1105b5-8.

way. The process of 'seeing' or appraising requires, as I have argued, the ability to assess one's beliefs. Having these beliefs also requires reflection and understanding. For example, in order to see a situation as one in which there is no conflict and in which another's welfare is affected, the individual must have beliefs about conflict, beliefs about what constitutes suffering or flourishing, beliefs about others' feelings, and so on.

I have shown that desires require objects. The object of benevolent desire is the improved or not diminished welfare of a sentient being who is not in a situation of conflict. The object of a just desire is the fair treatment of others in a situation with conflict. If these desires are to develop from objects of attention, then it follows that one's attention needs to be directed at situations and exemplars of situations in which the objects of benevolent and just desires are apparent. Murdoch indicates that "anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with virtue"[8] and she claims that "art . . . is the most educational of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen".[9] Good art, says Murdoch, "both in its genesis and its enjoyment . . . is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession.[10] Art presents us with

> a truthful image of the human condition in a form which can be steadily contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which many of us are capable of contemplating it at all. Art transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can enlarge the sensibility of its consumer.[11]

While good art exemplifies the process of directing one's attention away from oneself, bad art exemplifies self-indulgent fantasy. Good art is an exemplar of our moral relations with others, although as Murdoch indicates, "human beings are far more complicated and enigmatic and ambiguous . . . and selfishness operates in a much more devious and frenzied manner in our relations with them.[12] Yet the task involved in attending to others is the same as the task involved in attending to art--"to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent

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[8]Murdoch, p. 84.
[9]Murdoch, p. 88.
[10]Murdoch, p. 85.
[11]Murdoch, p. 87.
[12]Murdoch, p. 91.

it from returning surreptiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair."[13] There are other human activities which allow the attention to focus on others and not on oneself. Murdoch refers to these as intellectual disciplines. More specifically, it is likely that a study of such disciplines as history, economics and religion could assist in the development of 'positive looking'.

I have indicated that both objective and subjective imagination are essential to identification with others which in turn is essential to desiring others' welfare or fair treatment. The origins of both imagination and fantasy are in the unconscious, says Murdoch.[14] It is essential, then, that imagination and fantasy not be confused. If education of the imagination is to be part of moral education, it must develop the individual's abilities to both objectively imagine situations that sentient beings encounter and to subjectively imagine what the experiences are like. Education of the imagination, as part of moral education, is restricted to these kinds of situations. It is part of moral education to be objectively aware of, for example, deceitful, slothful or lustful people and this may be accomplished through literature. It is not part of moral education to be able to subjectively imagine being deceitful, slothful or lustful.

Since there is a conceptual link between desires and emotion, education of moral emotions is accomplished by the education of benevolent and just desires. Wilson's proposal that the education of the emotions consists of coming to understand what oneself and others are feeling is more appropriately a part of developing the ability to appraise. Being able to discern that someone is experiencing grief, for example, is important if one is to respond to that individual. And, it is important that one not 'see' anger in someone when the individual is not angry. However, having this ability alone is not sufficient for the individual to experience a moral emotion. I reject Peters's view of emotions as something which come over us and which are not connected to motivation. Consequently, I also reject his notion that the education of the emotions entails controlling and chanelling the emotions. Emotions can and do at times

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[13]Murdoch, p. 91.
[14]See Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banned the Artists (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1977.

incapacitate us but this is often the result of inaccurate appraisals--feeling acute fear at the sight of a mouse, for example, is evidence that the individual has an improper belief about mice and not evidence that emotions generally confound our judgments.

Having moral emotions is contingent upon having benevolent and just desires. Emotions, then, are also affected by attention, imagination, identification, and appraisals. Just as education of the imagination must avoid fantasy by avoiding self-indulgence, so too must education of the emotions. Human emotions do include, for example, jealously, rage, envy, and self-pity and, while it is important to recognize these emotions in oneself and others, indulging oneself in them is not part of moral education.

Although attention, imagination, and identification are necessary for the development of benevolent and just desires, they are not sufficient. One must also be able to 'see' situations as ones in which others' welfare or fair treatment is at stake. To appraise a situation according to a particular description implies, however, that one already is able to recognize situations according to this description. There is an apparent conundrum here. Does one acquire benevolent and just desires by attending and if so what motivates the individual to attend? Once attending, must one already be able to subjectively imagine and identify with others in order to be able to see a situation as one in which either a benevolent or just desire is appropriate? I want to suggest that there is a sequence which occurs even though desire, attention, imagination, identification and appraisal all have an effect on each other once the sequence is started. It is likely that almost everyone has specific benevolent or just desires toward at least one other sentient being. If one has even a weak benevolent or just desire, the individual is able to subjectively imagine another and identify with the other to some extent. Having even a weak benevolent or just desire helps to make one aware of at least some moral situations. If there is one instance of this recognition there is the possibility of building upon it so that other situations are recognized as instances for which a moral response is appropriate. This may come about by regularly attending to these types of situations or exemplars of these situations; by 'looking' one 'sees' the situation in a certain way. These two conditions are

necessary if the individual is to expand and strengthen his or her benevolent and just desires, although they do not guarantee this. 'Looking at' does not guarantee 'seeing' ("You can lead a student to insight, but you can't make him see."[15]) Moreover, seeing does not guarantee just and benevolent desire. Both are necessary, however, if subjective imagination and identification with others is to occur.

I have been utilizing a vision metaphor which is tied to Murdoch's notion of attention and to the notion of appraisal as the ability to see a situation in a certain way. I want to extend the metaphor by suggesting that moral education consists of a process of having one's eyes opened so that one looks at moral situations, sees them in a certain way, and cares that the welfare or fair treatment of the sentient beings involved is affected.

> It is not that one has found a better way of getting what one wants. It is that one's eyes have been opened. And this has been through what has come to one, not in the form of either reward or of punishment, but from people and from culture and from teachers.[16]

One's eyes may be opened by having experiences of others or by having exemplary experiences of others, but often our eyes will remain closed unless someone opens them for us.[17]

> Experience itself is an extremely imperfect teacher. Experience does not tell us what it is we are experiencing. Things simply happen. And if we do not know what to look for in our experiences, they often have no significance to us whatsoever.[18]

Murdoch is not to be understood as advocating that we must accumulate experiences. Attending is not merely experiencing. Positive 'looking at' takes effort because of the always present inclination to turn one's attention towards the self.

The process of having one's eyes opened so that one 'looks at' and 'sees' may happen through one's own efforts; it is more likely to happen through the influence of others. The influence may be the example of an outstanding individual. "I learn from knowing a person of

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[15]Carter, Dimensions of Moral Education, p. 26.
[16]Rhees, p. 158.
[17]S. I.Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 306.
[18]Hayakawa, p. 305.

character, whereas I do not learn much of anything from knowing a commonplace person."[19] The example of a benevolent and just person can be the impetus for us to attempt to 'see'.

> But the effect of her being on those around her was incalclably diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts: and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs.[20]

Others can considerably change the significance of what might otherwise go unnoticed. Trying to see what someone who is admired sees about an enterprise is an important step in the process of 'looking at' and coming to see. 'Having one's eyes opened' is more likely to occur if the other individual is significant to one's life. Pahel claims, for example, that a favourable attitude toward a teacher is probably a stronger motivator than any argument the teacher has, however logically relevant[21] and Dunlop states that the influence of a charismatic teacher or public figure "who becomes 'real' to the child will be powerful enough to work a moral 'conversion'".[22] There are, of course, dangers involved with relying on charismatic leaders. The charismatic leader may, for example, promote hatred toward a group of people. Moreover, even benevolent and just leaders may encourage others to merely copy their behavior without actually acquiring benevolent and just desires or understanding their importance. We must be wary of the influence of a charismatic person unless the individual has a benevolent and just character and inspires the other to want to see the point of morality.

This 'teacher' must have the ability to direct others to certain objects and experiences which, if given regular attention, may result in the acquisition of benevolent and just desires. Studies show that females and males tend to respond differently to moral situations. I have speculated that females may 'see' or appraise moral situations as ones in which benevolence is appropriate and males may 'see' or appraise moral situations as ones in which either justice or duty is appropriate. Those who assume responsibility for moral education need to be

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[19]Rhees, Without Answers, p. 15.
[20]Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 795.
[21]Kenneth Pahel, "Moral Motivation," in The Domain of Moral Education, p. 137.
[22]Francis Dunlop, "Moral Procedure and Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, p. 176.

particularly aware that females may require assistance to see the features of situations with conflict and males may require assistance to see the features of situations without conflict.

Significant others are important if people are to be motivated to understand enterprises such as mathematics, science and art as well. With these enterprises, however, the individual must eventually come to pursue the enterprise for the value he or she finds in the activity and not out of admiration for someone else. Morality, on the other hand, cannot be pursued if we dismiss the influence of those who have served as examples; the interconnection of people's lives is vital to morality.

Attention must be directed toward exemplary experiences and not toward experiences which glorify one's own or others' self-centered fantasies. The caring mentor will direct attention away from the self but also away from gratuitous violence, vulgar risk, sensational exploits, demeaning competition, conspicuous consumption, vicarious living, and so on. One can be aware of self-centered fantasy without succumbing to it.

In addition to the examples of moral situations which good art provides, it is also important that people are directed to enterprises in which actual moral situations arise. Though contrived, games of sport, for example, have certain features which provide opportunties for individuals to exercise both benevolence and justice. Because of their rule-governed nature, games of sport provide a number of occasions in which it is possible for an individual to maximize his or her own outcome by breaking a game rule. Conflicts of this type provide important opportunities for individuals to make decisions about fairness. There are also opportunities for participants to provide assistance to others during competition because of the physical nature of sport. Unfortunately, however, because competitive sport does not function for the purpose of developing individuals' moral responses (although ironically it is often claimed that character development occurs almost by virtue of being in the sporting environment), highly competitive sport often involves a number of self-indulgences. Moral educators, who might wish to utilize games of sport to provide opportunities for others to attend to moral situations, will have to decide whether it might be better to expend energy

elsewhere than attempt to change these contingent but pervasive features of games of sport. There are other enterprises which allow people to experience moral situations. These include community service organizations, national lobbying groups, international amnesty associations, and world hunger organizations.

In summary, education of character traits, which are the crucial components of moral care, consists of a lifelong process of attending to moral situations. This process is facilitated by the direction of someone who is benevolent and just and who is able to open the eyes of others through example, by helping direct attention, and by pointing out the significant features of the moral situation.

Conclusion

The analysis of moral care in this study was undertaken in order to show that moral care is essential to the understanding of morality and in order to suggest ways in which moral education can include moral care. In order to include moral care, moral education must be understood as a lifelong process because the acquisition of moral care is a lifelong process. Schools provide many objects for attention which, if of the appropriate kind, can contribute to the acquisition of moral character traits. However, the school alone cannot possibly fully develop an individual's character, because the school does not include all of our attentional experiences. Nor is schooling lifelong. Schools do, however, provide access to art, and the opportunity to develop imagination and recognize emotions. Because of the social nature of schools, there are opportunites for individuals to engage in situations with and without conflict. Schools are also a place where young people may see the example of significant others.

I conclude with a final note about analysis. The analysis of moral care is valuable because morality is valuable. Clarity about the nature of morality and moral education prevents the reduction of morality to one or a combination of its components. Analysis is essential to the understanding of the dimensions of the moral domain and the enterprise of moral education but, once these dimensions are marked out, analysis is not to be confused with

living a moral life. One need not be able to analyze care in order to learn to care.

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